On Monday, April 2, I will leave the Heritage Foundation to enter federal government service. Accordingly, today I am signing off as a regular contributor to Truth on the Market. First and foremost, I owe a great debt of gratitude to Geoff Manne, who was kind enough to afford me access to TOTM. Geoff’s outstanding leadership has made TOTM the leading blog site bringing to bear sound law and economics insights on antitrust and related regulatory topics. I was also privileged to have the opportunity to work on an article with TOTM stalwart Thom Lambert, whose concise book How To Regulate is by far the best general resource on sound regulatory principles (it should sit on the desk of the head of every regulatory agency). I have also greatly benefited from the always insightful analyses of fellow TOTM bloggers Allen Gibby, Eric Fruits, Joanna Shepherd, Kristian Stout, Mike Sykuta, and Neil Turkewitz. Thanks to all! I look forward to continuing to seek enlightenment at truthonthemarket.com.
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Introduction
Last week I attended the 17th Annual Conference of the International Competition Network (ICN) held in New Delhi, India from March 21-23. The Delhi Conference highlighted the key role of the ICN in promoting global convergence toward “best practices” in substantive and procedural antitrust analysis by national antitrust (“competition”) agencies. The ICN operates as a virtual network of competition agencies and expert “non-governmental advisers” (NGAs), not governments. As such, the ICN promulgates “recommended practices,” provides online training and other assistance to competition agencies, and serves as a forum for the building of relationships among competition officials (an activity which facilitates cooperation on particular matters and the exchange of advice on questions of antitrust policy and administration). There is a general consensus among competition agencies and NGAs (I am one) that the ICN has accomplished a great deal since its launch in 2001 – indeed, it has far surpassed expectations. Although (not surprisingly) inter-jurisdictional differences in perspective on particular competition issues remain, the ICN has done an excellent job in helping ensure that national competition agencies understand each other as they carry out their responsibilities. By “speaking a common antitrust language,” informed by economic reasoning, agencies are better able to cooperate on individual matters and evaluate the merits of potential changes in law and procedure.
Pre-ICN Program Hosted by Competition Policy International (CPI)
Special one-day programs immediately preceding the ICN have proliferated in recent years. On March 20, I participated in the small group one-day program hosted by Competition Policy International (CPI), attended by senior competition agency officials, private practitioners, and scholars. This program featured a morning roundtable covering problems of extraterritoriality and an afternoon roundtable focused on competition law challenges in the digital economy.
The extraterritoriality session reflected the growing number of competition law matters (particularly cartels and mergers) that have effects in multiple jurisdictions. There appeared to be general support for the proposition that a competition authority should impose remedies that have extraterritorial application only to the extent necessary to remedy harm to competition within the enforcing jurisdiction. There also was a general consensus that it is very difficult for a competition authority to cede enforcement jurisdiction to a foreign authority, when the first authority finds domestic harm attributable to extraterritorial conduct and has the ability to assert jurisdiction. Thus, although efforts to promote comity in antitrust enforcement are worthwhile, it must be recognized that there are practical limitations to such initiatives. As such, a focus on enhancing coordination and cooperation among multiple agencies investigating the same conduct will be of paramount importance.
The digital economy roundtable directed particular attention to enforcement challenges raised by Internet “digital platforms” (e.g., Google, Facebook, Amazon). In particular, with respect to digital platforms, roundtable participants discussed whether new business models and disruptive innovations create challenges to existing competition law and practices; what recent technology changes portend for market definition, assessment of market power, and other antitrust enforcement concepts; whether new analytic tools are required; and what are good mechanisms to harmonize regulation and competition enforcement. Although there was no overall consensus on these topics, there was robust discussion of multi-sided market analysis and differences in approach to digital platform oversight.
An ICN Conference Overview
As in recent years, the ICN Conference itself featured set-piece (no Q&A) plenary sessions involving colloquies among top agency officials regarding cartels, unilateral conduct, mergers, advocacy, and agency effectiveness – the areas covered during the year by the ICN’s specialized working groups. Numerous break-out sessions allowed ICN delegates to discuss in detail particular developments in these areas, and to evaluate and hash out the relative merits of competing approaches to problems. At least seven generalizations can be drawn from the Delhi Conference’s deliberations.
First, other international organizations that initially had kept their distance from the ICN, specifically the OECD, the World Bank, and UNCTAD, now engage actively with the ICN. This is a very positive development indeed. Research carried out by the OECD on competition policy – for example, on the economic evaluation of regulatory approaches (important for competition advocacy), digital platforms, and public tenders – has been injected as “policy inputs” to discrete ICN initiatives. Annual Competition advocacy contests cosponsored by the ICN and the World Bank have enabled a large number of agencies (particularly in developing countries) to showcase their successes in helping improve the competitive climate within their jurisdictions. UNCTAD initiatives on competition and economic development can be effectively presented to new competition agencies through ICN involvement.
Second, competition authorities are focusing more intensively on “vertical mergers” involving firms at different levels of the distribution chain. The ICN can help agencies be attentive to the need to weigh procompetitive efficiencies as well as new theories of anticompetitive harm in investigating these mergers.
Third, the transformation of economies worldwide through the Internet and the “digital revolution” is posing new challenges – and opportunities – for enforcers. Policy analysis, informed by economics, is evolving in this area.
Fourth, cartels and bid rigging (collusion in public tenders was the showcase “special project” at the Delhi Conference) investigations remain as significant as ever. Thinking on the administration of government leniency programs and “ex officio” investigations aimed at ferreting out cartels continues to be refined.
Fifth, the continuing growth in the number and scope of competition laws and the application of those laws to international commerce places a premium on enhanced coordination among competition agencies. The ICN’s role in facilitating such cooperation thus assumes increased importance.
Sixth, issues of due process, or procedural fairness, commendably are generally recognized as important elements of effective agency administration. Nevertheless, the precise contours of due process, and its specific application, are not uniform across agencies, and merit continued exploration by the ICN.
Seventh, the question of whether non-purely economic factors (such as fairness, corporate size, and the rights of workers) should be factored into competition analysis is gaining increased traction in a number of jurisdictions, and undoubtedly will be a subject of considerable debate in the years to come.
Conclusion
The ICN is by now a mature organization. As a virtual network that relies on the power to persuade, not to dictate, it is dynamic, not static. The ICN continues to respond flexibly to the changing needs of its many members and to global economic developments, within the context of the focused work carried out by its various substantive and process-related working groups. The Delhi Conference provided a welcome opportunity for a timely review of its accomplishments and an assessment of its future direction. In short, the ICN remains a highly useful vehicle for welfare-enhancing “soft convergence” among competition law regimes.
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) well-recognized expertise in assessing unfair or deceptive acts or practices can play a vital role in policing abusive broadband practices. Unfortunately, however, because Section 5(a)(2) of the FTC Act exempts common carriers from the FTC’s jurisdiction, serious questions have been raised about the FTC’s authority to deal with unfair or deceptive practices in cyberspace that are carried out by common carriers, but involve non-common-carrier activity (in contrast, common carrier services have highly regulated terms and must be made available to all potential customers).
Commendably, the Ninth Circuit held on February 26, in FTC v. AT&T Mobility, that harmful broadband data throttling practices by a common carrier were subject to the FTC’s unfair acts or practices jurisdiction, because the common carrier exception is “activity-based,” and the practices in question did not involve common carrier services. Key excerpts from the summary of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion follow:
The en banc court affirmed the district court’s denial of AT&T Mobility’s motion to dismiss an action brought by th Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) under Section 5 of the FTC Act, alleging that AT&T’s data-throttling plan was unfair and deceptive. AT&T Mobility’s data-throttling is a practice by which the company reduced customers’ broadband data speed without regard to actual network congestion. Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the agency enforcement authority over “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” but exempts “common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce.” 15 U.S.C § 45(a)(1), (2). AT&T moved to dismiss the action, arguing that it was exempt from FTC regulation under Section 5. . . .
The en banc court held that the FTC Act’s common carrier exemption was activity-based, and therefore the phrase “common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce” provided immunity from FTC regulation only to the extent that a common carrier was engaging in common carrier services. In reaching this conclusion, the en banc court looked to the FTC Act’s text, the meaning of “common carrier” according to the courts around the time the statute was passed in 1914, decades of judicial interpretation, the expertise of the FTC and Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), and legislative history.
Addressing the FCC’s order, issued on March 12, 2015, reclassifying mobile data service from a non-common carriage service to a common carriage service, the en banc court held that the prospective reclassification order did not rob the FTC of its jurisdiction or authority over conduct occurring before the order. Accordingly, the en banc court affirmed the district court’s denial of AT&T’s motion to dismiss.
A key introductory paragraph in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion underscores the importance of the court’s holding for sound regulatory policy:
This statutory interpretation [that the common carrier exception is activity-based] also accords with common sense. The FTC is the leading federal consumer protection agency and, for many decades, has been the chief federal agency on privacy policy and enforcement. Permitting the FTC to oversee unfair and deceptive non-common-carriage practices of telecommunications companies has practical ramifications. New technologies have spawned new regulatory challenges. A phone company is no longer just a phone company. The transformation of information services and the ubiquity of digital technology mean that telecommunications operators have expanded into website operation, video distribution, news and entertainment production, interactive entertainment services and devices, home security and more. Reaffirming FTC jurisdiction over activities that fall outside of common-carrier services avoids regulatory gaps and provides consistency and predictability in regulatory enforcement.
But what can the FTC do about unfair or deceptive practices affecting broadband services, offered by common carriers, subsequent to the FCC’s 2015 reclassification of mobile data service as a common carriage service? The FTC will be able to act, assuming that the Federal Communications Commission’s December 2017 rulemaking, reclassifying mobile broadband Internet access service as not involving a common carrier service, passes legal muster (as it should). In order to avoid any legal uncertainty, however, Congress could take the simple step of eliminating the FTC Act’s common carrier exception – an outdated relic that threatens to generate disparate enforcement outcomes toward the same abusive broadband practice, based merely upon whether the parent company is deemed a “common carrier.”
The cause of basing regulation on evidence-based empirical science (rather than mere negative publicity) – and of preventing regulatory interference with First Amendment commercial speech rights – got a judicial boost on February 26.
Specifically, in National Association of Wheat Growers et al. v. Zeise (Monsanto Case), a California federal district court judge preliminarily enjoined application against Monsanto of a labeling requirement imposed by a California regulatory law, Proposition 65. Proposition 65 mandates that the Governor of California publish a list of chemicals known to the State to cause cancer, and also prohibits any person in the course of doing business from knowingly and intentionally exposing anyone to the listed chemicals without a prior “clear and reasonable” warning. In this case, California sought to make Monsanto place warning labels on its popular Roundup weed killer products, stating that glyphosate, a widely-used herbicide and key Roundup ingredient, was known to cause cancer. Monsanto, joined by various agribusiness entities, sued to enjoin California from taking that action. Judge William Shubb concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the active ingredient in Roundup causes cancer, and that requiring Roundup to publish warning labels would violate Monsanto’s First Amendment rights by compelling it to engage in false and misleading speech. Salient excerpts from Judge Shubb’s opinion are set forth below:
[When, as here, it compels commercial speech, in order to satisfy the First Amendment,] [t]he State has the burden of demonstrating that a disclosure requirement is purely factual and uncontroversial, not unduly burdensome, and reasonably related to a substantial government interest. . . . The dispute in the present case is over whether the compelled disclosure is of purely factual and uncontroversial information. In this context, “uncontroversial” “refers to the factual accuracy of the compelled disclosure, not to its subjective impact on the audience.” [citation omitted]
On the evidence before the court, the required warning for glyphosate does not appear to be factually accurate and uncontroversial because it conveys the message that glyphosate’s carcinogenicity is an undisputed fact, when almost all other regulators have concluded that there is insufficient evidence that glyphosate causes cancer. . . .
It is inherently misleading for a warning to state that a chemical is known to the state of California to cause cancer based on the finding of one organization [, the International Agency for Research on Cancer] (which as noted above, only found that substance is probably carcinogenic), when apparently all other regulatory and governmental bodies have found the opposite, including the EPA, which is one of the bodies California law expressly relies on in determining whether a chemical causes cancer. . . . [H]ere, given the heavy weight of evidence in the record that glyphosate is not in fact known to cause cancer, the required warning is factually inaccurate and controversial. . . .
The court’s First Amendment inquiry here boils down to what the state of California can compel businesses to say. Whether Proposition 65’s statutory and regulatory scheme is good policy is not at issue. However, where California seeks to compel businesses to provide cancer warnings, the warnings must be factually accurate and not misleading. As applied to glyphosate, the required warnings are false and misleading. . . .
As plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim, are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction, and that the balance of equities and public interest favor an injunction, the court will grant plaintiffs’ request to enjoin Proposition 65’s warning requirement for glyphosate.
The Monsanto Case commendably highlights a little-appreciated threat of government overregulatory zeal. Not only may excessive regulation fail a cost-benefit test, and undermine private property rights, it may violates the First Amendment speech rights of private actors when it compels inaccurate speech. The negative economic consequences may be substantial when the government-mandated speech involves a claim about a technical topic that not only lacks empirical support (and thus may be characterized as “junk science”), but is deceptive and misleading (if not demonstrably false). Deceptive and misleading speech in the commercial market place reduces marketplace efficiency and reduces social welfare (both consumer’s surplus and producer’s surplus). In particular, it does this by deterring mutually beneficial transactions (for example, purchases of Roundup that would occur absent misleading labeling about cancer risks), generating suboptimal transactions (for example, purchases of inferior substitutes to Roundup due to misleading Roundup labeling), and distorting competition within the marketplace (the reallocation of market shares among Roundup and substitutes not subject to labeling). The short-term static effects of such market distortions may be dwarfed by the dynamic effects, such as firms’ disincentives to invest in innovation (or even participate) in markets subject to inaccurate information concerning the firms’ products or services.
In short, the Monsanto Case highlights the fact that government regulation not only imposes an implicit tax on business – it affirmatively distorts the workings of individual markets if it causes the introduction misleading or deceptive information that is material to marketplace decision-making. The threat of such distortive regulation may be substantial, especially in areas where regulators interact with “public interest clients” that have an incentive to demonize disfavored activities by private commercial actors – one example being the health and safety regulation of agricultural chemicals. In those areas, there may be a case for federal preemption of state regulation, and for particularly close supervision of federal agencies to avoid economically inappropriate commercial speech mandates. Stay tuned for future discussion of such potential legal reforms.
Over the last two decades, the United States government has taken the lead in convincing jurisdictions around the world to outlaw “hard core” cartel conduct. Such cartel activity reduces economic welfare by artificially fixing prices and reducing the output of affected goods and services. At the same, the United States has acted to promote international cooperation among government antitrust enforcers to detect, investigate, and punish cartels.
In 2017, however, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit (citing concerns of “international comity”) held that a Chinese export cartel that artificially raised the price of vitamin imports into the United States should be shielded from U.S. antitrust penalties—based merely on one brief from a Chinese government agency that said it approved of the conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court is set to review that decision later this year, in a case styled Animal Science Products, Inc., v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. By overturning the Second Circuit’s ruling (and disavowing the overly broad “comity doctrine” cited by that court), the Supreme Court would reaffirm the general duty of federal courts to apply federal law as written, consistent with the constitutional separation of powers. It would also reaffirm the importance of the global fight against cartels, which has reflected consistent U.S. executive branch policy for decades (and has enjoyed strong support from the International Competition Network, the OECD, and the World Bank).
Finally, as a matter of economic policy, the Animal Science Products case highlights the very real harm that occurs when national governments tolerate export cartels that reduce economic welfare outside their jurisdictions, merely because domestic economic interests are not directly affected. In order to address this problem, the U.S. government should negotiate agreements with other nations under which the signatory states would agree: (1) not to legally defend domestic exporting entities that impose cartel harm in other jurisdictions; and (2) to cooperate more fully in rooting out harmful export-cartel activity, wherever it is found.
For a more fulsome discussion of the separation of powers, international relations, and economic policy issues raised by the Animal Science Products case, see my recent Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum entitled The Supreme Court and Animal Science Products: Sovereignty and Export Cartels.
On January 23rd, the Heritage Foundation convened its Fourth Annual Antitrust Conference, “Trump Antitrust Policy after One Year.” The entire Conference can be viewed online (here). The Conference featured a keynote speech, followed by three separate panels that addressed developments at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), at the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division (DOJ), and in the international arena, developments that can have a serious effect on the country’s economic growth and expansion of our business and industrial sector.
- Professor Bill Kovacic’s Keynote Speech
The conference started with a bang, featuring a stellar keynote speech (complemented by excellent power point slides) by GW Professor and former FTC Chairman Bill Kovacic, who also serves as a Member of the Board of the UK Government’s Competitive Markets Authority. Kovacic began by noting the claim by senior foreign officials that “nothing is happening” in U.S. antitrust enforcement. Although this perception may be inaccurate, Kovacic argued that it colors foreign officials’ dealings with the U.S., and continues a preexisting trend of diminishing U.S. influence on foreign governments’ antitrust enforcement systems. (It is widely believed that the European antitrust model is dominant internationally.)
In order to enhance the perceived effectiveness (and prestige) of American antitrust on the global plane, American antitrust enforcers should, according to Kovacic, adopt a positive agenda citing specific priorities for action (as opposed to a “negative approach” focused on what actions will not be taken) – an orientation which former FTC Chairman Muris employed successfully in the last Bush Administration. The positive engagement themes should be communicated powerfully to the public here and abroad through active public engagement by agency officials. Agency strengths, such as FTC market studies and economic expertise, should be highlighted.
In addition, the FTC and Justice Department should act more like an “antitrust policy joint venture” at home and abroad, extending cooperation beyond guidelines to economic research, studies, and other aspects of their missions. This would showcase the outstanding capabilities of the U.S. public antitrust enterprise.
- FTC Panel
A panel on FTC developments (moderated by Dr. Jeff Eisenach, Managing Director of NERA Economic Consulting and former Chief of Staff to FTC Chairman James Miller) followed Kovacic’s presentation.
Acting Bureau of Competition Chief Bruce Hoffman began by stressing that FTC antitrust enforcers are busier than ever, with a number of important cases in litigation and resources stretched to the limit. Thus, FTC enforcement is neither weak nor timid – to the contrary, it is quite vigorous. Hoffman was surprised by recent political attacks on the 40 year bipartisan consensus regarding the economics-centered consumer welfare standard that has set the direction of U.S. antitrust enforcement. According to Hoffman, noted economist Carl Shapiro has debunked the notion that supposed increases in industry concentration even at the national level are meaningful. In short, there is no empirical basis to dethrone the consumer welfare standard and replace it with something else.
Other former senior FTC officials engaged in a discussion following Hoffman’s remarks. Orrick Partner Alex Okuliar, a former Attorney-Advisor to FTC Acting Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen, noted Ohlhausen’s emphasis on “regulatory humility” ( recognizing the inherent limitations of regulation and acting in accordance with those limits) and on the work of the FTC’s Economic Liberty Task Force, which centers on removing unnecessary regulatory restraints on competition (such as excessive occupational licensing requirements).
Wilson Sonsini Partner Susan Creighton, a former Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, discussed the importance of economics-based “technocratic antitrust” (applied by sophisticated judges) for a sound and manageable antitrust system – something still not well understood by many foreign antitrust agencies. Creighton had three reform suggestions for the Trump Administration:
(1) the DOJ and the FTC should stress the central role of economics in the institutional arrangements of antitrust (DOJ’s “economics structure” is a bit different than the FTC’s);
(2) both agencies should send relatively more economists to represent us at antitrust meetings abroad, thereby enabling the agencies to place a greater stress on the importance of economic rigor in antitrust enforcement; and
(3) the FTC and the DOJ should establish a task force to jointly carry out economics research and hone a consistent economic policy message.
Sidley & Austin Partner Bill Blumenthal, a former FTC General Counsel, noted the problems of defining Trump FTC policy in the absence of new Trump FTC Commissioners. Blumenthal noted that signs of a populist uprising against current antitrust norms extend beyond antitrust, and that the agencies may have to look to new unilateral conduct cases to show that they are “doing something.” He added that the populist rejection of current economics-based antitrust analysis is intellectually incoherent. There is a tension between protecting consumers and protecting labor; for example, anti-consumer cartels may be beneficial to labor union interests.
In a follow-up roundtable discussion, Hoffman noted that theoretical “existence theorems” of anticompetitive harm that lack empirical support in particular cases are not administrable. Creighton opined that, as an independent agency, the FTC may be a bit more susceptible to congressional pressure than DOJ. Blumenthal stated that congressional interest may be able to trigger particular investigations, but it does not dictate outcomes.
- DOJ Panel
Following lunch, a panel of antitrust experts (moderated by Morgan Lewis Partner and former Chief of Staff to the Assistant Attorney General Hill Wellford) addressed DOJ developments.
The current Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Andrew Finch, began by stating that the three major Antitrust Division initiatives involve (1) intellectual property (IP), (2) remedies, and (3) criminal enforcement. Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim’s November 2017 speech explained that antitrust should not undermine legitimate incentives of patent holders to maximize returns to their IP through licensing. DOJ is looking into buyer and seller cartel behavior (including in standard setting) that could harm IP rights. DOJ will work to streamline and improve consent decrees and other remedies, and make it easier to go after decree violations. In criminal enforcement, DOJ will continue to go after “no employee poaching” employer agreements as criminal violations.
Former Assistant Attorney General Tom Barnett, a Covington & Burling Partner, noted that more national agencies are willing to intervene in international matters, leading to inconsistencies in results. The International Competition Network is important, but major differences in rhetoric have created a sense that there is very little agreement among enforcers, although the reality may be otherwise. Muted U.S. agency voices on the international plane and limited resources have proven unfortunate – the FTC needs to engage better in international discussions and needs new Commissioners.
Former Counsel to the Assistant Attorney Eric Grannon, a White & Case Partner, made three specific comments:
(1) DOJ should look outside the career criminal enforcement bureaucracy and consider selecting someone with significant private sector experience as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement;
(2) DOJ needs to go beyond merely focusing on metrics that show increased aggregate fines and jail time year-by-year (something is wrong if cartel activities and penalties keep rising despite the growing emphasis on inculcating an “anti-cartel culture” within firms); and
(3) DOJ needs to reassess its “amnesty plus” program, in which an amnesty applicant benefits by highlighting the existence of a second cartel in which it participates (non-culpable firms allegedly in the second cartel may be fingered, leading to unjustified potential treble damages liability for them in private lawsuits).
Grannon urged that DOJ hold a public workshop on the amnesty plus program in the coming year. Grannon also argued against the classification of antitrust offenses as crimes of “moral turpitude” (moral turpitude offenses allow perpetrators to be excluded from the U.S. for 20 years). Finally, as a good government measure, Grannon recommended that the Antitrust Division should post all briefs on its website, including those of opposing parties and third parties.
Baker and Botts Partner Stephen Weissman, a former Deputy Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, found a great deal of continuity in DOJ civil enforcement. Nevertheless, he expressed surprise at Assistant Attorney General Delrahim’s recent remarks that suggested that DOJ might consider asking the Supreme Court to overturn the Illinois Brick ban on indirect purchaser suits under federal antitrust law. Weissman noted the increased DOJ focus on the rights of IP holders, not implementers, and the beneficial emphasis on the importance of DOJ’s amicus program.
The following discussion among the panelists elicited agreement (Weissman and Barnett) that the business community needs more clear-cut guidance on vertical mergers (and perhaps on other mergers as well) and affirmative statements on DOJ’s plans. DOJ was characterized as too heavy-handed in setting timing agreements in mergers. The panelists were in accord that enforcers should continue to emphasize the American consumer welfare model of antitrust. The panelists believed the U.S. gets it right in stressing jail time for cartelists and in detrebling for amnesty applicants. DOJ should, however, apply a proper dose of skepticism in assessing the factual content of proffers made by amnesty applicants. Former enforcers saw no need to automatically grant markers to those applicants. Andrew Finch returned to the topic of Illinois Brick, explaining that the Antitrust Modernization Commission had suggested reexamining that case’s bar on federal indirect purchaser suits. In response to an audience question as to which agency should do internet oversight, Finch stressed that relevant agency experience and resources are assessed on a matter-specific basis.
- International Panel
The last panel of the afternoon, which focused on international developments, was moderated by Cadwalader Counsel (and former Attorney-Advisor to FTC Chairman Tim Muris) Bilal Sayyed.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for International Matters, Roger Alford, began with an overview of trade and antitrust considerations. Alford explained that DOJ adds a consumer welfare and economics perspective to Trump Administration trade policy discussions. On the international plane, DOJ supports principles of non-discrimination, strong antitrust enforcement, and opposition to national champions, plus the addition of a new competition chapter in “NAFTA 2.0” negotiations. The revised 2017 DOJ International Antitrust Guidelines dealt with economic efficiency and the consideration of comity. DOJ and the Executive Branch will take into account the degree of conflict with other jurisdictions’ laws (fleshing out comity analysis) and will push case coordination as well as policy coordination. DOJ is considering new ideas for dealing with due process internationally, in addition to working within the International Competition Network to develop best practices. Better international coordination is also needed on the cartel leniency program.
Next, Koren Wong-Ervin, Qualcomm Director of IP and Competition Policy (and former Director of the Scalia Law School’s Global Antitrust Institute) stated that the Korea Fair Trade Commission had ignored comity and guidance from U.S. expert officials in imposing global licensing remedies and penalties on Qualcomm. The U.S. Government is moving toward a sounder approach on the evaluation of standard essential patents, as is Europe, with a move away from required component-specific patent licensing royalty determinations. More generally, a return to an economic effects-based approach to IP licensing is important. Comprehensive revisions to China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, now under consideration, will have enormous public policy importance. Balanced IP licensing rules, with courts as gatekeepers, are important. Chinese law still has overly broad essential facilities and deception law; IP price regulation proposals are very troublesome. New FTC Commissioners are needed, accompanied by robust budget support for international work.
Latham & Watkins’ Washington, D.C. Managing Partner Michael Egge focused on the substantial divergence in merger enforcement practice around the world. The cost of compliance imposed by European Commission pre-notification filing requirements is overly high; this pre-notification practice is not written down and has escaped needed public attention. Chinese merger filing practice (“China is struggling to cope”) features a costly 1-3 month pre-filing acceptance period, and merger filing requirements in India are particularly onerous.
Jim Rill, former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust and former ABA Antitrust Section Chair, stressed that due process improvements can help promote substantive antitrust convergence around the globe. Rill stated that U.S. Government officials, with the assistance of private sector stakeholders, need a mechanism (a “report card”) to measure foreign agencies’ implementation of OECD antitrust recommendations. U.S. Government officials should consider participating in foreign proceedings where the denial of due process is blatant, and where foreign governments indirectly dictate a particular harmful policy result. Multilateral review of international agreements is valuable as well. The comity principles found in the 1991 EU-U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement are quite useful. Trade remedies in antitrust agreements are not a competition solution, and are not helpful. More and better training programs for foreign officials are called for; International Chamber of Commerce, American Bar Association, and U.S. Chamber of Commerce principles are generally sound. Some consideration should be given to old ICPAC recommendations, such as (perhaps) the development of a common merger notification form for use around the world.
Douglas Ginsburg, Senior Judge (and former Chief Judge) of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, spoke last, focusing on the European Court of Justice’s Intel decision, which laid bare the deficiencies in the European Commission’s finding of a competition law violation in that matter.
In a brief closing roundtable discussion, Roger Alford suggested possible greater involvement by business community stakeholders in training foreign antitrust officials.
- Conclusion
Heritage Foundation host Alden Abbott closed the proceedings with a brief capsule summary of panel highlights. As in prior years, the Fourth Annual Heritage Antitrust Conference generated spirited discussion among the brightest lights in the American antitrust firmament on recent developments and likely trends in antitrust enforcement and policy development, here and abroad.
Are current antitrust tools fully adequate to cope with the challenges posed by giant online “digital platforms” (such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook)? Yes. Should antitrust rules be expanded to address broader social concerns that transcend consumer welfare and economic efficiency, such as income inequality and allegedly excessive big business influence on the political process? No. For more details, see my January 23 Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum entitled Antitrust and the Winner-Take-All Economy. That Memo concludes:
[T]he U.S. antitrust laws as currently applied, emphasizing sound economics, are fully capable of preventing truly anticompetitive behavior by major Internet platform companies and other large firms. But using antitrust to attack companies based on non-economic, ill-defined concerns about size, fairness, or political clout is unwarranted, and would be a recipe for reduced innovation and economic stagnation. Recent arguments trotted out to use antitrust in such an expansive manner are baseless, and should be rejected by enforcers and by Congress.
On January 23rd, for the fourth consecutive year, The Heritage Foundation will host a one-day antitrust conference that focuses on major thematic developments in domestic and international antitrust policy. The conference pulls together leaders of the antitrust bar and top current and former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Justice Department (DOJ) officials to provide an overarching perspective of antitrust trends that will affect the business community over the next year.
This year’s program, entitled “Trump Antitrust Policy after One Year,” will as usual feature an opening keynote address by former FTC Chairman and scholar extraordinaire Professor Bill Kovacic, followed by three separate panels covering FTC, DOJ, and international developments, respectively. A light lunch will be served following the FTC panel. The program will be held in the Allison Auditorium at The Heritage Foundation headquarters in the District of Columbia.
You can find out more about the program, and register to attend, here. (If you cannot attend in person, you will be able to see it streamed online at https://www.heritage.org/events.)
I hope to see you there!
On December 1, 2017, in granting certiorari in Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. SolarCity Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to consider “whether orders denying antitrust state-action immunity to public entities are immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.” At first blush, this case might appear to involve little more than a narrow technical question regarding the availability of interlocutory appeals. But more fundamentally, this matter may afford the Supreme Court yet another opportunity to weigh in on the essential nature of the antitrust state action doctrine (albeit indirectly), in deciding whether the existence of state action immunity should be decided prior to the litigation of substantive antitrust suits.
Background
The Salt River Power District (SRP) is the only supplier of traditional electrical power in Phoenix, and is a subdivision of the State of Arizona. SRP has lobbied successfully for special governmental status and has used its longstanding ties to government to advance the interests of its private shareholders. (This sort of tale comes as no surprise to students of public choice.) Counsel for respondent SolarCity discussed these ties in their brief opposing certiorari:
[SRP] was created in 1903 to take advantage of a federal law that provided interest-free loans for landowners to build reclamation projects to irrigate their lands. During the Great Depression, SRP successfully lobbied the Arizona legislature for a law denominating it a political subdivision of Arizona so the landowners who ran SRP could avoid income taxes and sell tax-free bonds. . . . Arizona denominates SRP a public entity, but as th[e] [U.S. Supreme] Court . . . explained [in a 1981 case involving [the right of local non-landowner residents to vote on SRP policy determinations], SRP and organizations like it are “essentially business enterprises, created by and chiefly benefitting a specific group of landowners.” . . . . Among other things, SRP lacks “the crucial powers of sovereignty typical of a general purpose unit of government” and SRP’s electric business does not implicate any traditional sovereign power. . . .
SRP’s retail electric business is unregulated. The business answers only to its own self-interested Board, not a public utility commission or any similar independent body. . . . 42 (ER55). SRP is thus free to serve private, not public interests. . . . SRP takes profits from electricity sales and uses them to subsidize irrigation and canal water so that, for example, certain agricultural interests can farm cheaply by a city in the desert. . . .
In short, [as the Supreme Court explained in 1981,] SRP makes money from electric customers and pays out dividends in the form of irrigating “private lands for personal profit.”
SolarCity sells and leases rooftop solar-energy panels in Arizona. It alleges that SRP used its special government subsidies to drive it out of the market for the supply of those panels to customers in the SRP district area. Specifically, according to counsel for SolarCity:
As solar generation increased in popularity and efficiency, SRP started to view solar as a long-term competitive threat to its electricity sales and profits. . . . Facing competition for the first time ever, SRP had a choice between competing in the market or using its monopoly power to exclude competition. . . . SRP first attempted to compete on the merits by developing its own solar offerings. . . . However, consumers continued to prefer SRP’s solar competitors. . . . Then, rather than offer consumers a better product or value, SRP used its unregulated market power to impose terms that lock customers into remaining what SRP calls “requirements” customers—those who satisfy all their electric needs from, and deal exclusively with, SRP. . . .
SRP’s plan [which imposed a large penalty on any customer who obtained power from its own solar system] worked. . . . The new requirements it mandated for its customers had a drastic anticompetitive effect. . . . New rooftop solar applications—from customers of any firm, not just SolarCity—dropped by about 96 percent. . . . SolarCity was forced to stop selling in SRP territory and to relocate employees.
SolarCity sued SRP for Sherman Antitrust Act violations in Arizona federal district court. SRP moved to dismiss under the antitrust state action doctrine, which (as Professor Herbert Hovenkamp puts it) “exempts qualifying state and local government regulation from federal antitrust [law], even if the regulation at issue compels an otherwise clear violation of the law.” The district court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit panel opinion (Judge Michelle Friedland, joined by Judges Alex Kozinski and Ronald Lee Gilman) assessed the applicability of the “collateral order doctrine,” which allows an appeal of a non-final district court decision if it is: (1) conclusive; (2) addresses a question separate from the merits of the underlying case; and (3) raises “some particular value of a high order” that will evade effective review if not considered immediately. The Ninth Circuit emphasized the Supreme Court’s teaching that the collateral order doctrine is a “narrow exception” that must be “strictly applied.” It concluded that, “because the state-action doctrine is a defense to liability and not an immunity from suit, the collateral-order doctrine does not give us jurisdiction here [footnotes omitted].”
In its brief supporting its writ of certiorari, SRP stressed that an interlocutory appeal was justified here because“[a] denial of state-action immunity, like a denial of state sovereign immunity, offends state sovereignty, dignity, and autonomy. . . . [T]he decision below threatens the dignity and autonomy of the states, as well as the division of regulatory power between the state and federal governments, by allowing a political subdivision of a state to be subjected to prolonged litigation for engaging in conduct that was clearly authorized by the state.”
In short, the Supreme Court has been asked to take fundamental federalism principles into account in weighing the applicability of the collateral order doctrine.
Discussion
Set aside for the moment the narrow question of the applicability of specific collateral order doctrine criteria in this case. Assuming the validity of the facts summarized above, this matter highlights the always-present anticompetitive potential of enabling private parties to exercise monopoly power under the mantle of state authority. Let us briefly examine, then, key state action principles that apply to essentially private conduct that seeks to shelter under a governmental cloak.
Commendably, in Midcal and 324 Liquor, the Supreme Court made it clear that the state action doctrine does not enable state governments to directly authorize purely private actors to violate the Sherman Act, free from state oversight. But should an entity such as SRP that is in essence an unregulated for-profit private enterprise, acting in an anticompetitive fashion, be free to undermine the competitive process (benefiting from government subsidies to boot) merely because a century-old state law characterized it as a state political subdivision?
The “spirit” of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that the answer should be no, and that the Court may be willing to look beyond the formality of a legislative designation (in this case, “state political subdivision”) to questions of political accountability. In 2015, In North Carolina Dental Board, the Court rejected the claim that state action immunity applied to the self-interested actions of a state dental regulatory board stacked with dentists (the board barred competition from non-dentists in tooth whitening). In so doing, the Court held that entities designated as state agencies are not exempt from active supervision when they are controlled by market participants, because immunizing such entities from federal antitrust challenge would pose the risk of self-dealing that the Court had warned against in prior decisions, such as Midcal.
A legal formalist might respond that a mere state board is of a lesser dignity than a state political subdivision, such as SRP, which directly exercises state sovereign power, and, as such, is not subject to “active supervision” requirements. Functionally, however, SRP acts in all respects like a private company, except that it benefits from certain special state subsidies that assist it in undermining competition. Recognizing that reality, the Court might be willing to say that it will look beyond formal legislative designations to the actual role of a state entity in deciding whether it is, or is not, engaging in “sovereign action.” (State instrumentalities engaging in classic sovereign functions, such as a state supreme court or state treasury department, would not raise this sort of problem.)
More specifically, the Court might wish to consider whether federal antitrust law should be applicable when a state instrumentality that does not have the attributes of a classic private business – such as a state owned-controlled- and operated electric company, for example – engages in business activity and uses its governmental ties to subvert competition. Such a company might, for instance, predate against competing private companies by pricing below its own cost to drive out and keep out rivals, relying on taxpayer funding to support its activities. Activity of this sort could be made subject to a “market participant exception” to the state action doctrine (at the very least requiring state active supervision), as recommended by the Federal Trade Commission’s 2004 State Action Task Force Report. Such an exception, which has not yet been specifically addressed by the Supreme Court, would reduce the returns to anticompetitive business activity engaged in by privileged “state” agents, thereby promoting commercial freedom and vibrant markets. And, as two learned commentators recently pointed out, it would not offend federalism principles that underlie the antitrust state action doctrine (footnote references deleted):
[T]he state does not act within its sovereign prerogative when engaged in economic conduct. It cannot be that the government is truly exercising sovereign powers when acting in the same way as its private citizens. Thus, restricting the prerogative of state and local governments to engage in economic conduct does not abrogate sovereign immunity. Therefore, the federalism concerns underpinning the . . . [state action] immunity doctrine are not in play when the State acts as an ordinary market-participant on equal-footing with private citizens.
The policy and federalism justifications for denying state action immunity to an unsupervised state agency acting as a commercial operator would apply “in spades” to SRP, which, as has been seen, in all material respects looks like a purely private actor.
Let’s return now to the specific question before the Supreme Court. While state action doctrinal issues (including, of course, a possible market operator exception) are not directly presented in the SRP v. SolarCity case, they may well flavor the approach the Court takes in determining the availability of interlocutory appeals of state action immunity denials. The clear and ringing invocation of federalism principles in petitioners’ brief for certiorari suggests a possible doctrinal hook. In particular, the Court might determine that respect for the dignity and role of states as coordinate sovereigns compels a finding that denials of antitrust state action immunity should be subject to immediate review.
A ruling that state action questions should be decided “up front” might, however, prove a pyrrhic victory for petitioners. Counsel for respondents have ably pointed out the quintessentially private commercial nature of SRP’s activities, which could amply support a judicial finding of no state action immunity – whether based on the somewhat novel “market participant” exception or because of inadequate state supervision.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in SPR v. SolarCity will determine the narrow issue of the availability of interlocutory appeals to an antitrust defendant that is denied a dismissal on antitrust state action grounds. A holding that authorizes such appeals also would have the incidental salutary effect of furthering efficiency, by eliminating a significant source of costly uncertainty affecting the litigation of cases that fall under the shadow of the “state action” umbrella.
More broadly, the facts in SPR v. SolarCity highlight a potential future clarification of the antitrust state action doctrine – establishment of a clear “market participant” exception to state action immunity. Such an exception commendably would promote effective market processes without offending federalism. It would also tend to diminish returns to (and thereby weaken incentives to engage in) rent seeking by those firms that seek to obtain a business advantage through special government privilege, rather than through competition on the merits.
Introduction and Summary
On December 19, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit presented Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) with an early Christmas present. Specifically, the Second Circuit commendably affirmed the District Court for the Southern District of New York’s September 2016 ruling rejecting the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) August 2016 reinterpretation of its longstanding antitrust consent decree with BMI. Because the DOJ reinterpretation also covered a parallel DOJ consent decree with the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), the Second Circuit’s decision by necessary implication benefits ASCAP as well, although it was not a party to the suit.
The Second Circuit’s holding is sound as a matter of textual interpretation and wise as a matter of economic policy. Indeed, DOJ’s current antitrust leadership, which recognizes the importance of vibrant intellectual property licensing in the context of patents (see here), should be pleased that the Second Circuit rescued it from a huge mistake by the Obama Administration DOJ in the context of copyright licensing.
Background
BMI and ASCAP are the two leading U.S. “performing rights organizations” (PROs). They contract with music copyright holders to act as intermediaries that provide “blanket” licenses to music users (e.g., television and radio stations, bars, and internet music distributors) for use of their full copyrighted musical repertoires, without the need for song-specific licensing negotiations. This greatly reduces the transactions costs of arranging for the playing of musical works, benefiting music users, the listening public, and copyright owners (all of whom are assured of at least some compensation for their endeavors). ASCAP and BMI are big businesses, with each PRO holding licenses to over ten million works and accounting for roughly 45 percent of the domestic music licensing market (ninety percent combined).
Because both ASCAP and BMI pool copyrighted songs that could otherwise compete with each other, and both grant users a single-price “blanket license” conveying the rights to play their full set of copyrighted works, the two organizations could be seen as restricting competition among copyrighted works and fixing the prices of copyrighted substitutes – raising serious questions under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which condemns contracts that unreasonably restrain trade. This led the DOJ to bring antitrust suits against ASCAP and BMI over eighty years ago, which were settled by separate judicially-filed consent decrees in 1941.
The decrees imposed a variety of limitations on the two PROs’ licensing practices, aimed at preventing ASCAP and BMI from exercising anticompetitive market power (such as the setting of excessive licensing rates). The decrees were amended twice over the years, most recently in 2001, to take account of changing market conditions. The U.S. Supreme Court noted the constraining effect of the decrees in BMI v. CBS (1979), in ruling that the BMI and ASCAP blanket licenses did not constitute per se illegal price fixing. The Court held, rather, that the licenses should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis under the antitrust “rule of reason,” since the licenses inherently generated great efficiency benefits (“the immediate use of covered compositions, without the delay of prior individual negotiations”) that had to be weighed against potential anticompetitive harms.
The August 4, 2016 DOJ Consent Decree Interpretation
Fast forward to 2014, when DOJ undertook a new review of the ASCAP and BMI decrees, and requested the submission of public comments to aid it in its deliberations. This review came to an official conclusion two years later, on August 4, 2016, when DOJ decided not to amend the decrees – but announced a decree interpretation that limits ASCAP’s and BMI’s flexibility. Specifically, DOJ stated that the decrees needed to be “more consistently applied.” By this, the DOJ meant that BMI and ASCAP should only grant blanket licenses that cover all of the rights to 100 percent of the works in the PROs’ respective catalogs (“full-work licensing”), not licenses that cover only partial interests in those works. DOJ stated:
Only full-work licensing can yield the substantial procompetitive benefits associated with blanket licenses that distinguish ASCAP’s and BMI’s activities from other agreements among competitors that present serious issues under the antitrust laws.
The New DOJ Interpretation Was Bad as a Matter of Policy
DOJ’s August 4 interpretation rejected industry practice. Under it, ASCAP and BMI were only allowed to offer a license covering all of the copyright interests in a musical competition, even if the license covers a joint work.
For example, consider a band of five composer-musicians, each of whom has a fractional interest in the copyright covering the band’s new album which is a joint work. Prior to the DOJ’s new interpretation, each musician was able to offer a partial interest in the joint work to a performance rights organization, reflecting the relative shares of the total copyright interest covering the work. The organization could offer a partial license, and a user could aggregate different partial licenses in order to cover the whole joint work. Following the new interpretation, however, BMI and ASCAP could not offer partial licenses to that work to users. This denied the band’s individual members the opportunity to deal profitably with BMI and ASCAP, thereby undermining their ability to receive fair compensation.
As the two PROs warned, this approach, if upheld, would “cause unnecessary chaos in the marketplace and place unfair financial burdens and creative constraints on songwriters and composers.” According to ASCAP President Paul Williams, “It is as if the DOJ saw songwriters struggling to stay afloat in a sea of outdated regulations and decided to hand us an anchor, in the form of 100 percent licensing, instead of a life preserver.” Furthermore, the president and CEO of BMI, Mike O’Neill, stated: “We believe the DOJ’s interpretation benefits no one – not BMI or ASCAP, not the music publishers, and not the music users – but we are most sensitive to the impact this could have on you, our songwriters and composers.”
The PROs’ views were bolstered by a January 2016 U.S. Copyright Office report, which concluded that “an interpretation of the consent decrees that would require 100-percent licensing or removal of a work from the ASCAP or BMI repertoire would appear to be fraught with legal and logistical problems, and might well result in a sharp decrease in repertoire available through these [performance rights organizations’] blanket licenses.” Regrettably, during the decree review period, DOJ ignored the expert opinion of the Copyright Office, as well as the public record comments of numerous publishers and artists (see here, for example) indicating that a 100 percent licensing requirement would depress returns to copyright owners and undermine the creative music industry.
Most fundamentally, DOJ’s new interpretation of the BMI and ASCAP consent decrees involved an abridgment of economic freedom. It further limited the flexibility of copyright music holders and music users to contract with intermediaries to promote the efficient distribution of music performance rights, in a manner that benefits the listening public while allowing creative artists sufficient compensation for their efforts. DOJ made no compelling showing that a new consent decree constraint was needed to promote competition (100 percent licensing only). Far from promoting competition, DOJ’s new interpretation undermined it. DOJ micromanagement of copyright licensing by consent decree reinterpretation was a costly new regulatory initiative that reflected a lack of appreciation for intellectual property rights, which incentivize innovation. In short, DOJ’s latest interpretation of the ASCAP and BMI decrees was terrible policy.
The New DOJ Interpretation Ran Counter to International Norms
The new DOJ interpretation had unfortunate international policy implications as well. According to Gadi Oron, Director General of the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC), a Paris-based organization that regroups 239 rights societies from 123 countries, including ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, the new interpretation departed from international norms in the music licensing industry and have disruptive international effects:
It is clear that the DoJ’s decisions have been made without taking the interests of creators, neither American nor international, into account. It is also clear that they were made with total disregard for the international framework, where fractional licensing is practiced, even if it’s less of a factor because many countries only have one performance rights organization representing songwriters in their territory. International copyright laws grant songwriters exclusive rights, giving them the power to decide who will license their rights in each territory and it is these rights that underpin the landscape in which authors’ societies operate. The international system of collective management of rights, which is based on reciprocal representation agreements and founded on the freedom of choice of the rights holder, would be negatively affected by such level of government intervention, at a time when it needs support more than ever.
The New DOJ Interpretation Was Defective as a Matter of Law, and the District Court and the Second Circuit So Held
As I explained in a November 2016 Heritage Foundation commentary (citing arguments made by counsel for BMI), DOJ’s new interpretation not only was bad domestic and international policy, it was inconsistent with sound textual construction of the decrees themselves. The BMI decree (and therefore the analogous ASCAP decree as well) did not expressly require 100 percent licensing and did not unambiguously prohibit fractional licensing. Accordingly, since a consent decree is an injunction, and any activity not expressly required or prohibited thereunder is permitted, fractional shares licensing should be authorized. DOJ’s new interpretation ignored this principle. It also was at odds with a report of the U.S. Copyright Office that concluded the BMI consent decree “must be understood to include partial interests in musical works.” Furthermore, the new interpretation was belied by the fact that the PRO licensing market has developed and functioned efficiently for decades by pricing, collecting, and distributing fees for royalties on a fractional basis. Courts view such evidence of trade practice and custom as relevant in determining the meaning of a consent decree.
The district court for the Southern District of New York accepted these textual arguments in its September 2016 ruling, granting BMI’s request for a declaratory judgment that the BMI decree did not require Decree did not require 100% (“full-work”) licensing. The court explained:
Nothing in the Consent Decree gives support to the Division’s views. If a fractionally-licensed composition is disqualified from inclusion in BMI’s repertory, it is not for violation of any provision of the Consent Decree. While the Consent Decree requires BMI to license performances of those compositions “the right of public performances of which [BMI] has or hereafter shall have the right to license or sublicense” (Art. II(C)), it contains no provision regarding the source, extent, or nature of that right. It does not address the possibilities that BMI might license performances of a composition without sufficient legal right to do so, or under a worthless or invalid copyright, or users might perform a music composition licensed by fewer than all of its creators. . . .
The Consent Decree does not regulate the elements of the right to perform compositions. Performance of a composition under an ineffective license may infringe an author’s rights under copyright, contract or other law, but it does not infringe the Consent Decree, which does not extend to matters such as the invalidity or value of copyrights of any of the compositions in BMI’s repertory. Questions of the validity, scope and limits of the right to perform compositions are left to the congruent and competing interests in the music copyright market, and to copyright, property and other laws, to continue to resolve and enforce. Infringements (and fractional infringements) and remedies are not part of the Consent Decree’s subject-matter.
The Second Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the district court’s reading of the decree:
The decree does not address the issue of fractional versus full work licensing, and the parties agree that the issue did not arise at the time of the . . . [subsequent] amendments [to the decree]. . . .
This appeal begins and ends with the language of the consent decree. It is a “well-established principle that the language of a consent decree must dictate what a party is required to do and what it must refrain from doing.” Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F.3d 419, 424 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971) (“[T]he scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners…”). “[C]ourts must abide by the express terms of a consent decree and may not impose additional requirements or supplementary obligations on the parties even to fulfill the purposes of the decree more effectively.” Perez, 347 F.3d at 424; see also Barcia v. Sitkin, 367 F.3d 87, 106 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted) (The district court may not “impose obligations on a party that are not unambiguously mandated by the decree itself.”). Accordingly, since the decree is silent on fractional licensing, BMI may (and perhaps must) offer them unless a clear and unambiguous command of the decree would thereby be violated. See United States v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., AFLCIO, 998 F.2d 1101, 1107 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Armour, 402 U.S. at 681-82.
Conclusion
The federal courts wisely have put to rest an ill-considered effort by the Obama Antitrust Division to displace longstanding industry practices that allowed efficient flexibility in the licensing of copyright interests by PROs. Let us hope that the Trump Antitrust Division will not just accept the Second Circuit’s decision, but will positively embrace it as a manifestation of enlightened antitrust-IP policy – one in harmony with broader efforts by the Division to restore sound thinking to the antitrust treatment of patent licensing and intellectual property in general.
