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Deadweight loss from no monopoly

Eric Fruits —  25 April 2019

The once-mighty Blockbuster video chain is now down to a single store, in Bend, Oregon. It appears to be the only video rental store in Bend, aside from those offering “adult” features. Does that make Blockbuster a monopoly?

It seems almost silly to ask if the last firm in a dying industry is a monopolist. But, it’s just as silly to ask if the first firm in an emerging industry is a monopolist. They’re silly questions because they focus on the monopoly itself, rather than the alternative—what if the firm, and therefore the industry—did not exist at all.

A recent post on CEPR’s Vox blog points out something very obvious, but often forgotten: “The deadweight loss from a monopolist’s not producing at all can be much greater than from charging too high a price.”

The figure below is from the post, by Michael Kremer, Christopher Snyder, and Albert Chen. With monopoly pricing (and no price discrimination), consumer surplus is given by CS, profit is given by ∏, and a deadweight loss given by H.

The authors point out if fixed costs (or entry costs) are so high that the firm does not enter the market, the deadweight loss is equal to CS + H.

Too often, competition authorities fall for the Nirvana Fallacy, a tendency to compare messy, real-world economic circumstances today to idealized potential alternatives and to justify policies on the basis of the discrepancy between the real world and some alternative perfect (or near-perfect) world.

In 2005, Blockbuster dropped its bid to acquire competing Hollywood Entertainment Corporation, the then-second-largest video rental chain. Blockbuster said it expected the Federal Trade Commission would reject the deal on antitrust grounds. The merged companies would have made up more than 50 percent of the home video rental market.

Five years later Blockbuster, Hollywood, and third-place Movie Gallery had all filed for bankruptcy.

Blockbuster’s then-CEO, John Antioco, has been ridiculed for passing up an opportunity to buy Netflix for $50 million in 2005. But, Blockbuster knew its retail world was changing and had thought a consolidation might help it survive that change.

But, just as Antioco can be chided for undervaluing Netflix, so should the FTC. The regulators were so focused on Blockbuster-Hollywood market share that they undervalued the competitive pressure Netflix and other services were bringing. With hindsight, it seems obvious that the Blockbuster’s post-merger market share would not have conveyed any significant power over price. What’s not known is whether the merger would have put off the bankruptcy of the three largest video rental retailers.

Also, what’s not known is the extent to which consumers are better or worse off with the exit of Blockbuster, Hollywood, and Movie Gallery.

Nevertheless, the video rental business highlights a key point in an earlier TOTM post: A great deal of competition comes from the flanks, rather than head-on. Head-on competition from rental kiosks, such as Redbox, nibbled at the sales and margins of Blockbuster, Hollywood, and Movie Gallery. But, the real killer of the bricks-and-mortar stores came from a wide range of streaming services.

The lesson for regulators is that competition is nearly always and everywhere present, even if it’s standing on the sidelines.

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Telecom regulators: Don’t get rolled by Rewheel

Eric Fruits —  29 March 2019

Will the merger between T-Mobile and Sprint make consumers better or worse off? A central question in the review of this merger—as it is in all merger reviews—is the likely effects that the transaction will have on consumers. In this post, we look at one study that opponents of the merger have been using to support their claim that the merger will harm consumers.

Along with my earlier posts on data problems and public policy (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), this provides an opportunity to explore why seemingly compelling studies can be used to muddy the discussion and fool observers into seeing something that isn’t there.

This merger—between the third and fourth largest mobile wireless providers in the United States—has been characterized as a “4-to-3” merger, on the grounds that it will reduce the number of large, ostensibly national carriers from four to three. This, in turn, has led to concerns that further concentration in the wireless telecommunications industry will harm consumers. Specifically, some opponents of the merger claim that “it’s going to be hard for someone to make a persuasive case that reducing four firms to three is actually going to improve competition for the benefit of American consumers.”

A number of previous mergers around the world can or have also been characterized as 4-to-3 mergers in the wireless telecommunications industry. Several econometric studies have attempted to evaluate the welfare effects of 4-to-3 mergers in other countries, as well as the effects of market concentration in the wireless industry more generally. These studies have been used by both proponents and opponents of the proposed merger of T-Mobile and Sprint to support their respective contentions that the merger will benefit or harm consumer welfare.

One particular study has risen to prominence among opponents of 4-to-3 mergers in telecom in general and the T-Mobile/Sprint merger in specific. This is worrying because the study has several fundamental flaws. 

This study, by Finnish consultancy Rewheel, has been cited by, among others, Phillip Berenbroick of Public Knowledge, who in Senate testimony, asserted that “Rewheel found that consumers in markets with three facilities-based providers paid twice as much per gigabyte as consumers in four firm markets.”

The Rewheel report upon which Mr. Berenbroick relied, is, however, marred by a number of significant flaws, which undermine its usefulness.

The Rewheel report

Rewheel’s report purports to analyze the state of 4G pricing across 41 countries that are either members of the EU or the OECD or both. The report’s conclusions are based mainly on two measures:

  1. Estimates of the maximum number of gigabytes available under each plan for a specific hypothetical monthly price, ranging from €5 to €80 a month. In other words, for each plan, Rewheel asks, “How many 4G gigabytes would X euros buy?” Rewheel then ranks countries by the median amount of gigabytes available at each hypothetical price for all the plans surveyed in each country.
  2. Estimates of what Rewheel describes as “fully allocated gigabyte prices.” This is the monthly retail price (including VAT) divided by the number of gigabytes included in each plan. Rewheel then ranks countries by the median price per gigabyte across all the plans surveyed in each country.

Rewheel’s convoluted calculations

Rewheel’s use of the country median across all plans is problematic. In particular it gives all plans equal weight, regardless of consumers’ use of each plan. For example, a plan targeted for a consumer with a “high” level of usage is included with a plan targeted for a consumer with a “low” level of usage. Even though a “high” user would not purchase a “low” plan (which would be relatively expensive for a “high” user), all plans are included, thereby skewing upward the median estimates.

But even if that approach made sense as a way of measuring consumers’ willingness to pay, in execution Rewheel’s analysis contains the following key defects:

  • The Rewheel report is essentially limited to quantity effects alone (i.e., how many gigabytes available under each plan for a given hypothetical price) or price effects alone (i.e., price per included gigabyte for each plan). These measures can mislead the analysis by missing, among other things, innovation and quality effects.
  • Rewheel’s analysis is not based on an impartial assessment of relevant price data. Rather, it is based on hypothetical measures. Such comparisons say nothing about the plans actually chosen by consumers or the actual prices paid by consumers in those countries, rendering Rewheel’s comparisons virtually meaningless. As Affeldt & Nitsche (2014) note in their assessment of the effects of concentration in mobile telecom markets:

Such approaches are taken by Rewheel (2013) and also the Austrian regulator rtr (when tracking prices over time, see rtr (2014)). Such studies face the following problems: They may pick tariffs that are relatively meaningless in the country. They will have to assume one or more consumption baskets (voice minutes, data volume etc.) in order to compare tariffs. This may drive results. Apart from these difficulties such comparisons require very careful tracking of tariffs and their changes. Even if one assumes studying a sample of tariffs is potentially meaningful, a comparison across countries (or over time) would still require taking into account key differences across countries (or over time) like differences in demand, costs, network quality etc.

  • The Rewheel report bases its comparison on dissimilar service levels by not taking into account, for instance, relevant features like comparable network capacity, service security, and, perhaps most important, overall quality of service.

Rewheel’s unsupported conclusions

Rewheel uses its analysis to come to some strong conclusions, such as the conclusion on the first page of its report declaring the median gigabyte price in countries with three carriers is twice as high as in countries with four carriers.

The figure below is a revised version of the figure on the first page of Rewheel’s report. The yellow blocks (gray dots) show the range of prices in countries with three carriers the blue blocks (pink dots) shows the range of prices in countries with four carriers. The darker blocks show the overlap of the two. The figure makes clear that there is substantial overlap in pricing among three and four carrier countries. Thus, it is not obvious that three carrier countries have significantly higher prices (as measured by Rewheel) than four carrier countries.

Rewheel

A simple “eyeballing” of the data can lead to incorrect conclusions, in which case statistical analysis can provide some more certainty (or, at least, some measure of uncertainty). Yet, Rewheel provides no statistical analysis of its calculations, such as measures of statistical significance. However, information on page 5 of the Rewheel report can be used to perform some rudimentary statistical analysis.

I took the information from the columns for hypothetical monthly prices of €30 a month and €50 a month, and converted data into a price per gigabyte to generate the dependent variable. Following Rewheel’s assumption, “unlimited” is converted to 250 gigabytes per month. Greece was dropped from the analysis because Rewheel indicates that no data is available at either hypothetical price level.

My rudimentary statistical analysis includes the following independent variables:

  • Number of carriers (or mobile network operators, MNOs) reported by Rewheel in each country, ranging from three to five. Israel is the only country with five MNOs.
  • A dummy variable for EU28 countries. Rewheel performs separate analysis for EU28 countries, suggesting they think this is an important distinction.
  • GDP per capita for each country, adjusted for purchasing power parity. Several articles in the literature suggest higher GDP countries would be expected to have higher wireless prices.
  • Population density, measured by persons per square kilometer. Several articles in the literature argue that countries with lower population density would have higher costs of providing wireless service which would, in turn, be reflected in higher prices.

The tables below confirm what an eyeballing of the figure suggest: Rewheel’s data show number of MNOs in a country have no statistically significant relationship with price per gigabyte, at either the €30 a month level or the €50 a month level.

RewheelRegression

While the signs on the MNO coefficient are negative (i.e., more carriers in a country is associated with lower prices), they are not statistically significantly different from zero at any of the traditional levels of statistical significance.

Also, the regressions suffer from relatively low measures of goodness-of-fit. The independent variables in the regression explain approximately five percent of the variation in the price per gigabyte. This is likely because of the cockamamie way Rewheel measures price, but is also due to the known problems with performing cross-sectional analysis of wireless pricing, as noted by Csorba & Pápai (2015):

Many regulatory policies are based on a comparison of prices between European countries, but these simple cross-sectional analyses can lead to misleading conclusions because of at least two reasons. First, the price difference between countries of n and (n + 1) active mobile operators can be due to other factors, and the analyst can never be sure of having solved the omitted variable bias problem. Second and more importantly, the effect of an additional operator estimated from a cross-sectional comparison cannot be equated with the effect of an actual entry that might have a long-lasting effect on a single market.

The Rewheel report cannot be relied upon in assessing consumer benefits or harm associated with the T-Mobile/Sprint merger, or any other merger

Rewheel apparently has a rich dataset of wireless pricing plans. Nevertheless, the analyses presented in its report are fundamentally flawed. Moreover, Rewheel’s conclusions regarding three vs. four carrier countries are not only baseless, but clearly unsupported by closer inspection of the information presented in its report. The Rewheel report cannot be relied upon to inform regulatory oversight of the T-Mobile/Spring merger or any other. This study isn’t unique and it should serve as a caution to be wary of studies that merely eyeball information.

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Boom, bust, and collusion: Does it really matter?

Eric Fruits —  22 January 2019

A recent working paper by Hashmat Khan and Matthew Strathearn attempts to empirically link anticompetitive collusion to the boom and bust cycles of the economy.

The level of collusion is higher during a boom relative to a recession as collusion occurs more frequently when demand is increasing (entering into a collusive arrangement is more profitable and deviating from an existing cartel is less profitable). The model predicts that the number of discovered cartels and hence antitrust filings should be procyclical because the level of collusion is procyclical.

The first sentence—a hypothesis that collusion is more likely during a “boom” than in recession—seems reasonable. At the same time, a case can be made that collusion would be more likely during recession. For example, a reduced risk of entry from competitors would reduce the cost of collusion.

The second sentence, however, seems a stretch. Mainly because it doesn’t recognize the time delay between the collusive activity, the date the collusion is discovered by authorities, and the date the case is filed.

Perhaps, more importantly, it doesn’t acknowledge that many collusive arrangement span months, if not years. That span of time could include times of “boom” and times of recession. Thus, it can be argued that the date of the filing has little (or nothing) to do with the span over which the collusive activity occurred.

I did a very lazy man’s test of my criticisms. I looked at six of the filings cited by Khan and Strathearn for the year 2011, a “boom” year with a high number of horizontal price fixing cases filed.

khanstrathearn

My first suspicion was correct. In these six cases, an average of more than three years passed from the date of the last collusive activity and the date the case was filed. Thus, whether the economy is a boom or bust when the case is filed provides no useful information regarding the state of the economy when the collusion occurred.

Nevertheless, my lazy man’s small sample test provides some interesting—and I hope useful—information regarding Khan and Strathearn’s conclusions.

  1. From July 2001 through September 2009, 24 of the 99 months were in recession. In other words, during this period, there was a 24 percent chance the economy was in recession in any given month.
  2. Five of the six collusive arrangements began when the economy was in recovery. Only one began during a recession. This may seem to support their conclusion that collusive activity is more likely during a recovery. However, even if the arrangements began randomly, there would be a 55 percent chance that that five or more began during a recovery. So, you can’t read too much into the observation that most of the collusive agreements began during a “boom.”
  3. In two of the cases, the collusive activity occurred during a span of time that had no recession. The chances of this happening randomly is less than 1 in 20,000, supporting their conclusion regarding collusive activity and the business cycle.

Khan and Strathearn fall short in linking collusive activity to the business cycle but do a good job of linking antitrust enforcement activities to the business cycle. The information they use from the DOJ website is sufficient to determine when the collusive activity occurred—but it’ll take more vigorous “scrubbing” (their word) of the site to get the relevant data.

The bigger question, however, is the relevance of this research. Naturally, one could argue this line of research indicates that competition authorities should be extra vigilant during a booming economy. Yet, Adam Smith famously noted, “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” This suggests that collusive activity—or the temptation to engage in such activity—is always and everywhere present, regardless of the business cycle.

 

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Economies of scale in homeless camp cleanups with some fishy results

Eric Fruits —  12 December 2018

“Our City has become a cesspool,” according Portland police union president, Daryl Turner. He was describing efforts to address the city’s large and growing homelessness crisis.

Portland Mayor Ted Wheeler defended the city’s approach, noting that every major city, “all the way up and down the west coast, in the Midwest, on the East Coast, and frankly, in virtually every large city in the world” has a problem with homelessness. Nevertheless, according to the Seattle Times, Portland is ranked among the 10 worst major cities in the U.S. for homelessness. Wheeler acknowledged, “the problem is getting worse.”

This week, the city’s Budget Office released a “performance report” for some of the city’s bureaus. One of the more eyepopping statistics is the number of homeless camps the city has cleaned up over the years.

PortlandHomelessCampCleanups

Keep in mind, Multnomah County reports there are 4,177 homeless residents in the entire county. But the city reports clearing more than 3,100 camps in one year. Clearly, the number of homeless in the city is much larger than reflected in the annual homeless counts.

The report makes a special note that, “As the number of clean‐ups has increased and program operations have stabilized, the total cost per clean‐up has decreased substantially as well.” Sounds like economies of scale.

Turns out, Budget Office’s simple graphic gives enough information to estimate the economies of scale in homeless camp cleanups. Yes, it’s kinda crappy data. (Could it really be the case that in two years in a row, the city cleaned up exactly the same number of camps at exactly the same cost?) Anyway data is data.

First we plot the total annual costs for cleanups. Of course it’s an awesome fit (R-squared of 0.97), but that’s what happens when you have three observations and two independent variables.

PortlandHomelessTC

Now that we have an estimate of the total cost function, we can plot the marginal cost curve (blue) and average cost curve (orange).

PortlandHomelessMCAC1

That looks like a textbook example of economies of scale: decreasing average cost. It also looks like a textbook example of natural monopoly: marginal cost lower than average cost over the relevant range of output.

What strikes me as curious is how low is the implied marginal cost of a homeless camp cleanup, as shown in the table below.

FY Camps TC AC MC
2014-15 139 $171,109 $1,231 $3,178
2015-16 139 $171,109 $1,231 $3,178
2016-17 571 $578,994 $1,014 $774
2017-18 3,122 $1,576,610 $505 $142

It is somewhat shocking that the marginal cost of an additional camp cleanup is only $142. The hourly wages for the cleanup crew alone would be way more than $142. Something seems fishy with the numbers the city is reporting.

My guess: The city is shifting some of the cleanup costs to other agencies, such as Multnomah County and/or the Oregon Department of Transportation. I also suspect the city is not fully accounting for the costs of the cleanups. And, I am almost certain the city is significantly under reporting how many homeless are living on Portland streets.

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Drifting toward nonsense on EU vs. US competitiveness: The profits puzzle

Eric Fruits —  4 December 2018

A recent NBER working paper by Gutiérrez & Philippon has attracted attention from observers who see oligopoly everywhere and activists who want governments to more actively “manage” competition. The analysis in the paper is fundamentally flawed and should not be relied upon by policymakers, regulators, or anyone else.

As noted in my earlier post, Gutiérrez & Philippon attempt to craft a causal linkage between differences in U.S. and EU antitrust enforcement and product market regulation to differences in market concentration and corporate profits. Their paper’s abstract leads with a bold assertion:

Until the 1990’s, US markets were more competitive than European markets. Today, European markets have lower concentration, lower excess profits, and lower regulatory barriers to entry.

This post focuses on Gutiérrez & Philippon’s claim that EU markets have lower “excess profits.” This is perhaps the most outrageous claim in the paper. If anyone bothers to read the full paper, they’ll see that claims that EU firms have lower excess profits is simply not supported by the paper itself. Aside from a passing mention of someone else’s work in a footnote, the only mention of “excess profits” is in the paper’s headline-grabbing abstract.

What’s even more outrageous is the authors don’t define (or even describe) what they mean by excess profits.

These two factors alone should be enough to toss aside the paper’s assertion about “excess” profits. But, there’s more.

Gutiérrez & Philippon define profit to be gross operating surplus and mixed income (known as “GOPS” in the OECD’s STAN Industrial Analysis dataset). GOPS is not the same thing as gross margin or gross profit as used in business and finance (for example GOPS subtracts wages, but gross margin does not). The EU defines GOPS as (emphasis added):

Operating surplus is the surplus (or deficit) on production activities before account has been taken of the interest, rents or charges paid or received for the use of assets. Mixed income is the remuneration for the work carried out by the owner (or by members of his family) of an unincorporated enterprise. This is referred to as ‘mixed income’ since it cannot be distinguished from the entrepreneurial profit of the owner.

Here’s Figure 1 from Gutiérrez & Philippon plotting GOPS as a share of gross output.

Fig1-GutierrezPhilippon

Look at the huge jump in gross operating surplus for U.S. firms!

Now, look at the scale of the y-axis. Not such a big jump after all.

Over 23 years, from 1992 to 2015, the gross operating surplus rate for U.S. firms grew by 2.5 percentage points. In the EU, the rate increased by about one percentage point.

Using the STAN dataset, I plotted the gross operating surplus rate for each EU country (blue dots) and the U.S. (red dots), along with a time trend. Three takeaways:

  1. There’s not much of a difference between the U.S. and the EU average—they both hover around a gross operating surplus rate of about 19.5 percent; and
  2. There’s a huge variation in gross operating surplus rate across EU countries.
  3. Yes, gross operating surplus is trending slightly upward in the U.S. and slightly downward for the EU average, but there doesn’t appear to be a huge difference in the slope of the trendlines. In fact the slopes of the trendlines are not statistically significantly different from zero and are not statistically significantly different from each other.

GOPSprod

The use of gross profits raises some serious questions. For example, the Stigler Center’s James Traina finds that, after accounting for selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A), mark-ups for publicly traded firms in the U.S. have not meaningfully increased since 1980.

The figure below plots net operating surplus (NOPS equals GOPS minus consumption of fixed capital)—which is not the same thing as net income for a business.

Same three takeaways:

  1. There’s not much of a difference between the U.S. and the EU average—they both hover around a net operating surplus rate of a little more than seven percent; and
  2. There’s a huge variation in net operating surplus rate across EU countries.
  3. The slope of the trendlines for net operating surplus in the U.S. and EU are not statistically significantly different from zero and are not statistically significantly different from each other.

NOPSprod

It’s very possible that U.S. firms are achieving higher and growing “excess” profits relative to EU firms. It’s also very possible they’re not. Despite the bold assertions of Gutiérrez & Philippon, the information presented in their paper provides no useful information one way or the other.

 

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EU markets are more competitive than U.S. markets? Not so fast

Eric Fruits —  19 November 2018

A recent NBER working paper by Gutiérrez & Philippon attempts to link differences in U.S. and EU antitrust enforcement and product market regulation to differences in market concentration and corporate profits. The paper’s abstract begins with a bold assertion:

Until the 1990’s, US markets were more competitive than European markets. Today, European markets have lower concentration, lower excess profits, and lower regulatory barriers to entry.

The authors are not clear what they mean by lower, however its seems they mean lower today relative to the 1990s.

This blog post focuses on the first claim: “Today, European markets have lower concentration …”

At the risk of being pedantic, Gutiérrez & Philippon’s measures of market concentration for which both U.S. and EU data are reported cover the period from 1999 to 2012. Thus, “the 1990s” refers to 1999, and “today” refers to 2012, or six years ago.

The table below is based on Figure 26 in Gutiérrez & Philippon. In 2012, there appears to be no significant difference in market concentration between the U.S. and the EU, using either the 8-firm concentration ratio or HHI. Based on this information, it cannot be concluded broadly that EU sectors have lower concentration than the U.S.

2012U.S.EU
CR826% (+5%)27% (-7%)
HHI640 (+150)600 (-190)

Gutiérrez & Philippon focus on the change in market concentration to draw their conclusions. However, the levels of market concentration measures are strikingly low. In all but one of the industries (telecommunications) in Figure 27 of their paper, the 8-firm concentration ratios for the U.S. and the EU are below 40 percent. Similarly, the HHI measures reported in the paper are at levels that most observers would presume to be competitive. In addition, in 7 of the 12 sectors surveyed, the U.S. 8-firm concentration ratio is lower than in the EU.

The numbers in parentheses in the table above show the change in the measures of concentration since 1999. The changes suggests that U.S. markets have become more concentrated and EU markets have become less concentrated. But, how significant are the changes in concentration?

A simple regression of the relationship between CR8 and a time trend finds that in the EU, CR8 has decreased an average of 0.5 percentage point a year, while the U.S. CR8 increased by less than 0.4 percentage point a year from 1999 to 2012. Tucked in an appendix to Gutiérrez & Philippon, Figure 30 shows that CR8 in the U.S. had decreased by about 2.5 percentage points from 2012 to 2014.

A closer examination of Gutiérrez & Philippon’s 8-firm concentration ratio for the EU shows that much of the decline in EU market concentration occurred over the 1999-2002 period. After that, the change in CR8 for the EU is not statistically significantly different from zero.

A regression of the relationship between HHI and a time trend finds that in the EU, HHI has decreased an average of 12.5 points a year, while the U.S. HHI increased by less than 16.4 points a year from 1999 to 2012.

As with CR8, a closer examination of Gutiérrez & Philippon’s HHI for the EU shows that much of the decline in EU market concentration occurred over the 1999-2002 period. After that, the change in HHI for the EU is not statistically significantly different from zero.

Readers should be cautious in relying on Gutiérrez & Philippon’s data to conclude that the U.S. is “drifting” toward greater market concentration while the EU is “drifting” toward lower market concentration. Indeed, the limited data presented in the paper point toward a convergence in market concentration between the two regions.

 

 

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Vapor products, smoking, and harm reduction policies: Recent blog posts

Eric Fruits —  22 October 2018

Over the past few weeks, Truth on the Market has had several posts related to harm reduction policies, with a focus on tobacco, e-cigarettes, and other vapor products:

Harm reduction policies are used to manage a wide range of behaviors including recreational drug use and sexual activity. Needle-exchange programs reduce the spread of infectious diseases among users of heroin and other injected drugs. Opioid replacement therapy substitutes illegal opioids, such as heroin, with a longer acting but less euphoric opioid. Safer sex education and condom distribution in schools are designed to reduce teenage pregnancy and reduce the spread of sexually transmitted infections. None of these harm reduction policies stop the risky behavior, nor do the policies eliminate the potential for harm. Nevertheless, the policies intend to reduce the expected harm.

Carrie Wade, Director of Harm Reduction Policy and Senior Fellow at the R Street Institute, draws a parallel between opiate harm reduction strategies and potential policies related to tobacco harm reduction. She notes that with successful one-year quit rates hovering around 10 percent, harm reduction strategies offer ways to transition more smokers off the most dangerous nicotine delivery device: the combustible cigarette.

Most of the harm from smoking is caused by the inhalation of toxicants released through the combustion of tobacco. Use of non-combustible nicotine delivery systems, such as e-cigarettes and smokeless tobacco generally are considered to be significantly less harmful than smoking cigarettes. UK government agency Public Health England has concluded that e-cigarettes are around 95 percent less harmful than combustible cigarettes.

In the New England Journal of Medicine, Fairchild, et al. (2018) identify a continuum of potential policies regarding the regulation of vapor products, such as e-cigarettes, show in the figure below.  They note that the most restrictive policies would effectively eliminate e-cigarettes as a viable alternative to smoking, while the most permissive may promote e-cigarette usage and potentially encourage young people—who would not do so otherwise—to take-up e-cigarettes. In between these extremes are policies that may discourage young people from initiating use of e-cigarettes, while encouraging current smokers to switch to less harmful vapor products.

nejmp1711991_f1

International Center for Law & Economics chief economist, Eric Fruits, notes in his blog post that more than 20 countries have introduced taxation on e-cigarettes and other vapor products. In the United States, several states and local jurisdictions have enacted e-cigarette taxes. His post is based on a recently released ICLE white paper entitled Vapor products, harm reduction, and taxation: Principles, evidence and a research agenda.

Under a harm reduction principle, Fruits argues that e-cigarettes and other vapor products should face no taxes or low taxes relative to conventional cigarettes, to guide consumers toward a safer alternative to smoking.

In contrast to harm reduction principles,  the precautionary principle as well as principles of tax equity point toward the taxation of vapor products at rates similar to conventional cigarettes.

On the one hand, some policymakers claim that the objective of taxing nicotine products is to reduce nicotine consumption. On the other hand, Dan Mitchell, co-founder of the Center for Freedom and Prosperity, points out that some politicians are concerned that they will lose tax revenue if a substantial number of smokers switch to options such as vaping.

Often missed in the policy discussion is the effect of fiscal policies on innovation and the development and commercialization of harm-reducing products. Also, often missed are the consequences for current consumers of nicotine products, including smokers seeking to quit using harmful conventional cigarettes.

Policy decisions regarding taxation of vapor products should take into account both long-term fiscal effects and broader economic and welfare effects. These effects might (or might not) suggest very different tax policies to those that have been enacted or are under consideration. These considerations, however, are frustrated by unreliable and wildly divergent empirical estimates of consumer demand in the face of changing prices and/or rising taxes.

Along the lines of uncertain—if not surprising—impacts Fritz Laux, professor of economics at Northeastern State University, provides an explanation of why smoke-free air laws have not been found to adversely affect revenues or employment in the restaurant and hospitality industries.

He argues that social norms regarding smoking in restaurants have changed to the point that many smokers themselves support bans on smoking in restaurants. In this way, he hypothesizes, smoke-free air laws do not impose a significant constraint on consumer behavior or business activity. We might likewise infer, by extension, that policies which do not prohibit vaping in public spaces (leaving such decisions to the discretion of business owners and managers) could encourage switching by people who otherwise would have to exit buildings in order to vape or smoke—without adversely affecting businesses.

Principles of harm reduction recognize that every policy proposal has uncertain outcomes as well as potential spillovers and unforeseen consequences. With such high risks and costs associated with cigarette and other combustible use, taxes and regulations must be developed in an environment of uncertainty and with an eye toward a net reduction in harm, rather than an unattainable goal of zero harm or in an overt pursuit of tax revenues.

 

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Vapor products, harm reduction, and taxation: More questions than answers for a young and dynamic product market

Eric Fruits —  3 October 2018

ICLE has released a white paper entitled Vapor products, harm reduction, and taxation: Principles, evidence and a research agenda, authored by ICLE Chief Economist, Eric Fruits.

More than 20 countries have introduced taxation on e-cigarettes and other vapor products. In the United States, several states and local jurisdictions have enacted e-cigarette taxes.

The concept of tobacco harm reduction began in 1976 when Michael Russell, a psychiatrist and lecturer at the Addiction Research Unit of Maudsley Hospital in London, wrote: “People smoke for nicotine but they die from the tar.”  Russell hypothesized that reducing the ratio of tar to nicotine could be the key to safer smoking.

Since then, much of the harm from smoking has been well-established as caused almost exclusively by toxicants released through the combustion of tobacco. Public Health England and the American Cancer Society have concluded non-combustible tobacco products as well as pure nicotine products are considerably less harmful than combustible products. Earlier this year, the American Cancer Society shifted its position on e-cigarettes, recommending that individuals who do not quit smoking, “… should be encouraged to switch to the least harmful form of tobacco product possible; switching to the exclusive use of e-cigarettes is preferable to continuing to smoke combustible products.”

In contrast, some public health advocates urge a precautionary approach in which the introduction and sale of e-cigarettes be limited or halted until the products are demonstrably safe.

Policymakers face a wide range of strategies regarding the taxation of vapor products. On the one hand, principles of harm reduction suggest vapor products should face no taxes or low taxes relative to conventional cigarettes, to guide consumers toward a safer alternative to smoking. the U.K. House of Commons Science and Technology Committee concludes:

The level of taxation on smoking-related products should directly correspond to the health risks that they present, to encourage less harmful consumption. Applying that logic, e-cigarettes should remain the least-taxed and conventional cigarettes the most, with heat-not-burn products falling between the two.

In contrast, the precautionary principle as well as principles of tax equity point toward the taxation of vapor products at rates similar to conventional cigarettes.

Analysis of tax policy issues is complicated by divergent—and sometimes obscured—intentions of such policies. Some policymakers claim that the objective of taxing nicotine products is to reduce nicotine consumption. Other policymakers indicate the objective is to raise revenues to support government spending. Often missed in the policy discussion is the effect of fiscal policies on innovation and the development and commercialization of harm-reducing products. Also, often missed are the consequences for current consumers of nicotine products, including smokers seeking to quit using harmful conventional cigarettes.

Policy decisions regarding taxation of vapor products should take into account both long-term fiscal effects, as well as broader economic and welfare effects. These effects might (or might not) suggest very different tax policies to those that have been enacted or are under consideration.

Apart from being a significant source of revenue, the cigarette taxes have been promoted as “sin” taxes to discourage consumption either because of externalities caused by smoking (increased costs for third-party health payers and health consequences) or paternalism. According to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in U.S., smoking-related illness in the U.S. costs more than $300 billion each year, including; (1) nearly $170 billion for direct medical care for adults and (2) more than $156 billion in lost productivity, including $5.6 billion in lost productivity due to secondhand smoke exposure.

The CDC’s cost estimates raise important questions regarding who bears the burden of smoking related illness. Much of the cost is borne by private insurance, which charges steeper premiums for customers who smoke. In addition, the CDC estimates reflect costs imposed by people who have smoked for decades—many of whom have now quit. A proper accounting of the costs vis-à-vis tax policy would measure the incremental discounted costs imposed by today’s smokers.

According to Levy et al. (2017), a strategy of replacing cigarette smoking with e-cigarettes would yield substantial life year gains, even under pessimistic assumptions regarding cessation, initiation, and relative harm. Increased longevity does not simply extend the individual’s years of retirement and reliance on government transfers but has impact on greater work effort and productivity together with higher tax payments on consumption.

Vapor products that cause less direct harm or have lower externalities (e.g., the absence of “second hand smoke”) should be subject to a lower “sin” tax. A cost-benefit analysis of the desired excise tax rate on vapor products would include reduced health spending as an offset against excise tax revenue that was foregone by putting a lesser rate on those products.

State and local governments in the U.S. collect more than $18 billion a year in tobacco taxes. While some jurisdictions earmark a portion of tobacco taxes for prevention and cessation efforts, in practice most tobacco taxes are treated by policymakers as general revenues to be spent in whatever way the legislative body determines.

In the long-run, the goals of reducing or eliminating consumption of the taxed good and generating revenues are in conflict. If the tax is successful in reducing consumption, it falls short in generating revenue. Similarly, if the tax succeeds in generating revenues, it falls short in reducing or eliminating consumption.

Substitutability is another consideration. An increase in the tax on spirits will result in an increase in beer and wine purchases. A high toll on a road will divert traffic to untolled streets that may not be designed for increased traffic volumes. Evidence from the U.S. and Europe indicate high or rising tobacco taxes in one jurisdiction will result in increased sales in bordering jurisdictions as well as increase illegal cross-jurisdiction sales or smuggling.

As of March 2018, nine U.S. states have enacted taxes on e-cigarettes:

California 65.08% on wholesale price
Delaware 0.05 USD/ml
DC 70% on wholesale price
Kansas 0.05 USD/ml
Louisiana 0.05 USD/ml
Minnesota 95% of wholesale price
North Carolina 0.05 USD/ml
Pennsylvania 40% of wholesaler price
West Virginia 0.075 USD/ml

In addition, 22 countries outside of the U.S. have introduced taxation on e-cigarettes.

The effects of different types of taxation on usage and thus economic outcomes varies. Research to date finds a wide range of own price and cross price elasticities for e-cigarettes. While most researchers conclude that the demand for e-cigarettes is more elastic than the demand for combustible cigarettes, some studies find inelastic demand and some studies find highly elastic demand. Economic theory would point to e-cigarettes as a substitute for combustible cigarettes. Some empirical research supports this hypothesis, while others conclude the two products are complements.

In addition to e-cigarettes, little cigars and smokeless tobacco are also potential substitutes for cigarettes. The results from Zheng, et al. (2016) suggest increases in sales of little cigars and smokeless tobacco products would account for about 14 percent of the decline in cigarette sales associated with a hypothetical 10 percent increase in the price of cigarettes. On the other hand, another study using a seemingly identical data set (Zheng, et al., 2017), suggests that sales of little cigars and smokeless tobacco would decrease in the face of an increase in cigarette prices.

The wide range of estimated elasticities calls into question the reliability of published estimates. As a nascent area of research, the policy debate would benefit from additional research that involves larger samples with better statistical power, reflects the dynamic nature of this relatively new product category, and accounts for the wide variety of vapor products.

More importantly, demand and supply conditions for e-cigarettes, heated tobacco products and other electronic nicotine delivery products have been changing rapidly over the past few years—and are expected for rapidly change into the foreseeable future. Thus, estimates of demand parameters, such as elasticity and cross-price elasticity estimates, are almost certain to vary over time as users gain knowledge and experience and as products and suppliers enter the market.

Because the market for e-cigarettes and other vapor products is small and developing, the tax bearing capacity of these new product segments are untested and unknown. Moreover, current tax levels and prices could be also misleading based on the relatively sparse empirical data, in which case more data points and evaluation is needed. One can argue, given the slow growth rates of these segments in many markets, that current prices of e-cigarettes and heat-not-burn products are relatively high when compared to cigarettes and a tax or an increase on existing tax would slow down the segment growth or even lead to a decline.

Separately, the challenges in assessing a tax on electronic nicotine delivery products indicate the costs of collecting the tax, especially an excise tax, may be much higher than similar taxes levied on combustible cigarettes. In addition, as discussed above, heavy taxation of this relatively new industry would likely stifle innovation in a way that is contrary to the goal harm reduction.

Principles of harm reduction recognize that every proposal has uncertain outcomes as well as potential spillovers and unforeseen consequences. Nevertheless, the basic principle of harm reduction is a focus on safer rather than safe. Policymakers must make their decisions weighing the expected benefits and expected costs. With such high risks and costs associated with cigarette and other combustible use, taxes and regulations must be developed in an environment of uncertainty and with an eye toward a net reduction in harm, rather than an unattainable goal of zero harm.

Read the full report.

In harm reduction, regulation, regulatory reform, truth on the market
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Amazon-Whole Foods: The Speculation Then, the Evidence Today

Eric Fruits —  28 August 2018

Carl Shapiro, the government’s economics expert opposing the AT&T-Time Warner merger, seems skeptical of much of the antitrust populists’ Amazon rhetoric: “Simply saying that Amazon has grown like a weed, charges very low prices, and has driven many smaller retailers out of business is not sufficient. Where is the consumer harm?”

On its face, there was nothing about the Amazon/Whole Foods merger that should have raised any antitrust concerns. While one year is too soon to fully judge the competitive impacts of the Amazon-Whole Foods merger, nevertheless, it appears that much of the populist antitrust movement’s speculation that the merger would destroy competition and competitors and impoverish workers has failed to materialize.

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In amazon-whole foods symposium, antitrust, mergers & acquisitions, truth on the market , , , , ,
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E-cigarette taxation: Lessons from “sin taxes”

Eric Fruits —  3 August 2018

The Economist takes on “sin taxes” in a recent article, “‘Sin’ taxes—eg, on tobacco—are less efficient than they look.” The article has several lessons for policy makers eyeing taxes on e-cigarettes and other vapor products.

Historically, taxes had the key purpose of raising revenues. The “best” taxes would be on goods with few substitutes (i.e., inelastic demand) and on goods deemed to be luxuries. In Wealth of Nations Adam Smith notes:

Sugar, rum, and tobacco are commodities which are nowhere necessaries of life, which are become objects of almost universal consumption, and which are therefore extremely proper subjects of taxation.

The Economist notes in 1764, a fiscal crisis driven by wars in North America led Britain’s parliament began enforcing tariffs on sugar and molasses imported from outside the empire. In the U.S., from 1868 until 1913, 90 percent of all federal revenue came from taxes on liquor, beer, wine and tobacco.

Over time, the rationale for these taxes has shifted toward “sin taxes” designed to nudge consumers away from harmful or distasteful consumption. The Temperance movement in the U.S. argued for higher taxes to discourage alcohol consumption. Since the Surgeon General’s warning on the dangers of smoking, tobacco tax increases have been justified as a way to get smokers to quit. More recently, a perceived obesity epidemic has led several American cities as well as Thailand, Britain, Ireland, South Africa to impose taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages to reduce sugar consumption.

Because demand curves slope down, “sin taxes” do change behavior by reducing the quantity demanded. However, for many products subject to such taxes, demand is not especially responsive. For example, as shown in the figure below, a one percent increase in the price of tobacco is associated with a one-half of one percent decrease in sales.

Economist-Sin-Taxes

 

Substitutability is another consideration for tax policy. An increase in the tax on spirits will result in an increase in beer and wine purchases. A high toll on a road will divert traffic to untolled streets that may not be designed for increased traffic volumes. A spike in tobacco taxes in one state will result in a spike in sales in bordering states as well as increase illegal interstate sales or smuggling. The Economist reports:

After Berkeley introduced its tax, sales of sugary drinks rose by 6.9% in neighbouring cities. Denmark, which instituted a tax on fat-laden foods in 2011, ran into similar problems. The government got rid of the tax a year later when it discovered that many shoppers were buying butter in neighbouring Germany and Sweden.

Advocates of “sin” taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and sugar argue their use impose negative externalities on the public, since governments have to spend more to take care of sick people. With approximately one-third of the U.S. population covered by some form of government funded health insurance, such as Medicare or Medicaid, what were once private costs of healthcare have been transformed into a public cost.

According to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in U.S., smoking-related illness in the U.S. costs more than $300 billion each year, including; (1) nearly $170 billion for direct medical care for adults and (2) more than $156 billion in lost productivity, including $5.6 billion in lost productivity due to secondhand smoke exposure.

On the other hand, The Economist points out:

Smoking, in contrast, probably saves taxpayers money. Lifelong smoking will bring forward a person’s death by about ten years, which means that smokers tend to die just as they would start drawing from state pensions. In a study published in 2002 Kip Viscusi, an economist at Vanderbilt University who has served as an expert witness on behalf of tobacco companies, estimated that even if tobacco were untaxed, Americans could still expect to save the government an average of 32 cents for every pack of cigarettes they smoke.

The CDC’s cost estimates raise important questions regarding who bears the burden of smoking related illness. For example, much of the direct cost is borne by private insurance, which charge steeper premiums for customers who smoke. In addition, the CDC estimates reflect costs imposed by people who have smoked for decades—many of whom have now quit. A proper accounting of the costs vis-à-vis tax policy should evaluate the discounted costs imposed by today’s smokers.

State and local governments in the U.S. collect more than $18 billion a year in tobacco taxes. While some jurisdictions earmark a portion of tobacco taxes for prevention and cessation efforts, in practice most tobacco taxes are treated by policymakers as general revenues to be spent in whatever way the legislative body determines. Thus, in practice, there is no clear nexus between taxes levied on tobacco and government’s use of the tax revenues on smoking related costs.

Most of the harm from smoking is caused by the inhalation of toxicants released through the combustion of tobacco. Public Health England and the American Cancer Society have concluded non-combustible tobacco products, such as e-cigarettes, “heat-not-burn” products, smokeless tobacco, are considerably less harmful than combustible products.

Many experts believe that the best option for smokers who are unable or unwilling to quit smoking is to switch to a less harmful alternative activity that has similar attributes, such as using non-combustible nicotine delivery products. Policies that encourage smokers to switch from more harmful combustible tobacco products to less harmful non-combustible products would be considered a form of “harm reduction.”

Nine U.S. states now have taxes on vapor products. In addition, several local jurisdictions have enacted taxes. Their methods and levels of taxation vary widely. Policy makers considering a tax on vapor products should account for the following factors.

  • The current market for e-cigarettes as well as heat-not-burn products in the range of 0-10 percent of the cigarette market. Given the relatively small size of the e-cigarette and heated tobacco product market, it is unlikely any level of taxation of e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products would generate significant tax revenues to the taxing jurisdiction. Moreover much of the current research likely represents early adopters and higher income consumer groups. As such, the current empirical data based on total market size and price/tax levels are likely to be far from indicative of the “actual” market for these products.
  • The demand for e-cigarettes is much more responsive to a change in price than the demand for combustible cigarettes. My review of the published research to date finds the median estimated own-price elasticity is -1.096, meaning something close to a 1-to-1 relationship: a tax resulting in a one percent increase in e-cigarette prices would be associated with one percent decline in e-cigarette sales. Many of those lost sales would be shifted to purchases of combustible cigarettes.
  • Research on the price responsiveness of vapor products is relatively new and sparse. There are fewer than a dozen published articles, and the first article was published in 2014. As a result, the literature reports a wide range of estimated elasticities that calls into question the reliability of published estimates, as shown in the figure below. As a relatively unformed area of research, the policy debate would benefit from additional research that involves larger samples with better statistical power, reflects the dynamic nature of this new product category, and accounts for the wide variety of vapor products.

 

With respect to taxation and pricing, policymakers would benefit from reliable information regarding the size of the vapor product market and the degree to which vapor products are substitutes for combustible tobacco products. It may turn out that a tax on vapor products may be, as The Economist notes, less efficient than they look.

In behavioral economics, harm reduction, truth on the market
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A big year for business and economics in the courts, even if we’re not talking about Janus

Eric Fruits —  27 June 2018

This has been a big year for business in the courts. A U.S. district court approved the AT&T-Time Warner merger, the Supreme Court upheld Amex’s agreements with merchants, and a circuit court pushed back on the Federal Trade Commission’s vague and heavy handed policing of companies’ consumer data safeguards.

These three decisions mark a new era in the intersection of law and economics.

AT&T-Time Warner

AT&T-Time Warner is a vertical merger, a combination of firms with a buyer-seller relationship. Time Warner creates and broadcasts content via outlets such as HBO, CNN, and TNT. AT&T distributes content via services such as DirecTV.

Economists see little risk to competition from vertical mergers, although there are some idiosyncratic circumstances in which competition could be harmed. Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of Justice went to court to block the merger.

The last time the goverment sued to block a merger was more than 40 years ago, and the government lost. Since then, the government relied on the threat of litigation to extract settlements from the merging parties. For example, in the 1996 merger between Time Warner and Turner, the FTC required limits on how the new company could bundle HBO with less desirable channels and eliminated agreements that allowed TCI (a cable company that partially owned Turner) to carry Turner channels at preferential rates.

With AT&T-Time Warner, the government took a big risk, and lost. It was a big risk because (1) it’s a vertical merger, and (2) the case against the merger was weak. The government’s expert argued consumers would face an extra 45 cents a month on their cable bills if the merger went through, but under cross-examination, conceded it might be as little as 13 cents a month. That’s a big difference and raised big questions about the reliability of the expert’s model.

Judge Richard J. Leon’s 170+ page ruling agreed that the government’s case was weak and its expert was not credible. While it’s easy to cheer a victory of big business over big government, the real victory was the judge’s heavy reliance on facts, data, and analysis rather than speculation over the potential for consumer harm. That’s a big deal and may make the way for more vertical mergers.

Ohio v. American Express

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Amex may seem obscure. The court backed American Express Co.’s policy of preventing retailers from offering customers incentives to pay with cheaper cards.

Amex charges higher fees to merchants than do other cards, such as Visa, MasterCard, and Discover. Amex cardholders also have higher incomes and tend to spend more at stores than those associated with other networks. And, Amex offers its cardholders better benefits, services, and rewards than the other cards. Merchants don’t like Amex because of the higher fees, customers prefer Amex because of the card’s perks.

Amex, and other card companies, operate in what is known as a two-sided market. Put simply, they have two sets of customers: merchants who pay swipe fees, and consumers who pay fees and interest.

Part of Amex’s agreement with merchants is an “anti-steering” provision that bars merchants from offering discounts for using non-Amex cards. The U.S. Justice Department and a group of states sued the company, alleging the Amex rules limited merchants’ ability to reduce their costs from accepting credit cards, which meant higher retail prices. Amex argued that the higher prices charged to merchants were kicked back to its cardholders in the form of more and better perks.

The Supreme Court found that the Justice Department and states focused exclusively on one side (merchant fees) of the two-sided market. The courts says the government can’t meet its burden by showing some effect on some part of the market. Instead, they must demonstrate, “increased cost of credit card transactions … reduced number of credit card transactions, or otherwise stifled competition.” The government could not prove any of those things.

We live in a world two-sided markets. Amazon may be the biggest two-sided market in the history of the world, linking buyers and sellers. Smartphones such as iPhones and Android devices are two-sided markets, linking consumers with app developers. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Amex sets a standard for how antitrust law should treat the economics of two-sided markets.

LabMD

LabMD is another matter that seems obscure, but could have big impacts on the administrative state.

Since the early 2000s, the FTC has brought charges against more than 150 companies alleging they had bad security or privacy practices. LabMD was one of them, when its computer system was compromised by professional hackers in 2008. The FTC claimed that LabMD’s failure to adequately protect customer data was an “unfair” business practice.

Challenging the FTC can get very expensive and the agency used the threat of litigation to secure settlements from dozens of companies. It then used those settlements to convince everyone else that those settlements constituted binding law and enforceable security standards.

Because no one ever forced the FTC to defend what it was doing in court, the FTC’s assertion of legal authority became a self-fulfilling prophecy. LabMD, however, chose to challege the FTC. The fight drove LabMD out of business, but public interest law firm Cause of Action and lawyers at Ropes & Gray took the case on a pro bono basis.

The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the FTC’s approach to developing security standards violates basic principles of due process. The court said the FTC’s basic approach—in which the FTC tries to improve general security practices by suing companies that experience security breaches—violates the basic legal principle that the government can’t punish someone for conduct that the government hasn’t previously explained is problematic.

My colleague at ICLE observes the lesson to learn from LabMD isn’t about the illegitimacy of the FTC’s approach to internet privacy and security. Instead, it says legality of the administrative state is premised on courts placing a check on abusive regulators.

The lessons learned from these three recent cases reflect a profound shift in thinkging about the laws governing economic activity:

  • AT&T-Time Warner indicates that facts matter. Mere speculation of potential harms will not satisfy the court.
  • Amex highlights the growing role two-sided markets play in our economy and provides framework for evaluating competition in these markets.
  • LabMD is a small step in reining in the administrative state. Regulations must be scrutinized before they are imposed and enforced.

In some ways none of these decisions are revolutionary. Instead, they reflect an evolution toward greater transparency in how the law is to be applied and greater scrutiny over how the regulations are imposed.

 

In antitrust, consent decrees, credit cards, data security, federal trade commission, truth on the market
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Weekend reads: Big is bad edition

Eric Fruits —  22 June 2018

Big is bad, part 1: Kafka, Coase, and Brandeis walk into a bar … There’s a quip in a well-known textbook that Nobel laureate Ronald Coase said he’d grown weary of antitrust because when prices went up, the judges said it was monopoly; when the prices went down, they said it was predatory pricing; and when they stayed the same, they said it was tacit collusion. ICLE’s Geoffrey Manne and Gus Hurwitz worry that with the rise of the neo-Brandeisians, not much has changed since Coase’s time:

[C]ompetition, on its face, is virtually indistinguishable from anticompetitive behavior. Every firm strives to undercut its rivals, to put its rivals out of business, to increase its rivals’ costs, or to steal its rivals’ customers. The consumer welfare standard provides courts with a concrete mechanism for distinguishing between good and bad conduct, based not on the effect on rival firms but on the effect on consumers. Absent such a standard, any firm could potentially be deemed to violate the antitrust laws for any act it undertakes that could impede its competitors.

Big is bad, part 2. A working paper published by researchers from Denmark and the University of California at Berkeley suggest that companies such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Nike are taking advantage of so-called “tax havens” to cause billions of dollars of income go “missing.” There’s a lot of mumbo jumbo in this one, but it’s getting lots of attention.

We show theoretically and empirically that in the current international tax system, tax authorities of high-tax countries do not have incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. They instead focus their enforcement effort on relocating profits booked in other high-tax places—in effect stealing revenue from each other.

Big is bad, part 3: Can any country survive with debt-to-GDP of more than 100 percent? Apparently, the answer is “yes.” The U.K. went 80 years, from 1779 to 1858. Then, it went 47 years from 1916 to 1962. Tim Harford has a fascinating story about an effort to clear the country’s debt in that second run.

In 1928, an anonymous donor resolved to clear the UK’s national debt and gave £500,000 with that end in mind. It was a tidy sum — almost £30m at today’s prices — but not nearly enough to pay off the debt. So it sat in trust, accumulating interest, for nearly a century.

How do you make a small fortune? Begin with a big one. A lesson from Johnny Depp.

Will we ever stop debating the Trolley Problem? Apparently the answer is “no.” Also, TIL there’s a field of research that relies on “notions.”

For so long, moral psychology has relied on the notion that you can extrapolate from people’s decisions in hypothetical thought experiments to infer something meaningful about how they would behave morally in the real world. These new findings challenge that core assumption of the field.

 

The week that was on Truth on the Market

LabMD.

[T]argets of complaints settle for myriad reasons, and no outside authority need review the sufficiency of a complaint as part of a settlement. And the consent orders themselves are largely devoid of legal and even factual specificity. As a result, the FTC’s authority to initiate an enforcement action  is effectively based on an ill-defined series of hunches — hardly a sufficient basis for defining a clear legal standard.

Google Android.

Thus, had Google opted instead to create a separate walled garden of its own on the Apple model, everything it had done would have otherwise been fine. This means that Google is now subject to an antitrust investigation for attempting to develop a more open platform.

AT&T-Time Warner. First this:

The government’s contention that, after the merger, AT&T and rival Comcast could coordinate to restrict access to popular Time Warner and NBC content to harm emerging competitors was always a weak argument.

Then this:

Doing no favors to its case, the government turned to a seemingly contradictory argument that AT&T and Comcast would coordinate to demand virtual providers take too much content.

 

 

In truth on the market
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