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David Haddock is Professor of Law and Professor of Economics at Northwestern University and a Senior Fellow Emeritus at PERC.

The day Fred McChesney departed this life, the world lost an intelligent, enthusiastic, and intellectually rigorous scholar of law & economics. A great many of us also lost one of our most trusted and generous friends.

I first met Fred when Emory University, hoping to recruit the then young scholar to the law school faculty, brought him to Atlanta to deliver a research paper. The effort was successful, and Fred joined as an assistant professor in the fall of 1983. Jon Macey joined the law school, also as an entry-level assistant professor, at about the same time. A couple of years earlier Professor Bill Carney and law school Dean Tom Morgan had enticed Henry Manne to Emory to establish a new Law & Economics Center. Although Henry did not know me, upon Armen Alchian’s recommendation he persuaded me to leave Ohio State to join the LEC soon after it commenced operation.

I was only a bit older than Fred and Jon. Each of us had training in economics in addition to our interest in law. We shared a respect for markets. We had noticed how often special interests deflected government interventions away from the public interest that was the ostensible motivation. One might say we three had large Venn diagram intersections of background, interest, and outlook. Fred, Jon and I quickly became friends both at work and – along with our respective girlfriends and eventual wives – at leisure. We began to coauthor journal articles and book chapters, sometimes in pairs and sometimes as a trio.

Alas, though Chris Curran and Matt Lindsay from the economics department shared the law school’s enthusiasm for the LEC, the university administration proved decidedly lukewarm toward Manne’s ambitious blueprint. After flashing onto the national, or rather international, stage for a few bright years, the LEC began to atrophy in the face of limitations issuing from above.

Fred, Henry, Jon and I each spent time at the International Center for Economic Research in Torino, Italy, becoming friends with ICER’s director Enrico Colombatto. Macey moved to Cornell. I spent a year at Yale before returning to join Emory’s economics department. Manne left to become dean of a humble law school in the DC suburbs that had been devoted almost exclusively to teaching. Henry quickly transformed that school into a nationally recognized research and innovative teaching institution now known as the Antonin Scalia Law School of George Mason University, but his departure effectively ended the brief if illustrious history of the Emory LEC.

Fred and I visited the University of Chicago in 1987, and though I then moved directly to Northwestern where I finished my career, Fred returned to Emory for another ten years. The two of us continued to coauthor, sometimes with a third such as Bill Shughart, Terry Anderson, or Menahem Spiegel. I worked diligently to get Fred to Northwestern but Cornell succeeded first, though by then Macey had moved on to Yale. Two years later, Fred finally joined me at Northwestern where both he and Elaine held faculty positions until Elaine’s untimely death.

I have mentioned a number of people. Nearly all of those people have changed location, sometimes repeatedly. Through it all and across the deaths of Elaine, then Henry, and now Fred, we have all remained friends and often continued to work together, though usually at a distance.

Everyone who knew him remembers how easily Fred made friends upon meeting new people. Due to his extensive knowledge of rock music, Fred even became a telephone buddy of the late Casey Kasem, longtime host of the nationally syndicated America’s Top 40. Fred’s cordiality was not only social but extended into the work environment. He was no pushover, demanding careful thought in classroom and seminar, but he made his points calmly without endeavoring to cow or humiliate those with whom he disagreed, a trait that unfortunately is far from universal in the academic world.

Considering Fred’s passion for rock music, perhaps it is appropriate to end this remembrance with a few lightly edited lines from James Taylor’s Fire and Rain:

Just yesterday morning, they let me know you were gone.
The path laid down has put an end to you.
I walked out this morning and I wrote down this song,
I just can’t remember who to send it to.

Won’t you look down upon us, Jesus,
You’ve got to help us make a stand.
You’ve just got to see us through another day.
My body’s aching and my time is at hand and I won’t make it any other way.

Oh, I’ve seen fire and I’ve seen rain.
I’ve seen sunny days that I thought would never end.
I’ve seen lonely times when I could not find a friend,
but I always thought that I’d see you again.

Rest in peace, pal.

Louis De Alessi is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Miami.

Fred and I met when he enrolled in my graduate course in Microeconomic Theory at George Washington University. The class was small, I used a Socratic approach, and Fred — as you would expect – was an active participant, asking good questions and making insightful comments. We began to get to know each other, and toward the end of the course he came to see me. He said that he had been intrigued by the range of interesting problems that economic theory could be used to explore, and was thinking of studying for the Ph.D. We discussed his interests and constraints, and it seemed to me that the Department of Economics at the University of Virginia would be a very good fit. I encouraged him to look into it, he did, and decided to go there. I was delighted. He was an outstanding student of great academic promise, and UVA was an excellent springboard.

In 1975 Henry Manne, a good friend, approached me about joining the Law & Economics Center at the University of Miami as co-director of the John M. Olin Fellowship Program. One of his inducements was that Fred was going to be one of the Fellows in the first class, and that helped me decide to accept the offer. When the LEC moved into its own building, Fred had the office directly across the hallway from mine, and we saw a lot of each other. Fred did extremely well in the LEC courses and seminars as well as in the UM School of Law, where he made law review and graduated at the top of his class.

Fred and I became good friends. He inevitably had a good story to tell – usually the long version – and time spent with him was always entertaining and informative. We had other interests in common besides economics, including history and — during his stint at LEC — sailing. He and three colleagues owned an O’Day Daysailer that they docked at our house and used to explore Biscayne Bay and its keys, and occasionally our boats crossed paths.

Fred was thoughtful and kind. He and Tim Muris used to spend an occasional Spring weekend making a tour of baseball Spring training camps in Florida. One weekend they took along my son Michael, a 9-year old baseball fan. Michael had a marvelous time, and my wife Helen and I were deeply appreciative.

After Fred graduated from law school, I followed his career with great interest and I was delighted that he fulfilled his promise. We corresponded, and we met at conferences, meetings, and similar events. We were members of many of the same professional organizations and we had a lot of friends in common, so it was easy and rewarding to keep in touch.  We exchanged reprints and I contributed a chapter to the book on antitrust that he co-edited with William Shughart. For a time I taught a few days a year in a master’s program in Napoli, Italy, and in 1992 I asked Fred to teach a segment on law. We overlapped, and Fred – with his usual flair – opened his first lecture in Italian. The next day he joined my wife and me in Roma, and we spent a day or two wending our way to Torino, where he stayed with us for a couple of days. He was bright, cheerful, witty, and a great companion.

When Fred returned to the University of Miami School of Law, first on a visiting basis and then as a chair professor, I was utterly pleased. We began to meet periodically for mid-morning coffee (Fred always had a banana as well) at a Starbucks with an outdoor patio and spend an hour or two chatting. As usual, he was bubbling with research and writing ideas and travel plans. Life here was good to him for a while. Then a close friend died suddenly of cancer and not too long afterwards his own health began to deteriorate.

The last time we met he did not look well and was quite subdued. I thought it was just a temporary setback, and he certainly seemed to think so. Even after his family moved him to the Washington, DC  area for better care, I expected him to recover, as he had before. His demise was a shock.

Fred had a long and brilliant career. It spanned legal practice with a major law firm, an influential position at the Federal Trade Commission, and a series of distinguished academic appointments. Those in the profession will remember him for his many research contributions as a leading scholar in law and economics. His friends will also remember him for his good humor, warmth, and erudition.  We had been friends for some forty-five years, and I will miss him.

He loved his family, and it is comforting that he was with them at the end.

William C. MacLeod is a partner at Kelley, Drye & Warren LLP, where he chairs the firm’s Antitrust and Competition practice group. He is a former director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the FTC.

It is only with hindsight that we can appreciate the naïveté of conventional wisdom. In 1970, when Fred McChesney left Holy Cross College, serious economists were advocating the dismantling of large American companies, supposedly because they had grown too large to compete effectively.  Regulations were multiplying, as were the bureaucracies Congress created to impose them. OSHA, EPA, CPSC, to name a few, were reordering behavior from the factory floor to the family room. A Republican president outdid them all with an executive order freezing wages and prices across the economy, divorcing the dollar from the gold standard, and taxing imports to protect US producers. These measures met the acclaim of the intelligentsia and the media by and large. The learned classes were already concerned that communist economies were performing better than the capitalism in the US.

The legal profession offered a coveted career in those days of expanding government. A regulatory state needs tens of thousands lawyers to promulgate, enforce, observe and resist the rules that direct economic activity and restrict property rights. Fresh out of college, Fred wanted to be a lawyer. He left for the Ivy League and entertained visions of practice in elite institutions of law. The visions evaporated in the drudgery of cases. Fortunately for us, Fred found that preparing for a traditional practice neither challenged his intellect nor inspired his passion.

For those who knew Fred, whose passion for good people and great ideas was unmatched, it is no surprise that the encounter that changed his life came in an economics class. Nor is it a surprise, for those who have heard Louis DeAlessi, that the class was his course in price theory. There Fred started to explore the myriad ways in which people enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness (or maximize utility within budget constraints, as the economists eloquently put it). Many of those pursuits, this young Washingtonian saw, found riches and faced ruin on Capitol Hill.

Louis told Fred of a place not far away where a future Nobel laureate, James Buchanan, had broken ground in the largely uncharted territory of public choice. Fred packed his bags for Charlottesville and the University of Virginia. By that time, Buchanan had decamped, but UVA remained a hub of the discipline that explored the economic implications of public and private ownership of property, and the costs of collective control of the means of production. Among their many accomplishments, the economists in Rouss Hall examined the Soviet economy through the lens of their new learning, and they were among the first to predict the economic decline of that supposed juggernaut. Rumor has it that they were working for the CIA, economic spies at your service. If you wanted to learn the economic consequences of government activity, UVA was a great place to go.

That is why I went, that is where I met Fred, and that is when he became my friend for life. Together we studied, wrote, worked, and spun rock and roll records, sometimes all at once, as we tried to absorb the wisdom of Bill Breit, Ken Elzinga, Roland McKean, John Moore, Warren Nutter, Roger Sherman and Leland Yeager. We treated the radio station like a lending library for oldies unattainable anywhere else. We took our final exam in public finance the gray day after Bobby Darren died. And we learned to appreciate the magic of markets. Perhaps most gratifying, we saw weary refuges return from Washington’s war on free markets, every one sadder, wiser, and ready to teach a new generation that Hayek and Friedman were right. Not even brilliant believers in the market can run it better than free customers and competitors can.

Charlottesville was paradise, but it couldn’t hold Fred. That great academic entrepreneur and talent scout, Henry Manne, looked to UVA for the core of his team at the Law and Economics Center in the University of Miami. Fred was one of Henry’s first recruits. A year later, I was one of Fred’s. He returned to Charlottesville, helped me pack my old Ford, and joined me for a twenty-four-hour rolling concert with Dion, Chubby, Fats, the Marvelettes, Ronettes and Searchers serenading the countryside all the way.

We enjoyed every minute of L&EC. When judges and professors came to Miami to teach and learn economics at Henry’s Institutes, we welcomed them, and Fred made more friends for life. He wrote his dissertation and published a pathbreaking study with Tim Muris on the economic effects of legal restrictions in the legal profession. Fred joined the law review, played with the champions of UM Intramural Softball, acquired academic honors, and landed a clerkship in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Then the elite law firms came calling, but a life of law practice had gained no power over Fred after he’d seen economics. Tim Muris lured him to the FTC, where Fred evaluated enforcement proposals with the eye of an economics professor and supervised the Commission’s advocacy of competition where public and private barriers had kept it at bay. A career capstone for many a student of law and economics, wielding the power of the government was not what Fred wanted to do. He wanted to explain it. He left the FTC and embarked on the career that would make his own name in public choice economics.

I cannot do justice to the body of Fred’s prodigious scholarly contributions in this note. Instead, I will describe just one and invite you to sample another.

To frame the first, remember (as Ken Elzinga’s students all do) Alfred Marshall’s famous illustration of supply and demand: the two forces are like blades of a scissors, neither of which can serve without the other. Public choice for years had recognized how the economic incentives of individuals in the private and public sectors could create thriving throngs of rent seekers, bent on shaping rules to their benefit. One would have thought that the counterpart would have been equally obvious to political economists, but it wasn’t. The literature had largely neglected the other blade of the scissors, until Fred described it in Money for Nothing, Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion, which explained that rent seekers need scarce resources. Of course, no entity can create scarcity better than government can. Its ability to do so, Fred observed, spawned eager rent extractors, as well as rent seekers. People with the power to take property or impair its full enjoyment could exact payments simply by threatening to do it. They could even forbear – do nothing – and still reap rewards of extraction, just by posing the threat. If scarcity can be made, and government has been doing it for centuries, markets will form on both sides of it. A young Fred McChesney had lived through a painful episode of socially engineered scarcity in the 1970s. He wrote the book on it twenty years later.

Finally, for an invitation to the economics of property rights, here is a link to a lecture Fred gave thirty years ago in the heart of a country he loved but could not explain. The setting was France, and at the time a socialist government was taking property rights from the private sector and appropriating them for a public purpose. You can see in the lecture that Fred was pondering the mystery he later solved in Money for Nothing. French rent creators were keeping seekers and extractors fully occupied. Consumers and sellers of goods and services suffered the consequences.

A new administration in France is still struggling to repair the damage of the rent creation in the 1980s. Meanwhile, back in the USA, as a new tax code makes its way through the halls of Congress, we all would do well to watch out for politicians, extortion, and rent extraction. They could be coming to a wallet near you.

Thanks, Fred.  We owe you a lot of rent.

Yours always,

Bill MacLeod

As many Truth on the Market readers likely know, law and economics scholar, Fred McChesney, passed away last month. As we prepare to lay Fred to rest later this week, I have asked some of Fred’s friends and colleagues to contribute their thoughts about Fred’s life, and his influence as a scholar and as a friend. Over the next few days we will post those remembrances on the main page (and they will be collected here).

Fred was a lifelong friend, mentor, and intellectual influence — to me, as to so many others. I first met Fred when I was something like four years old, and he has been a significant influence in my life ever since. Like many others, I came to know Fred through my father, Henry Manne, who invited Fred to become one of the first Olin Fellows at the nascent Law and Economics Center at the University of Miami. Whatever his professional success in that role, in those early years he was to me a source of education about good music and a respite from the boredom of the interminable professional gatherings of various LEC events.

Later, as my interests and my career brought me further within Fred’s orbit, he graciously advised me on my studies and my career, and provided his insightful thoughts on my scholarship. Still later, he unhesitatingly agreed to serve as one of the initial members of the board of directors of the International Center for Law & Economics, and, unlike some other members of the board who thoughtlessly saw fit to take government jobs (you know who you are…), served on the board without interruption until his death.  

As others will recount, his scholarship was incredibly influential. It was Fred who explained that rent seeking is a two-way street, and that the price and quantity of political influence is not just some abstract function of what would-be influencers want from the government, but of what politicians and regulators provide — or threaten to impose. Many a critic of crony capitalism will unflinchingly lay blame at the capitalists’ feet, without understanding that there would be little worth influencing if politicians didn’t strategically manipulate the supply of regulation, extracting “money for nothing” simply to forbear from cynically exercising their power to impose regulatory costs. Yet, ignorant of this dynamic — even, remarkably, in the Age of Trump — self-appointed protectors of the public interest go on advocating that the government have more and more authority in order, ostensibly, to combat the unseemly power of private enterprise — without ever seeing that the cure can actually cause the disease. If only they read — and understood — Fred McChesney….    

And Fred was a titan of antitrust and consumer protection law and economics. His contributions to these areas are legion, and they have influenced all of us in the fields — whether we know it or not. Among many others are his articles bringing key economic insights to bear on issues like the faulty (or absent) assessment of materiality in the FTC’s deception actions, the faulty assumption of consumer benefit from the FTC’s Funeral Rule (and other disclosure-based regulations), and the influence of special interests on FTC merger enforcement decisions. His edited volume with Bill Shughart, The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective, and his antitrust casebook with Charlie Goetz (and later TOTM’s own Thom Lambert) are among the standards in the field.

And maybe most important of all, Fred edited the Liberty Fund’s three-volume collection of Henry Manne’s papers and conducted its excellent “Intellectual Portraits” series interview with my dad, as well.

The worlds of public choice, antitrust, consumer protection, and much else have lost a great scholar. And many of us have lost a great friend.

In addition to the encomiums that will appear here, readers should read the wonderful remembrance of Fred by his friend and co-author, Bill Shughart. Also worthwhile are the obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Post, and the University of Miami’s tribute to Fred. A remembrance by David Henderson also highlights some of Fred’s best insights.

Today the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) submitted an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to review the DC Circuit’s 2016 decision upholding the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order. The brief was authored by Geoffrey A. Manne, Executive Director of ICLE, and Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law and ICLE affiliate, with able assistance from Kristian Stout and Allen Gibby of ICLE. Jeffrey A. Mandell of the Wisconsin law firm of Stafford Rosenbaum collaborated in drafting the brief and provided invaluable pro bono legal assistance, for which we are enormously grateful. Laura Lamansky of Stafford Rosenbaum also assisted. 

The following post discussing the brief was written by Jeff Mandell (originally posted here).

Courts generally defer to agency expertise when reviewing administrative rules that regulate conduct in areas where Congress has delegated authority to specialized executive-branch actors. An entire body of law—administrative law—governs agency actions and judicial review of those actions. And at the federal level, courts grant agencies varying degrees of deference, depending on what kind of function the agency is performing, how much authority Congress delegated, and the process by which the agency adopts or enforces policies.

Should courts be more skeptical when an agency changes a policy position, especially if the agency is reversing prior policy without a corresponding change to the governing statute? Daniel Berninger v. Federal Communications Commission, No. 17-498 (U.S.), raises these questions. And this week Stafford Rosenbaum was honored to serve as counsel of record for the International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”) in filing an amicus curiae brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case and to answer these questions.

ICLE’s amicus brief highlights new academic research suggesting that systematic problems undermine judicial review of agency changes in policy. The brief also points out that judicial review is complicated by conflicting signals from the Supreme Court about the degree of deference that courts should accord agencies in reviewing reversals of prior policy. And the brief argues that the specific policy change at issue in this case lacks a sufficient basis but was affirmed by the court below as the result of a review that was, but should not have been, “particularly deferential.”

In 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) issued the Open Internet Order (“OIO”), which required Internet Service Providers to abide by a series of regulations popularly referred to as net neutrality. To support these regulations, the FCC interpreted the Communications Act of 1934 to grant it authority to heavily regulate broadband internet service. This interpretation reversed a long-standing agency understanding of the statute as permitting only limited regulation of broadband service.

The FCC ostensibly based the OIO on factual and legal analysis. However, ICLE argues, the OIO is actually based on questionable factual reinterpretations and misunderstanding of statutory interpretation adopted more in order to support radical changes in FCC policy than for their descriptive accuracy. When a variety of interested parties challenged the OIO, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the regulations. In doing so, the court afforded substantial deference to the FCC—so much that the D.C. Circuit never addressed the reasonableness of the FCC’s decisionmaking process in reversing prior policy.

ICLE’s amicus brief argues that the D.C. Circuit’s decision “is both in tension with [the Supreme] Court’s precedents and, more, raises exceptionally important and previously unaddressed questions about th[e] Court’s precedents on judicial review of agency changes of policy.” Without further guidance from the Supreme Court, the brief argues, “there is every reason to believe” the FCC will again reverse its position on broadband regulation, such that “the process will become an endless feedback loop—in the case of this regulation and others—at great cost not only to regulated entities and their consumers, but also to the integrity of the regulatory process.”

The ramifications of the Supreme Court accepting this case would be twofold. First, administrative agencies would gain guidance for their decisionmaking processes in considering changes to existing policies. Second, lower courts would gain clarity on agency deference issues, making judicial review more uniform and appropriate where agencies reverse prior policy positions.

Read the full brief here.

In a recent post at the (appallingly misnamed) ProMarket blog (the blog of the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business — George Stigler is rolling in his grave…), Marshall Steinbaum keeps alive the hipster-antitrust assertion that lax antitrust enforcement — this time in the labor market — is to blame for… well, most? all? of what’s wrong with “the labor market and the broader macroeconomic conditions” in the country.

In this entry, Steinbaum takes particular aim at the US enforcement agencies, which he claims do not consider monopsony power in merger review (and other antitrust enforcement actions) because their current consumer welfare framework somehow doesn’t recognize monopsony as a possible harm.

This will probably come as news to the agencies themselves, whose Horizontal Merger Guidelines devote an entire (albeit brief) section (section 12) to monopsony, noting that:

Mergers of competing buyers can enhance market power on the buying side of the market, just as mergers of competing sellers can enhance market power on the selling side of the market. Buyer market power is sometimes called “monopsony power.”

* * *

Market power on the buying side of the market is not a significant concern if suppliers have numerous attractive outlets for their goods or services. However, when that is not the case, the Agencies may conclude that the merger of competing buyers is likely to lessen competition in a manner harmful to sellers.

Steinbaum fails to mention the HMGs, but he does point to a US submission to the OECD to make his point. In that document, the agencies state that

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) [] do not consider employment or other non-competition factors in their antitrust analysis. The antitrust agencies have learned that, while such considerations “may be appropriate policy objectives and worthy goals overall… integrating their consideration into a competition analysis… can lead to poor outcomes to the detriment of both businesses and consumers.” Instead, the antitrust agencies focus on ensuring robust competition that benefits consumers and leave other policies such as employment to other parts of government that may be specifically charged with or better placed to consider such objectives.

Steinbaum, of course, cites only the first sentence. And he uses it as a launching-off point to attack the notion that antitrust is an improper tool for labor market regulation. But if he had just read a little bit further in the (very short) document he cites, Steinbaum might have discovered that the US antitrust agencies have, in fact, challenged the exercise of collusive monopsony power in labor markets. As footnote 19 of the OECD submission notes:

Although employment is not a relevant policy goal in antitrust analysis, anticompetitive conduct affecting terms of employment can violate the Sherman Act. See, e.g., DOJ settlement with eBay Inc. that prevents the company from entering into or maintaining agreements with other companies that restrain employee recruiting or hiring; FTC settlement with ski equipment manufacturers settling charges that companies illegally agreed not to compete for one another’s ski endorsers or employees. (Emphasis added).

And, ironically, while asserting that labor market collusion doesn’t matter to the agencies, Steinbaum himself points to “the Justice Department’s 2010 lawsuit against Silicon Valley employers for colluding not to hire one another’s programmers.”

Steinbaum instead opts for a willful misreading of the first sentence of the OECD submission. But what the OECD document refers to, of course, are situations where two firms merge, no market power is created (either in input or output markets), but people are laid off because the merged firm does not need all of, say, the IT and human resources employees previously employed in the pre-merger world.

Does Steinbaum really think this is grounds for challenging the merger on antitrust grounds?

Actually, his post suggests that he does indeed think so, although he doesn’t come right out and say it. What he does say — as he must in order to bring antitrust enforcement to bear on the low- and unskilled labor markets (e.g., burger flippers; retail cashiers; Uber drivers) he purports to care most about — is that:

Employers can have that control [over employees, as opposed to independent contractors] without first establishing themselves as a monopoly—in fact, reclassification [of workers as independent contractors] is increasingly standard operating procedure in many industries, which means that treating it as a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act should not require that outright monopolization must first be shown. (Emphasis added).

Honestly, I don’t have any idea what he means. Somehow, because firms hire independent contractors where at one time long ago they might have hired employees… they engage in Sherman Act violations, even if they don’t have market power? Huh?

I get why he needs to try to make this move: As I intimated above, there is probably not a single firm in the world that hires low- or unskilled workers that has anything approaching monopsony power in those labor markets. Even Uber, the example he uses, has nothing like monopsony power, unless perhaps you define the market (completely improperly) as “drivers already working for Uber.” Even then Uber doesn’t have monopsony power: There can be no (or, at best, virtually no) markets in the world where an Uber driver has no other potential employment opportunities but working for Uber.

Moreover, how on earth is hiring independent contractors evidence of anticompetitive behavior? ”Reclassification” is not, in fact, “standard operating procedure.” It is the case that in many industries firms (unilaterally) often decide to contract out the hiring of low- and unskilled workers over whom they do not need to exercise direct oversight to specialized firms, thus not employing those workers directly. That isn’t “reclassification” of existing workers who have no choice but to accept their employer’s terms; it’s a long-term evolution of the economy toward specialization, enabled in part by technology.

And if we’re really concerned about what “employee” and “independent contractor” mean for workers and employment regulation, we should reconsider those outdated categories. Firms are faced with a binary choice: hire workers or independent contractors. Neither really fits many of today’s employment arrangements very well, but that’s the choice firms are given. That they sometimes choose “independent worker” over “employee” is hardly evidence of anticompetitive conduct meriting antitrust enforcement.

The point is: The notion that any of this is evidence of monopsony power, or that the antitrust enforcement agencies don’t care about monopsony power — because, Bork! — is absurd.

Even more absurd is the notion that the antitrust laws should be used to effect Steinbaum’s preferred market regulations — independent of proof of actual anticompetitive effect. I get that it’s hard to convince Congress to pass the precise laws you want all the time. But simply routing around Congress and using the antitrust statutes as a sort of meta-legislation to enact whatever happens to be Marshall Steinbaum’s preferred regulation du jour is ridiculous.

Which is a point the OECD submission made (again, if only Steinbaum had read beyond the first sentence…):

[T]wo difficulties with expanding the scope of antitrust analysis to include employment concerns warrant discussion. First, a full accounting of employment effects would require consideration of short-term effects, such as likely layoffs by the merged firm, but also long-term effects, which could include employment gains elsewhere in the industry or in the economy arising from efficiencies generated by the merger. Measuring these effects would [be extremely difficult.]. Second, unless a clear policy spelling out how the antitrust agency would assess the appropriate weight to give employment effects in relation to the proposed conduct or transaction’s procompetitive and anticompetitive effects could be developed, [such enforcement would be deeply problematic, and essentially arbitrary].

To be sure, the agencies don’t recognize enough that they already face the problem of reconciling multidimensional effects — e.g., short-, medium-, and long-term price effects, innovation effects, product quality effects, etc. But there is no reason to exacerbate the problem by asking them to also consider employment effects. Especially not in Steinbaum’s world in which certain employment effects are problematic even without evidence of market power or even actual anticompetitive harm, just because he says so.

Consider how this might play out:

Suppose that Pepsi, Coca-Cola, Dr. Pepper… and every other soft drink company in the world attempted to merge, creating a monopoly soft drink manufacturer. In what possible employment market would even this merger create a monopsony in which anticompetitive harm could be tied to the merger? In the market for “people who know soft drink secret formulas?” Yet Steinbaum would have the Sherman Act enforced against such a merger not because it might create a product market monopoly, but because the existence of a product market monopoly means the firm must be able to bad things in other markets, as well. For Steinbaum and all the other scolds who see concentration as the source of all evil, the dearth of evidence to support such a claim is no barrier (on which, see, e.g., this recent, content-less NYT article (that, naturally, quotes Steinbaum) on how “big business may be to blame” for the slowing rate of startups).

The point is, monopoly power in a product market does not necessarily have any relationship to monopsony power in the labor market. Simply asserting that it does — and lambasting the enforcement agencies for not just accepting that assertion — is farcical.

The real question, however, is what has happened to the University of Chicago that it continues to provide a platform for such nonsense?

Last week the editorial board of the Washington Post penned an excellent editorial responding to the European Commission’s announcement of its decision in its Google Shopping investigation. Here’s the key language from the editorial:

Whether the demise of any of [the complaining comparison shopping sites] is specifically traceable to Google, however, is not so clear. Also unclear is the aggregate harm from Google’s practices to consumers, as opposed to the unlucky companies. Birkenstock-seekers may well prefer to see a Google-generated list of vendors first, instead of clicking around to other sites…. Those who aren’t happy anyway have other options. Indeed, the rise of comparison shopping on giants such as Amazon and eBay makes concerns that Google might exercise untrammeled power over e-commerce seem, well, a bit dated…. Who knows? In a few years we might be talking about how Facebook leveraged its 2 billion users to disrupt the whole space.

That’s actually a pretty thorough, if succinct, summary of the basic problems with the Commission’s case (based on its PR and Factsheet, at least; it hasn’t released the full decision yet).

I’ll have more to say on the decision in due course, but for now I want to elaborate on two of the points raised by the WaPo editorial board, both in service of its crucial rejoinder to the Commission that “Also unclear is the aggregate harm from Google’s practices to consumers, as opposed to the unlucky companies.”

First, the WaPo editorial board points out that:

Birkenstock-seekers may well prefer to see a Google-generated list of vendors first, instead of clicking around to other sites.

It is undoubtedly true that users “may well prefer to see a Google-generated list of vendors first.” It’s also crucial to understanding the changes in Google’s search results page that have given rise to the current raft of complaints.

As I noted in a Wall Street Journal op-ed two years ago:

It’s a mistake to consider “general search” and “comparison shopping” or “product search” to be distinct markets.

From the moment it was technologically feasible to do so, Google has been adapting its traditional search results—that familiar but long since vanished page of 10 blue links—to offer more specialized answers to users’ queries. Product search, which is what is at issue in the EU complaint, is the next iteration in this trend.

Internet users today seek information from myriad sources: Informational sites (Wikipedia and the Internet Movie Database); review sites (Yelp and TripAdvisor); retail sites (Amazon and eBay); and social-media sites (Facebook and Twitter). What do these sites have in common? They prioritize certain types of data over others to improve the relevance of the information they provide.

“Prioritization” of Google’s own shopping results, however, is the core problem for the Commission:

Google has systematically given prominent placement to its own comparison shopping service: when a consumer enters a query into the Google search engine in relation to which Google’s comparison shopping service wants to show results, these are displayed at or near the top of the search results. (Emphasis in original).

But this sort of prioritization is the norm for all search, social media, e-commerce and similar platforms. And this shouldn’t be a surprise: The value of these platforms to the user is dependent upon their ability to sort the wheat from the chaff of the now immense amount of information coursing about the Web.

As my colleagues and I noted in a paper responding to a methodologically questionable report by Tim Wu and Yelp leveling analogous “search bias” charges in the context of local search results:

Google is a vertically integrated company that offers general search, but also a host of other products…. With its well-developed algorithm and wide range of products, it is hardly surprising that Google can provide not only direct answers to factual questions, but also a wide range of its own products and services that meet users’ needs. If consumers choose Google not randomly, but precisely because they seek to take advantage of the direct answers and other options that Google can provide, then removing the sort of “bias” alleged by [complainants] would affirmatively hurt, not help, these users. (Emphasis added).

And as Josh Wright noted in an earlier paper responding to yet another set of such “search bias” charges (in that case leveled in a similarly methodologically questionable report by Benjamin Edelman and Benjamin Lockwood):

[I]t is critical to recognize that bias alone is not evidence of competitive harm and it must be evaluated in the appropriate antitrust economic context of competition and consumers, rather individual competitors and websites. Edelman & Lockwood´s analysis provides a useful starting point for describing how search engines differ in their referrals to their own content. However, it is not useful from an antitrust policy perspective because it erroneously—and contrary to economic theory and evidence—presumes natural and procompetitive product differentiation in search rankings to be inherently harmful. (Emphasis added).

We’ll have to see what kind of analysis the Commission relies upon in its decision to reach its conclusion that prioritization is an antitrust problem, but there is reason to be skeptical that it will turn out to be compelling. The Commission states in its PR that:

The evidence shows that consumers click far more often on results that are more visible, i.e. the results appearing higher up in Google’s search results. Even on a desktop, the ten highest-ranking generic search results on page 1 together generally receive approximately 95% of all clicks on generic search results (with the top result receiving about 35% of all the clicks). The first result on page 2 of Google’s generic search results receives only about 1% of all clicks. This cannot just be explained by the fact that the first result is more relevant, because evidence also shows that moving the first result to the third rank leads to a reduction in the number of clicks by about 50%. The effects on mobile devices are even more pronounced given the much smaller screen size.

This means that by giving prominent placement only to its own comparison shopping service and by demoting competitors, Google has given its own comparison shopping service a significant advantage compared to rivals. (Emphasis added).

Whatever truth there is in the characterization that placement is more important than relevance in influencing user behavior, the evidence cited by the Commission to demonstrate that doesn’t seem applicable to what’s happening on Google’s search results page now.

Most crucially, the evidence offered by the Commission refers only to how placement affects clicks on “generic search results” and glosses over the fact that the “prominent placement” of Google’s “results” is not only a difference in position but also in the type of result offered.

Google Shopping results (like many of its other “vertical results” and direct answers) are very different than the 10 blue links of old. These “universal search” results are, for one thing, actual answers rather than merely links to other sites. They are also more visually rich and attractively and clearly displayed.

Ironically, Tim Wu and Yelp use the claim that users click less often on Google’s universal search results to support their contention that increased relevance doesn’t explain Google’s prioritization of its own content. Yet, as we note in our response to their study:

[I]f a consumer is using a search engine in order to find a direct answer to a query rather than a link to another site to answer it, click-through would actually represent a decrease in consumer welfare, not an increase.

In fact, the study fails to incorporate this dynamic even though it is precisely what the authors claim the study is measuring.

Further, as the WaPo editorial intimates, these universal search results (including Google Shopping results) are quite plausibly more valuable to users. As even Tim Wu and Yelp note:

No one truly disagrees that universal search, in concept, can be an important innovation that can serve consumers.

Google sees it exactly this way, of course. Here’s Tim Wu and Yelp again:

According to Google, a principal difference between the earlier cases and its current conduct is that universal search represents a pro-competitive, user-serving innovation. By deploying universal search, Google argues, it has made search better. As Eric Schmidt argues, “if we know the answer it is better for us to answer that question so [the user] doesn’t have to click anywhere, and in that sense we… use data sources that are our own because we can’t engineer it any other way.”

Of course, in this case, one would expect fewer clicks to correlate with higher value to users — precisely the opposite of the claim made by Tim Wu and Yelp, which is the surest sign that their study is faulty.

But the Commission, at least according to the evidence cited in its PR, doesn’t even seem to measure the relative value of the very different presentations of information at all, instead resting on assertions rooted in the irrelevant difference in user propensity to click on generic (10 blue links) search results depending on placement.

Add to this Pinar Akman’s important point that Google Shopping “results” aren’t necessarily search results at all, but paid advertising:

[O]nce one appreciates the fact that Google’s shopping results are simply ads for products and Google treats all ads with the same ad-relevant algorithm and all organic results with the same organic-relevant algorithm, the Commission’s order becomes impossible to comprehend. Is the Commission imposing on Google a duty to treat non-sponsored results in the same way that it treats sponsored results? If so, does this not provide an unfair advantage to comparison shopping sites over, for example, Google’s advertising partners as well as over Amazon, eBay, various retailers, etc…?

Randy Picker also picks up on this point:

But those Google shopping boxes are ads, Picker told me. “I can’t imagine what they’re thinking,” he said. “Google is in the advertising business. That’s how it makes its money. It has no obligation to put other people’s ads on its website.”

The bottom line here is that the WaPo editorial board does a better job characterizing the actual, relevant market dynamics in a single sentence than the Commission seems to have done in its lengthy releases summarizing its decision following seven full years of investigation.

The second point made by the WaPo editorial board to which I want to draw attention is equally important:

Those who aren’t happy anyway have other options. Indeed, the rise of comparison shopping on giants such as Amazon and eBay makes concerns that Google might exercise untrammeled power over e-commerce seem, well, a bit dated…. Who knows? In a few years we might be talking about how Facebook leveraged its 2 billion users to disrupt the whole space.

The Commission dismisses this argument in its Factsheet:

The Commission Decision concerns the effect of Google’s practices on comparison shopping markets. These offer a different service to merchant platforms, such as Amazon and eBay. Comparison shopping services offer a tool for consumers to compare products and prices online and find deals from online retailers of all types. By contrast, they do not offer the possibility for products to be bought on their site, which is precisely the aim of merchant platforms. Google’s own commercial behaviour reflects these differences – merchant platforms are eligible to appear in Google Shopping whereas rival comparison shopping services are not.

But the reality is that “comparison shopping,” just like “general search,” is just one technology among many for serving information and ads to consumers online. Defining the relevant market or limiting the definition of competition in terms of the particular mechanism that Google (or Foundem, or Amazon, or Facebook…) happens to use doesn’t reflect the extent of substitutability between these different mechanisms.

Properly defined, the market in which Google competes online is not search, but something more like online “matchmaking” between advertisers, retailers and consumers. And this market is enormously competitive. The same goes for comparison shopping.

And the fact that Amazon and eBay “offer the possibility for products to be bought on their site” doesn’t take away from the fact that they also “offer a tool for consumers to compare products and prices online and find deals from online retailers of all types.” Not only do these sites contain enormous amounts of valuable (and well-presented) information about products, including product comparisons and consumer reviews, but they also actually offer comparisons among retailers. In fact, Fifty percent of the items sold through Amazon’s platform, for example, are sold by third-party retailers — the same sort of retailers that might also show up on a comparison shopping site.

More importantly, though, as the WaPo editorial rightly notes, “[t]hose who aren’t happy anyway have other options.” Google just isn’t the indispensable gateway to the Internet (and definitely not to shopping on the Internet) that the Commission seems to think.

Today over half of product searches in the US start on Amazon. The majority of web page referrals come from Facebook. Yelp’s most engaged users now access it via its app (which has seen more than 3x growth in the past five years). And a staggering 40 percent of mobile browsing on both Android and iOS now takes place inside the Facebook app.

Then there are “closed” platforms like the iTunes store and innumerable other apps that handle copious search traffic (including shopping-related traffic) but also don’t figure in the Commission’s analysis, apparently.

In fact, billions of users reach millions of companies every day through direct browser navigation, social media, apps, email links, review sites, blogs, and countless other means — all without once touching So-called “dark social” interactions (email, text messages, and IMs) drive huge amounts of some of the most valuable traffic on the Internet, in fact.

All of this, in turn, has led to a competitive scramble to roll out completely new technologies to meet consumers’ informational (and merchants’ advertising) needs. The already-arriving swarm of VR, chatbots, digital assistants, smart-home devices, and more will offer even more interfaces besides Google through which consumers can reach their favorite online destinations.

The point is this: Google’s competitors complaining that the world is evolving around them don’t need to rely on Google. That they may choose to do so does not saddle Google with an obligation to ensure that they can always do so.

Antitrust laws — in Europe, no less than in the US — don’t require Google or any other firm to make life easier for competitors. That’s especially true when doing so would come at the cost of consumer-welfare-enhancing innovations. The Commission doesn’t seem to have grasped this fundamental point, however.

The WaPo editorial board gets it, though:

The immense size and power of all Internet giants are a legitimate focus for the antitrust authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. Brussels vs. Google, however, seems to be a case of punishment without crime.

We’re delighted to welcome Eric Fruits as our newest blogger at Truth on the Market.

Eric Fruits, Ph.D. is the Oregon Association of Realtors Faculty Fellow at Portland State University and the recently minted Chief Economist at the International Center for Law & Economics.

Eric Fruits

Among other things, Dr. Fruits is an antitrust expert, with particular expertise in price fixing and cartels (see, e.g., his article, Market Power and Cartel Formation: Theory and an Empirical Test, in the Journal of Law and Economics). He has assisted in the review of several mergers including Sysco-US Foods, Exxon-Mobil, BP-Arco, and Nestle-Ralston. He has worked on numerous antitrust lawsuits, including Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons, a predatory bidding case that was ultimately decided by the US Supreme Court (and discussed at some length by Thom here on TOTM: See here and here).

As an expert in statistics, he has provided expert opinions and testimony regarding market manipulation, real estate transactions, profit projections, agricultural commodities, and war crimes allegations. His expert testimony has been submitted to state courts, federal courts, and an international court.

Eric has also written peer-reviewed articles on insider trading, initial public offerings (IPOs), and the municipal bond market, among many other topics. His economic analysis has been widely cited and has been published in The Economist and the Wall Street Journal. His testimony regarding the economics of public employee pension reforms was heard by a special session of the Oregon Supreme Court.

You can also find him on Twitter at @ericfruits

Welcome, Eric!



I’ll be participating in two excellent antitrust/consumer protection events next week in DC, both of which may be of interest to our readers:

5th Annual Public Policy Conference on the Law & Economics of Privacy and Data Security

hosted by the GMU Law & Economics Center’s Program on Economics & Privacy, in partnership with the Future of Privacy Forum, and the Journal of Law, Economics & Policy.

Conference Description:

Data flows are central to an increasingly large share of the economy. A wide array of products and business models—from the sharing economy and artificial intelligence to autonomous vehicles and embedded medical devices—rely on personal data. Consequently, privacy regulation leaves a large economic footprint. As with any regulatory enterprise, the key to sound data policy is striking a balance between competing interests and norms that leaves consumers better off; finding an approach that addresses privacy concerns, but also supports the benefits of technology is an increasingly complex challenge. Not only is technology continuously advancing, but individual attitudes, expectations, and participation vary greatly. New ideas and approaches to privacy must be identified and developed at the same pace and with the same focus as the technologies they address.

This year’s symposium will include panels on Unfairness under Section 5: Unpacking “Substantial Injury”, Conceptualizing the Benefits and Costs from Data Flows, and The Law and Economics of Data Security.

I will be presenting a draft paper, co-authored with Kristian Stout, on the FTC’s reasonableness standard in data security cases following the Commission decision in LabMD, entitled, When “Reasonable” Isn’t: The FTC’s Standard-less Data Security Standard.

Conference Details:

  • Thursday, June 8, 2017
  • 8:00 am to 3:40 pm
  • at George Mason University, Founders Hall (next door to the Law School)
    • 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201

Register here

View the full agenda here


The State of Antitrust Enforcement

hosted by the Federalist Society.

Panel Description:

Antitrust policy during much of the Obama Administration was a continuation of the Bush Administration’s minimal involvement in the market. However, at the end of President Obama’s term, there was a significant pivot to investigations and blocks of high profile mergers such as Halliburton-Baker Hughes, Comcast-Time Warner Cable, Staples-Office Depot, Sysco-US Foods, and Aetna-Humana and Anthem-Cigna. How will or should the new Administration analyze proposed mergers, including certain high profile deals like Walgreens-Rite Aid, AT&T-Time Warner, Inc., and DraftKings-FanDuel?

Join us for a lively luncheon panel discussion that will cover these topics and the anticipated future of antitrust enforcement.


  • Albert A. Foer, Founder and Senior Fellow, American Antitrust Institute
  • Profesor Geoffrey A. Manne, Executive Director, International Center for Law & Economics
  • Honorable Joshua D. Wright, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law
  • Moderator: Honorable Ronald A. Cass, Dean Emeritus, Boston University School of Law and President, Cass & Associates, PC

Panel Details:

  • Friday, June 09, 2017
  • 12:00 pm to 2:00 pm
  • at the National Press Club, MWL Conference Rooms
    • 529 14th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20045

Register here

Hope to see everyone at both events!

Today the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) Antitrust and Consumer Protection Research Program released a new white paper by Geoffrey A. Manne and Allen Gibby entitled:

A Brief Assessment of the Procompetitive Effects of Organizational Restructuring in the Ag-Biotech Industry

Over the past two decades, rapid technological innovation has transformed the industrial organization of the ag-biotech industry. These developments have contributed to an impressive increase in crop yields, a dramatic reduction in chemical pesticide use, and a substantial increase in farm profitability.

One of the most striking characteristics of this organizational shift has been a steady increase in consolidation. The recent announcements of mergers between Dow and DuPont, ChemChina and Syngenta, and Bayer and Monsanto suggest that these trends are continuing in response to new market conditions and a marked uptick in scientific and technological advances.

Regulators and industry watchers are often concerned that increased consolidation will lead to reduced innovation, and a greater incentive and ability for the largest firms to foreclose competition and raise prices. But ICLE’s examination of the underlying competitive dynamics in the ag-biotech industry suggests that such concerns are likely unfounded.

In fact, R&D spending within the seeds and traits industry increased nearly 773% between 1995 and 2015 (from roughly $507 million to $4.4 billion), while the combined market share of the six largest companies in the segment increased by more than 550% (from about 10% to over 65%) during the same period.

Firms today are consolidating in order to innovate and remain competitive in an industry replete with new entrants and rapidly evolving technological and scientific developments.

According to ICLE’s analysis, critics have unduly focused on the potential harms from increased integration, without properly accounting for the potential procompetitive effects. Our brief white paper highlights these benefits and suggests that a more nuanced and restrained approach to enforcement is warranted.

Our analysis suggests that, as in past periods of consolidation, the industry is well positioned to see an increase in innovation as these new firms unite complementary expertise to pursue more efficient and effective research and development. They should also be better able to help finance, integrate, and coordinate development of the latest scientific and technological developments — particularly in rapidly growing, data-driven “digital farming” —  throughout the industry.

Download the paper here.

And for more on the topic, revisit TOTM’s recent blog symposium, “Agricultural and Biotech Mergers: Implications for Antitrust Law and Economics in Innovative Industries,” here.