Last updated on Feb 25, 2024
This symposium invited participants to discuss how the FTC has changed during the course of the Biden administration and what those changes mean for antitrust law and consumer-protection policy.
Over the past two years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has operated differently than it has in recent decades. Characterized by—among other things—an enforcement-heavy approach to antitrust and consumer protection, a vigorous embrace of rulemaking, a skeptical approach to mergers, robust engagement with overseas counterparts, and centralization of decision-making within the Office of the Chair, this is, arguably, a very different FTC than Congress, practitioners, and commentators are used to.
Some commentators—including many former FTC staff and officials—have expressed concern about these changes. And Congress has ramped up oversight hearings in response to these concerns. But FTC leadership also has its supporters. For many, the problem was the old normal, rather than the new one, and the FTC’s more recent and more aggressive embrace of its statutory authority is welcomed as a corrective to decades of systematic underenforcement.
This symposium invites participants to discuss how the FTC has changed during the course of the Biden administration and what those changes mean for antitrust law and consumer protection policy.
Contributions, which will be posted over the course of the coming weeks, will address a range of topics. Some will focus narrowly on specific agency actions, such as proposed changes to the merger guidelines or the agency’s use of administrative law judges. Some will survey a wider range of topics. Others might focus on more operational aspects of the agency, including its relationship with Congress, other agencies like the U.S. Justice Department, and its international counterparts. And other contributions might apply an even broader lens, situating changes at the FTC within the context of the Biden administration’s approach to regulation more generally.
In addition to the initial contributions to this symposium, we also invite submission of unsolicited responses to contributions for potential inclusion from practitioners, academics, and others with relevant experience. Posts, including responses, should be between 800 and 2,500 words. We particularly welcome thematic responses that engage with the ideas underlying individual posts or a series of posts. If interested, please email Keith Fierro at kfierro@laweconcenter.org.
Before becoming chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Lina Khan advocated the use of rulemakings to implement the prohibition on unfair methods of competition (UMC) in Section 5 of the FTC Act. As chair, she proposed a rule, which likely will be finalized in the spring, to ban noncompete clauses in employment contracts. But ... The FTC Lacks Authority for Competition Rulemaking
The Evolution of FTC Antitrust Enforcement – Highlights of Its Origins and Major Trends 1910-1914 – Creation and Launch The election of 1912, which led to the creation of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), occurred at the apex of the Progressive Era. Since antebellum times, Grover Cleveland had been the only Democrat elected as president. ... The FTC Tacks Into the Gale, Battening No Hatches: Part 1
Part 1 of this piece can be found here. Emergence of the ‘Neo-Brandeisians’ Thus, matters unfolded until the curtain began to descend on the second Obama term in 2016. In the midst of presidential primary season, a targeted political challenge to the prevailing economic approach to antitrust first came to light. No one has yet ... The FTC Tacks Into the Gale, Battening No Hatches: Part 2
In less than two and a half years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) have undone more than two decades of work aimed at moving global competition law toward an economics-friendly consumer welfare standard. In tandem with foreign competition authorities, the U.S. antitrust agencies are now cooperating in an effort to ... The FTC, DOJ, and International Competition Law: Convergence Away From the Consumer Welfare Standard?
Presidential administrations over the last 50 years have pursued widely varying policy goals, but they have agreed—at least, in principle—that policies should be efficient and improve social welfare. Now, the Biden administration is taking steps to unravel that bipartisan consensus. We focus on different policy areas (Dudley on regulation and Sullivan on antitrust) and are ... Recent Antitrust and Regulatory Changes Both Unravel the Consensus
Competition policy at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will naturally ebb and flow, depending on its leadership. Over the years, some commissions have taken a more aggressive approach, while others have granted greater credibility to market forces. Still, regardless of the party in power, the agency was generally able to maintain a solid reputation as ... Regulatory Humility or Regulatory Hubris at the Federal Trade Commission?
This symposium wonders what exactly is “The FTC’s New Normal”? The short answer: scary. The current Federal Trade Commission (FTC) leadership is clear that old U.S. Supreme Court opinions, rather than more recent jurisprudence, are their lodestones for antitrust analysis. This is dramatically illustrated by the draft merger guidelines recently proposed by the FTC and ... Abandoning Antitrust Common Sense: The FTC’s New Normal?
There is much in the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) record over the past two years that could be categorized as abnormal. There is, for instance, nothing “normal” about using the threat of excessive force to cower businesses into submission. Introducing sky high costs for the filing of mergers isn’t normal, as it will scare away ... An FTC Complaint Against Amazon Gets Personal
There is mounting evidence that both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division (DOJ) are, under their current leadership, hostile to mergers. There are multiple elements to this evidence. Draft Merger Guidelines The recently released draft merger guidelines provide a strong indication of the agencies’ general aversion to mergers. ... The FTC’s (and DOJ’s) Merger Aversion
What will become of our culture if we forget the classics? Two bits seem salient here, would that either were my own. Dr. Frankenstein: Now, that brain you gave me. Was it Hans Delbruck’s? Igor: … [pause] … No. Dr. Frankenstein: Ah! Very good. Would you mind telling me whose brain I did put in? ... Abby Normal, a Flood of Ill-Considered Withdrawals, and the FTC’s Theatre of Listening
The draft merger guidelines that were released July 19 by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) indicate a shift by the agencies toward an overreliance on structural market factors to trigger merger scrutiny. For example, Draft Guideline 1—titled “Mergers Should Not Significantly Increase Concentration in Highly Concentrated Markets”—would lower the bar ... The Changing Role of Structural Presumption at the Federal Trade Commission
In this post—the last planned post for this symposium on The FTC’s New Normal (though we will continue to accept unsolicited submissions of responses)—I will offer some summary of the ideas that have been shared here over the past month, before turning to some of my own thoughts. To keep your attention rapt, I will ... I, For One, Welcome Our New FTC Overlords
Gus Hurwitz’s closing post in this symposium was a very cogent and persuasive (albeit overly optimistic) take on the current state of antitrust enforcement. I hesitate to quibble with my intellectual superior, but on some points I have a slightly different take. Gus says that law should be made through legislation or litigation, and obviously ... A Response to Gus on Our New FTC Overlords
