Scholarly commentary on law, economics, & more

‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design,’ by Robert Scott and George Triantis

Economists and lawyers know that almost every contract is incomplete. Contracts routinely omit or leave undefined important terms, and they rarely anticipate every circumstance that might frustrate performance. The reason is simple: It makes little sense to spend $1,000 drafting a provision that has an expected value of only $100. Parties therefore leave lower-value contingencies ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design,’ by Robert Scott and George Triantis

Who, Exactly, Does New York City’s Delivery Protection Act Protect?

New York City has found an unlikely culprit for unsafe deliveries: the name on a driver’s paycheck. Its proposed cure would force Amazon to bring thousands of drivers in-house. The evidence that this would improve safety is thin. The implications for union organizing are anything but. Last month, New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani formally Who, Exactly, Does New York City’s Delivery Protection Act Protect?

No Free Ride: Uber’s African Retreat

First, “Uber” became a verb. Now, in parts of Africa, it is becoming past tense. The company’s withdrawal from Nigeria and Uganda complicates one of competition policy’s favorite storylines: U.S. technology platforms enter, conquer, and never leave. That assumption has helped fuel a rush to import rules modeled on the European Union’s Digital Markets Act No Free Ride: Uber’s African Retreat

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