Showing archive for: “Banking & Insurance”
Fin Reg and Too Big to Fail: A New Kind of Antitrust?
Simon Johnson argues that the conventional antitrust tools of Sherman Act are outdated and ill-equipped to deal with the power of big banks: Why are these antitrust tools not used against today’s megabanks, which have become so powerful that they can sway legislation and regulation massively in their favor, while also receiving generous taxpayer-financed bailouts ... Fin Reg and Too Big to Fail: A New Kind of Antitrust?
A Defense of the Insurance Industry Antitrust Exemption?
The subject of antitrust exemptions has been an oft-discussed topic here at TOTM (see, e.g. here and here). In the latter of those two links I was somewhat critical of the DOJ for taking a neutral stance on the insurance industry exemption, which has now become rather wrapped up in the health care reform debate. ... A Defense of the Insurance Industry Antitrust Exemption?
Note to Simon Johnson: I do not think antitrust means what you think it means
Simon Johnson is at it again, advocating the use of antitrust to break up the banks because they are, you know, big, and antitrust is about busting up big companies, right? As Josh suggested back in July, the idea is gaining momentum, it seems. The Financial Times is also pushing the idea. What’s remarkable about ... Note to Simon Johnson: I do not think antitrust means what you think it means
The Myth of Consumer Protection Through Disclosure
I will focus my blog post on one of the proposals for reducing interchange fees: the requirement that the fees be disclosed to consumers. I am not sure how seriously this option is taken by the GAO report. Indeed, the report concedes that mandated disclosures in this context are not very likely to be effective, ... The Myth of Consumer Protection Through Disclosure
The optimal level of risk is not zero
I have said it before and I’ll say it again: All of this hand wringing over executive compensation seems to exist in a parallel world where corporate executives have no risk aversion, where there is no real competition for managerial talent, and where firms can only take on too much–never too little–risk. And this in ... The optimal level of risk is not zero
Section 2 Symposium: Howard Marvel–An Economist’s View
In the wake of Bork and Posner, and Baxter and the Reagan Revolution, a consensus emerged that big could be bad, but the harm that dominant firms could do needed to be demonstrated, not simply assumed in consequence of their sheer size. Moreover, the demonstration required harm to competition. The consensus held through the Clinton ... Section 2 Symposium: Howard Marvel–An Economist’s View
Fannie and Freddie as "Greater Fools"
Today’s New York Times features an op-ed by Michigan Law Professor Michael Barr and former Clinton advisor Gene Sperling that (somewhat predictably) blames our current financial mess on a lack of “common sense regulation” and exonerates the Community Reinvestment Act, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. I propose a counter-narrative. It begins with a nutshell version ... Fannie and Freddie as "Greater Fools"
Tabarrok on the Credit Snobs
Marginal Revolution’s Alex Tabarrok has a good post responding to recent attacks on the extension of credit to poor borrowers (and in particular, this rant from Nouriel Roubini). Here is a taste: Roubini and others generating hysteria about defaults in the mortgage market are credit snobs – they think credit is something that only the ... Tabarrok on the Credit Snobs
