Showing results for: “digital markets act”
Antitrust, Multi-Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do We Have an Antitrust-Relevant Theory of Competition Now?
My essay on economics, innovation, and antitrust, forthcoming in Manne & Wright’s forthcoming volume on Regulating Innovation: Competition Policy and Patent Law Under Certainty (introductory chapter available here), is now available on SSRN. The essay is a revisiting of a fundamental challenge Harold Demsetz offered to antitrust decades ago that I believe has gone, from ... Antitrust, Multi-Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do We Have an Antitrust-Relevant Theory of Competition Now?
Kobayashi and Wright on Antitrust Aspects of Intellectual Property and Standard Setting
[REPOSTED BECAUSE SSRN LINK INACTIVE EARLIER, CHAPTER IS NOW AVAILABLE FOR DOWNLOAD] Bruce Kobayashi and I have posted our forthcoming chapter, Intellectual Property and Standard Setting, in the forthcoming ABA Antitrust Section Handbook on the Antitrust Aspects of Standard Setting. It offers an analytical overview of the antitrust issues involving intellectual property and standard setting ... Kobayashi and Wright on Antitrust Aspects of Intellectual Property and Standard Setting
International Signals: The Political Dimension of International Competition Law Harmonization
Seth Weinberger and I have a new article up at SSRN injecting some IR theory into the debate over international antitrust law. Abstract: The article, written jointly by a law professor and political science professor, endeavors to explain why the United States is particularly resistant to various efforts at international harmonization of antitrust law. While ... International Signals: The Political Dimension of International Competition Law Harmonization
Regulating Innovation: Competition Policy and Patent Law Under Uncertainty
Later this year Josh and I have an edited volume with the above title coming out with Cambridge University Press. The list of contributors is phenomenal, including: Bob Cooter Vincenzo Denicolo Richard Epstein Luigi Franzoni Damien Geradin Keith Hylton Marco Iansiti Scott Kieff Bruce Kobayashi Haizhen Lee Stan Leibowitz Mark Lemley Doug Lichtman Steve Margolis ... Regulating Innovation: Competition Policy and Patent Law Under Uncertainty
Some Links
Alex Tabarrok reviews economic growth textbooks and recommends this one Ribstein on the proxy access battles Private antitrust litigation is increasing quickly (picture here) — I’m setting the over/under for 2010 at 1600 cases Steve Salop on the appropriate Section 2 rule of reason standard for refusal to deal and price squeezes by unregulated, vertically ... Some Links
Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz and Ben Klein Should Win the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics
With the start of the school year comes another fall tradition here at TOTM: Nobel speculation. More specifically, every fall I yell from the rooftops that some combination of Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz and Ben Klein should win the award. In 2006, I argued that the UCLA trio outperformed the more conventionally wise trio of ... Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz and Ben Klein Should Win the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics
Kobayashi and Wright on Antitrust Issues in Intellectual Property & Standard Setting
Bruce Kobayashi and I have posted our forthcoming chapter, Intellectual Property and Standard Setting, in the forthcoming ABA Antitrust Section Handbook on the Antitrust Aspects of Standard Setting. It offers an analytical overview of the antitrust issues involving intellectual property and standard setting including, but not limited to, patent holdup, royalty stacking, refusals to license, ... Kobayashi and Wright on Antitrust Issues in Intellectual Property & Standard Setting
Another Way DOJ Might Pursue "Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era"
DOJ’s top antitrust enforcer Christine Varney had hardly gotten settled in her office before she repudiated the existing DOJ guidelines on policing single-firm conduct. In the spirit of Rahm Emanuel’s famous “never let a serious crisis go to waste” directive, Ms. Varney invoked the current economic crisis as grounds for her decision to throw out ... Another Way DOJ Might Pursue "Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era"
An Addendum on Jones v. Harris in Response to Professor Birdthistle: Ex Ante Competition, Cognitive Biases and Behavioral Economics
Professor Birdthistle has a very thoughtful reply to my earlier post over at the Conglomerate on Jones v. Harris and behavioral economics. I thank Professor Birdthistle for his reply. I’ve learned a great deal about Jones v. Harris from reading his posts at the Conglomerate and have no doubt that I’ll learn more from this ... An Addendum on Jones v. Harris in Response to Professor Birdthistle: Ex Ante Competition, Cognitive Biases and Behavioral Economics
Jones v. Harris and Some Ramblings on Burdens of Proof, Empirical Evidence, and Behavioral Law and Economics
Much has been made about the importance of Jones v. Harris as a battle in the ongoing war between behavioral economics and rational choice/neoclassical framework (see, e.g. the NYT). If the case if to be about the appropriate economic methodology or model for assessing legal questions, it is definitely an interesting turn to have Judge ... Jones v. Harris and Some Ramblings on Burdens of Proof, Empirical Evidence, and Behavioral Law and Economics
Results Not Typical
Apparently, under the proposed changes to the FTC advertising guidelines, a “results not typical” disclaimer for consumer endorsements representing a non-typical experience will no longer be sufficient on the grounds that those types of disclaimers have not been sufficient in deterring deception. The big change in the rules is as follows: “If the advertiser does ... Results Not Typical
The optimal level of risk is not zero
I have said it before and I’ll say it again: All of this hand wringing over executive compensation seems to exist in a parallel world where corporate executives have no risk aversion, where there is no real competition for managerial talent, and where firms can only take on too much–never too little–risk. And this in ... The optimal level of risk is not zero
