Archives For financial regulation

European Union lawmakers appear close to finalizing a number of legislative proposals that aim to reform the EU’s financial-regulation framework in response to the rise of cryptocurrencies. Prominent within the package are new anti-money laundering and “countering the financing of terrorism” rules (AML/CFT), including an extension of the so-called “travel rule.” The travel rule, which currently applies to wire transfers managed by global banks, would be extended to require crypto-asset service providers to similarly collect and make available details about the originators and beneficiaries of crypto-asset transfers.

This legislative process proceeded with unusual haste in recent months, which partially explains why legal objections to the proposals have not been adequately addressed. The resulting legislation is fundamentally flawed to such an extent that some of its key features are clearly invalid under EU primary (treaty) law and liable to be struck down by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 

In this post, I will offer a brief overview of some of the concerns, which I also discuss in this recent Twitter thread. I focus primarily on the travel rule, which—in the light of EU primary law—constitutes a broad and indiscriminate surveillance regime for personal data. This characterization also applies to most of AML/CFT.

The CJEU, the EU’s highest court, established a number of conditions that such legally mandated invasions of privacy must satisfy in order to be valid under EU primary law (the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). The legal consequences of invalidity are illustrated well by the Digital Rights Ireland judgment, in which the CJEU struck down an entire piece of EU legislation (the Data Retention Directive). Alternatively, the CJEU could decide to interpret EU law as if it complied with primary law, even if that is contrary to the text.

The Travel Rule in the Transfer of Funds Regulation

The EU travel rule is currently contained in the 2015 Wire Transfer Regulation (WTR). But at the end of June, EU legislators reached a likely final deal on its replacement, the Transfer of Funds Regulation (TFR; see the original proposal from July 2021). I focus here on the TFR, but much of the argument also applies to the older WTR now in force. 

The TFR imposes obligations on payment-system providers and providers of crypto-asset transfers (refer to here, collectively, as “service providers”) to collect, retain, transfer to other service providers, and—in some cases—report to state authorities:

…information on payers and payees, accompanying transfers of funds, in any currency, and the information on originators and beneficiaries, accompanying transfers of crypto-assets, for the purposes of preventing, detecting and investigating money laundering and terrorist financing, where at least one of the payment or crypto-asset service providers involved in the transfer of funds or crypto-assets is established in the Union. (Article 1 TFR)

The TFR’s scope extends to money transfers between bank accounts or other payment accounts, as well as transfers of crypto assets other than peer-to-peer transfers without the involvement of a service provider (Article 2 TFR). Hence, the scope of the TFR includes, but is not limited to, all those who send or receive bank transfers. This constitutes the vast majority of adult EU residents.

The information that service providers are obligated to collect and retain (under Articles 4, 10, 14, and 21 TFR) include data that allow for the identification of both sides of a transfer of funds (the parties’ names, as well as the address, country, official personal document number, customer identification number, or the sender’s date and place of birth) and for linking their identity with the (payment or crypto-asset) account number or crypto-asset wallet address. The TFR also obligates service providers to collect and retain additional data to verify the accuracy of the identifying information “on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source” (Articles 4(4), 7(3), 14(5), 16(2) TFR). 

The scope of the obligation to collect and retain verification data is vague and is likely to lead service providers to require their customers to provide copies of passports, national ID documents, bank or payment-account statements, and utility bills, as is the case under the WTR and the 5th AML Directive. Such data is overwhelmingly likely to go beyond information on the civil identity of customers and will often, if not almost always, allow inferring even sensitive personal data about the customer.

The data-collection and retention obligations in the TFR are general and indiscriminate. No distinction is made in TFR’s data-collection and retention provisions based on likelihood of a connection with criminal activity, except for verification data in the case of transfers of funds (an exception not applicable to crypto assets). Even, the distinction in the case of verification data for transfers of funds (“has reasonable grounds for suspecting money laundering or terrorist financing”) arguably lacks the precision required under CJEU case law.

Analogies with the CJEU’s Passenger Name Records Decision

In late June, following its established approach in similar cases, the CJEU gave its judgment in the Ligue des droits humains case, which challenged the EU and Belgian regimes on passenger name records (PNR). The CJEU decided there that the applicable EU law, the PNR Directive, is valid under EU primary law. But it reached that result by interpreting some of the directive’s provisions in ways contrary to their express language and by deciding that some national legal rules implementing the directive are invalid. Some features of the PNR regime that were challenged by the court are strikingly similar to the TFR regime.

First, just like the TFR, the PNR rules imposed a five-year data-retention period for the data of all passengers, even where there is no “objective evidence capable of establishing a risk that relates to terrorist offences or serious crime having an objective link, even if only an indirect one, with those passengers’ air travel.” The court decided that this was a disproportionate restriction of the rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data under Articles 5-7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Instead of invalidating the relevant article of the PNR Directive, the CJEU reinterpreted it as if it only allowed for five-year retention in cases where there is evidence of a relevant connection to criminality.

Applying analogous reasoning to the TFR, which imposes an indiscriminate five-year data retention period in its Article 21, the conclusion must be that this TFR provision is invalid under Articles 7-8 of the charter. Article 21 TFR may, at minimum, need to be recast to apply only to that transaction data where there is “objective evidence capable of establishing a risk” that it is connected to serious crime. The court also considered the issue of government access to data that has already been collected. Under the CJEU’s established interpretation of the EU Charter, “it is essential that access to retained data by the competent authorities be subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body.” In the PNR regime, at least some countries (such as Belgium) assigned this role to their “passenger information units” (PIUs). The court noted that a PIU is “an authority competent for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and of serious crime, and that its staff members may be agents seconded from the competent authorities” (e.g. from police or intelligence authorities). But according to the court:

That requirement of independence means that that authority must be a third party in relation to the authority which requests access to the data, in order that the former is able to carry out the review, free from any external influence. In particular, in the criminal field, the requirement of independence entails that the said authority, first, should not be involved in the conduct of the criminal investigation in question and, secondly, must have a neutral stance vis-a-vis the parties to the criminal proceedings …

The CJEU decided that PIUs do not satisfy this requirement of independence and, as such, cannot decide on government access to the retained data.

The TFR (especially its Article 19 on provision of information) does not provide for prior independent review of access to retained data. To the extent that such a review is conducted by Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) under the AML Directive, concerns arise very similar to the treatment of PIUs under the PNR regime. While Article 32 of the AML Directive requires FIUs to be independent, that doesn’t necessarily mean that they are independent in the ways required of the authority that will decide access to retained data under Articles 7-8 of the EU Charter. For example, the AML Directive does not preclude the possibility of seconding public prosecutors, police, or intelligence officers to FIUs.

It is worth noting that none of the conclusions reached by the CJEU in the PNR case are novel; they are well-grounded in established precedent. 

A General Proportionality Argument

Setting aside specific analogies with previous cases, the TFR clearly has not been accompanied by a more general and fundamental reflection on the proportionality of its basic scheme in the light of the EU Charter. A pressing question is whether the TFR’s far-reaching restrictions of the rights established in Articles 7-8 of the EU Charter (and perhaps other rights, like freedom of expression in Article 11) are strictly necessary and proportionate. 

Arguably, the AML/CFT regime—including the travel rule—are significantly more costly and more rights-restricting than potential alternatives. The basic problem is that there is no reliable data on the relative effectiveness of measures like the travel rule. Defenders of the current AML/CFT regime focus on evidence that it contributes to preventing or prosecuting some crime. But this is not the relevant question when it comes to proportionality. The relevant question is whether those measures are as effective or more effective than alternative, less costly, and more privacy-preserving alternatives. One conservative estimate holds that AML compliance costs in Europe were “120 times the amount successfully recovered from criminals’ and exceeded the estimated total of criminal funds (including funds not seized or identified).” 

The fact that the current AML/CFT regime is a de facto global standard cannot serve as a sufficient justification either, given that EU fundamental law is perfectly comfortable in rejecting non-European law-enforcement practices (see the CJEU’s decision in Schrems). The travel rule has been unquestioningly imported to EU law from U.S. law (via FATF), where the standards of constitutional protection of privacy are much different than under the EU Charter. This fact would likely be noticed by the Court of Justice in any putative challenge to the TFR or other elements of the AML/CFT regime. 

Here, I only flag the possibility of a general proportionality challenge. Much more work needs to be done to flesh it out.

Conclusion

Due to the political and resource constraints of the EU legislative process, it is possible that the legislative proposals in the financial-regulation package did not receive sufficient legal scrutiny from the perspective of their compatibility with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This hypothesis would explain the presence of seemingly clear violations, such as the indiscriminate five-year data-retention period. Given that none of the proposals has, as yet, been voted into law, making the legislators aware of the problem may help to address at least some of the issues.

Legal arguments about the AML/CFT regime’s incompatibility with the EU Charter should be accompanied with concrete alternative proposals to achieve the goals of preventing and combating serious crime that, according to the best evidence, the current AML/CFT regime does ineffectively. We need more regulatory imagination. For example, one part of the solution may be to properly staff and equip government agencies tasked with prosecuting financial crime.

But it’s also possible that the proposals, including the TFR, will be adopted broadly without amendment. In that case, the main recourse available to EU citizens (or to any EU government) will be to challenge the legality of the measures before the Court of Justice.

Canada’s large merchants have called on the government to impose price controls on interchange fees, claiming this would benefit not only merchants but also consumers. But experience elsewhere contradicts this claim.

In a recently released Macdonald Laurier Institute report, Julian Morris, Geoffrey A. Manne, Ian Lee, and Todd J. Zywicki detail how price controls on credit card interchange fees would result in reduced reward earnings and higher annual fees on credit cards, with adverse effects on consumers, many merchants and the economy as a whole.

This study draws on the experience with fee caps imposed in other jurisdictions, highlighting in particular the effects in Australia, where interchange fees were capped in 2003. There, the caps resulted in a significant decrease in the rewards earned per dollar spent and an increase in annual card fees. If similar restrictions were imposed in Canada, resulting in a 40 percent reduction in interchange fees, the authors of the report anticipate that:

  1. On average, each adult Canadian would be worse off to the tune of between $89 and $250 per year due to a loss of rewards and increase in annual card fees:
    1. For an individual or household earning $40,000, the net loss would be $66 to $187; and
    2. for an individual or household earning $90,000, the net loss would be $199 to $562.
  2. Spending at merchants in aggregate would decline by between $1.6 billion and $4.7 billion, resulting in a net loss to merchants of between $1.6 billion and $2.8 billion.
  3. GDP would fall by between 0.12 percent and 0.19 percent per year.
  4. Federal government revenue would fall by between 0.14 percent and 0.40 percent.

Moreover, tighter fee caps would “have a more dramatic negative effect on middle class households and the economy as a whole.”

You can read the full report here.

On February 28, the Heritage Foundation released Prosperity Unleashed:  Smarter Financial Regulation, a Report that lays bare the heavy and unnecessary burdens imposed on our economy by defective financial regulations, and proposed market-oriented regulatory reforms that would benefit American producers, consumers, and the overall economy.  In a recent Truth on the Market blog commentary, I summarized the key findings and recommendations set forth in the Report’s 23 chapters.  In this commentary, I explore in greater detail chapter 19 of the Report, “How Congress Should Protect Consumers’ Finances,” co-authored by George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law Todd J. Zywicki and me.

Chapter 19 makes the case for legislative reform that would eliminate the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s oversight of consumer protection in financial markets and transfer such authority to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (key excerpts with footnote references omitted follow):

Free-market competition is key to the efficient provision of the goods and services that consumers desire. More generally, the free market promotes innovation and overall economic welfare. Imperfect information can, however, limit the ability of competition to be effective in benefiting consumers and the economy. In particular, inaccurate information about the quality and attributes of market offerings may lead consumers to make mistaken purchase decisions—in other words, consumers may not get what they think they bargained for. This will lead to the distrust of market processes, as sellers find it harder to differentiate themselves from their competition. The end result is less-effective competition, less consumer satisfaction, and lower economic welfare.

Fraudulent or deceptive statements regarding product or service attributes, and negative features of products or services that become evident only after sale, are prime examples of inaccurate information that undermines trust in competitive firms. Accordingly, the government has a legitimate role in seeking to curb fraud, deception, and related informational problems. Historically, the federal government’s primary consumer protection agency, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), has taken the lead in bringing enforcement actions against businesses that distort markets by engaging in “deceptive” or “unfair” practices when marketing their offerings to consumers. In recent decades, the FTC has taken an economics-focused approach in these areas. Specifically, it has limited “deception prosecutions” to cases where consumers acting reasonably were misled and tangibly harmed, and “unfairness prosecutions” to situations involving consumer injury not outweighed by countervailing benefits (a cost-benefit approach). In other words, although the FTC may have erred from time to time in specific cases, its general approach has avoided government overreach and has been conducive to enhancing marketplace efficiency and consumer welfare.

However, Congress has not allowed the FTC to exercise economy-wide oversight over consumer protection, in general, and fraud and deception, in particular. For many years, a hodgepodge of different federal financial service regulators were empowered to regulate the practices of a wide variety of financial industry entities, with the FTC only empowered to oversee consumer financial protection with respect to the narrow category of “non-bank financial institutions.” As part of the 2010 Dodd–Frank financial reform legislation, Congress created a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), loosely tied to the Federal Reserve Board. While Dodd–Frank mandated shared CFPB–FTC consumer protection jurisdiction over non-bank financial institutions, it transferred all other authority over the many separate consumer financial protection laws to the CFPB alone. The CFPB is simultaneously one of the most powerful and least-accountable regulatory bodies in United States history. In marked contrast to the FTC’s economics-based approach, the CFPB intervenes in financial market consumer-related practices in a heavy-handed arbitrary fashion that ignores sound economics. The upshot is that far from improving market efficiency, the CFPB reduces market efficiency, to the detriment of consumers, producers, and the overall economy. In short, the CFPB’s actions are a prime example of government failure.

The substantive powers of the CFPB are vast and ill-defined. The CFPB has power to regulate the terms and marketing of every consumer credit product in the economy. And, because many small businesses use personal credit to start and grow their businesses (such as personal credit cards, home equity lines of credit, and even products like auto title loans), the CFPB possesses substantial control over much of the allocation of small-business credit as well. The CFPB has the power to take enforcement and regulatory action against “unfair, deceptive, and abusive” consumer credit terms, an authority that the CFPB has exercised with gusto. Moreover, the CFPB has deliberately eschewed regulatory rule-making that would clarify these terms, preferring to engage in case-by-case enforcement actions that undermine predictability and chill vigorous competition and innovation. Yet despite the broad authority granted to the CFPB, its appetite is broader still: The CFPB has taken action to regulate products such as cellphone billing, for-profit career colleges, and even loans made by auto dealers (despite express jurisdictional limits in Dodd–Frank regarding the latter).

The consequences of this unchecked authority have been disastrous for consumers and the economy. Complicated rules with high compliance costs have choked off access to mortgages, credit cards, and other financial products. Overwhelmed by the costs and uncertainty of regulatory compliance, small banks have exited traditional lines of business, such as home mortgages, and feared entering new lines, such as small-dollar loans. Consistent with the general effects of Dodd–Frank, the CFPB has contributed to the consolidation of the American financial sector, making big banks bigger, and forcing consolidation of small banks. By imposing one-size-fits-all bureaucratic underwriting standards on community banks and credit unions, the CFPB has deprived these actors of their traditional model of relationship lending and intimate knowledge of their customers—their lone competitive advantage over megabanks.

Perhaps the most tragic element of the CFPB train wreck is the missed opportunity for reform that it represents. At the time of Dodd–Frank, the system of consumer financial protection was badly in need of modernization: The existing system was cumbersome, incoherent, and ineffective. Fragmented among multiple federal agencies with authority over different providers of financial services, the federal system lacked the ability to lay down a coherent regulatory regime that would promote competition, consumer choice, and consumer protection consistent with the realities of a 21st-century economy and technology. While there is little evidence that the financial crisis resulted from a breakdown of consumer financial protection (as opposed to safety and soundness issues), reform was timely. But Dodd–Frank squandered a once-in-a-generation opportunity to bring about real reform.

In this chapter, we briefly make the case that some degree of reform of the consumer financial protection system was appropriate, in particular, the consolidation of consumer financial protection in one federal agency. However, we challenge the apparatus constructed by Dodd–Frank that created a new unaccountable super-regulator with a tunnel vision focus on a narrow definition of “consumer protection.” Instead, we argue that existing substantive powers were largely sufficient to the task of consumer protection, and that Congress could have achieved better results by acting within the existing institutional framework by simply consolidating authority in the FTC. By working within the existing framework of long-standing substantive authorities and institutional arrangements, Congress could have provided the needed modernization of the federal consumer financial protection system without the unintended consequences that have resulted from the creation of the CFPB. . . .

Consolidating the powers granted to the CFPB in the FTC, which still retains certain regulatory responsibilities with respect to consumer finance, would have a number of advantages over the course chosen in Dodd–Frank.

First, the FTC is a multimember, bipartisan commission. This is an important improvement over the structure of the CFPB, which [is led by a single unaccountable director and] is neither an independent commission nor an executive agency. . . . 

[Second,] [t]he FTC [,unlike the CFPB,] is . . . subject to Congress’s appropriations process, an important check on the agency’s actions. . . .

Finally, the FTC has a large Bureau of Economics, staffed with academically trained economists who would be ideally suited to take into account the regulatory economic policy issues, discussed herein, to which the CFPB has paid no heed. This would make it far more likely that agency regulatory decisions affecting consumer credit markets would be taken in light of the effects of agency actions on consumer welfare and the broader economy. . . .

[In conclusion,] [e]liminating the CFPB’s authority over consumer protection in financial services, and transferring such authority to the FTC, would greatly improve the current sorry state of affairs. Admittedly, the FTC is a less-than-perfect agency, and even a multimember-commission structure does not prevent institutional mistakes from being made and repeated by the majority. All in all, however, as an accountable institution, the FTC is far superior to the CFPB. Consolidating this authority with the FTC—where it should have been in the first place—will better allow free markets to promote innovation and overall economic welfare. Strengthening this legal framework to provide a single, clearly defined, properly limited set of rules will facilitate competition among financial firms, thus protecting consumers and providing them with better choices.

On September 28, the American Antitrust Institute released a report (“AAI Report”) on the state of U.S. antitrust policy, provocatively entitled “A National Competition Policy:  Unpacking the Problem of Declining Competition and Setting Priorities for Moving Forward.”  Although the AAI Report contains some valuable suggestions, in important ways it reminds one of the drunkard who seeks his (or her) lost key under the nearest lamppost.  What it requires is greater sobriety and a broader vision of the problems that beset the American economy.

The AAI Report begins by asserting that “[n]ot since the first federal antitrust law was enacted over 120 years ago has there been the level of public concern over the concentration of economic and political power that we see today.”  Well, maybe, although I for one am not convinced.  The paper then states that “competition is now on the front pages, as concerns over rising concentration, extraordinary profits accruing to the top slice of corporations, slowing innovation, and widening income and wealth inequality have galvanized attention.”  It then goes on to call for a more aggressive federal antitrust enforcement policy, with particular attention paid to concentrated markets.  The implicit message is that dedicated antitrust enforcers during the Obama Administration, led by Federal Trade Commission Chairs Jonathan Leibowitz and Edith Ramirez, and Antitrust Division chiefs Christine Varney, Bill Baer, and Renata Hesse (Acting) have been laggard or asleep at the switch.  But where is the evidence for this?  I am unaware of any and the AAI doesn’t say.  Indeed, federal antitrust officials in the Obama Administration consistently have called for tough enforcement, and they have actively pursued vertical as well as horizontal conduct cases and novel theories of IP-antitrust liability.  Thus, the AAI Report’s contention that antitrust needs to be “reinvigorated” is unconvincing.

The AAI Report highlights three “symptoms” of declining competition:  (1) rising concentration, (2) higher profits to the few and slowing rates of start-up activity, and (3) widening income and wealth inequality.  But these concerns are not something that antitrust policy is designed to address.  Mergers that threaten to harm competition are within the purview of antitrust, but modern antitrust rightly focuses on the likely effects of such mergers, not on the mere fact that they may increase concentration.  Furthermore, antitrust assesses the effects of business agreements on the competitive process.  Antitrust does not ask whether business arrangements yield “unacceptably” high profits, or “overly low” rates of business formation, or “unacceptable” wealth and income inequality.  Indeed, antitrust is not well equipped to address such questions, nor does it possess the tools to “solve” them (even assuming they need to be solved).

In short, if American competition is indeed declining based on the symptoms flagged by the AAI Report, the key to the solution will not be found by searching under the antitrust policy lamppost for illumination.  Rather, a more thorough search, with the help of “common sense” flashlights, is warranted.

The search outside the antitrust spotlight is not, however, a difficult one.  Finding the explanation for lagging competitive conditions in the United States requires no great policy legerdemain, because sound published research already provides the answer.  And that answer centers on government failures, not private sector abuses.

Consider overregulation.  In its annual Red Tape Rising reports (see here for the latest one), the Heritage Foundation has documented the growing burden of federal regulation on the American economy.  Overregulation acts like an implicit tax on businesses and disincentivizes business start-ups.  Moreover, as regulatory requirements grow in complexity and burdensomeness, they increasingly place a premium on large size – only relatively larger businesses can better afford the fixed costs needed to establish regulatory compliance department than their smaller rivals.  Heritage Foundation Scholar Norbert Michel summarizes this phenomenon in his article Dodd-Frank and Glass-Steagall – ‘Consumer Protection for Billionaires’:

Even when it’s not by nefarious design, we end up with rules that favor the largest/best-funded firms over their smaller/less-well-funded competitors. Put differently, our massive regulatory state ends up keeping large firms’ competitors at bay.  The more detailed regulators try to be, the more complex the rules become. And the more complex the rules become, the smaller the number of people who really care. Hence, more complicated rules and regulations serve to protect existing firms from competition more than simple ones. All of this means consumers lose. They pay higher prices, they have fewer choices of financial products and services, and they pretty much end up with the same level of protection they’d have with a smaller regulatory state.

What’s worse, some of the most onerous regulatory schemes are explicitly designed to favor large competitors over small ones.  A prime example is financial services regulation, and, in particular, the rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act (other examples could readily be provided).  As a Heritage Foundation report explains (footnote citations omitted):

The [Dodd-Frank] act was largely intended to reduce the risk of a major bank failure, but the regulatory burden is crippling community banks (which played little role in the financial crisis). According to Harvard University researchers Marshall Lux and Robert Greene, small banks’ share of U.S. commercial banking assets declined nearly twice as much since the second quarter of 2010—around the time of Dodd–Frank’s passage—as occurred between 2006 and 2010. Their share currently stands at just 22 percent, down from 41 percent in 1994.

The increased consolidation rate is driven by regulatory economies of scale—larger banks are better suited to handle increased regulatory burdens than are smaller banks, causing the average costs of community banks to rise. The decline in small bank assets spells trouble for their primary customer base—small business loans and those seeking residential mortgages.

Ironically, Dodd–Frank proponents pushed for the law as necessary to rein in the big banks and Wall Street. In fact, the regulations are giving the largest companies a competitive advantage over smaller enterprises—the opposite outcome sought by Senator Christopher Dodd (D–CT), Representative Barney Frank (D–MA), and their allies. As Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein recently explained: “More intense regulatory and technology requirements have raised the barriers to entry higher than at any other time in modern history. This is an expensive business to be in, if you don’t have the market share in scale.

In sum, as Dodd-Frank and other regulatory programs illustrate, large government rulemaking schemes often are designed to favor large and wealthy well-connected rent-seekers at the expense of smaller and more dynamic competitors.

More generally, as Heritage Foundation President Jim DeMint and Heritage Action for America CEO Mike Needham have emphasized, well-connected businesses use lobbying and inside influence to benefit themselves by having government enact special subsidies, bailouts and complex regulations, including special tax preferences. Those special preferences undermine competition on the merits by firms that lack insider status, to the public detriment.  Relatedly, the hideously complex system of American business taxation, which features the highest corporate tax rates in the developed world (which can better be manipulated by very large corporate players), depresses wages and is a serious drag on the American economy, as shown by Heritage Foundation scholars Curtis Dubay and David Burton.  In a similar vein, David Burton testified before Congress in 2015 on how the various excesses of the American regulatory state (including bad tax, health care, immigration, and other regulatory policies, combined with an overly costly legal system) undermine U.S. entrepreneurship (see here).

In other words, special subsidies, regulations, and tax and regulatory programs for the well-connected are part and parcel of crony capitalism, which (1) favors large businesses, tending to raise concentration; (2) confers higher profits on the well-connected while discouraging small business entrepreneurship; and (3) promotes income and wealth inequality, with the greatest returns going to the wealthiest government cronies who know best how to play the Washington “rent seeking game.”  Unfortunately, crony capitalism has grown like topsy during the Obama Administration.

Accordingly, I would counsel AAI to turn its scholarly gaze away from antitrust and toward the true source of the American competitive ailments it spotlights:  crony capitalism enabled by the growth of big government special interest programs and increasingly costly regulatory schemes.  Let’s see if AAI takes my advice.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is, to say the least, a controversial agency.  As documented by such experts as Scalia Law School Professor Todd Zywicki, the CFPB imposes enormous costs on consumers and financial service providers through costly and unwarranted command-and-control regulation.  Furthermore, as I explained in a February 2016 Heritage Foundation legal memorandum, the CFPB’s exemption from the oversight constraints that apply to other federal agencies offends the separation of powers and thus raises serious constitutional problems.  (Indeed, a federal district court in the District of Columbia is currently entertaining a challenge to the Bureau’s constitutionality.)

Given its freedom from normal constitutionally-mandated supervision, the CFPB’s willingness to take sweeping and arguably arbitrary actions is perhaps not surprising.  Nevertheless, even by its own standards, the Bureau’s latest initiative is particularly egregious.  Specifically, on June 2, 2016, the CFPB issued a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans” (CFPB NPRM) setting forth a set of requirements that would effectively put “payday loan” companies out of business.  (The U.S. Government has already unjustifiably harmed payday lenders through “Operation Choke Point,” pursuant to which federal bank regulators, in particular the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), have sought to deny those lenders access to banking services.  A Heritage Foundation overview of Operation Choke Point and a call for its elimination may be found here; the harm the FDIC has imposed on payday lenders is detailed here.)

The CFPB defines a “payday loan” as “a short-term loan, generally for $500 or less, that is typically due on your next payday. . . .  [The borrower] must give lenders access to . . . [his or her] checking account or write a check for the full balance in advance that the lender has an option of depositing when the loan comes due.”  Moreover, payday loans are often structured to be paid off in one lump-sum payment, but interest-only payments – “renewals” or “rollovers” – are not unusual. In some cases, payday loans may be structured so that they are repayable in installments over a longer period of time.”

Despite their unusual character, economic analysis reveals that payday loans efficiently serve the needs of a certain class of borrower and that welfare is reduced if government seeks to sharply limit them.  In a 2009 study, Professor Zywicki summarized key research findings:

Economic research strongly supports two basic conclusions about payday lending:  First, those who use payday lending do so because they have to, not because they want to.  They use payday lending to deal with short-term exigencies and a lack of access to payday loans would likely cause them substantial cost and personal difficulty, such as bounced checks, disconnected utilities, or lack of funds for emergencies such as medical expenses or car repairs. Those who use payday loans have limited alternative sources of credit, such as pawn shops, bank overdraft protection, credit card cash advances (where available), and informal lenders. Although expensive, payday loans are less expensive than available alternatives. Misguided paternalistic regulation that deprives consumers of access to payday loans would likely force many of them to turn to even more expensive lenders or to do without emergency funds. Although payday loans may lead some consumers to be trapped in a “debt trap” of repeated revolving debt, this concern is not unique to payday lending. Moreover, evidence indicates that those who are led into a debt trap by payday lending are far fewer in number than those who are benefited by access to payday loans.

Second, efforts by legislators to regulate the terms of small consumer loans (such as by imposing price caps on fees or limitations on repeated use “rollovers”) almost invariably produce negative unintended consequences that vastly exceed any social benefits gained from the legislation. Moreover, prior studies of price caps on lending have found that low-income and minority borrowers are most negatively affected by the regulations and the adjustments that they produce. Volumes of economic theory and empirical analysis indicate that further restrictions on payday lending likely would prove counterproductive and harmful to the very people such restrictions would be intended to help.

Unfortunately, the CFPB seems to be oblivious to these findings on payday lending, as demonstrated by key language of the CFPB NPRM:

[T]he [CFPB’s] proposal would identify it as an abusive and unfair practice for a lender to make a covered loan without reasonably determining that the consumer has the ability to repay the loan.  The proposal generally would require that, before making a covered loan, a lender must reasonably determine that the consumer has the ability to repay the loan.  The proposal also would impose certain restrictions on making covered loans when a consumer has or recently had certain outstanding loans. . . .  The proposal also would identify it as an unfair and abusive practice to attempt to withdraw payment from a consumer’s account for a covered loan after two consecutive payment attempts have failed, unless the lender obtains the consumer’s new and specific authorization to make further withdrawals from the account. The proposal would require lenders to provide certain notices to the consumer before attempting to withdraw payment for a covered loan from the consumer’s account. The proposal would also prescribe processes and criteria for registration of information systems, and requirements for furnishing loan information to and obtaining consumer reports from those registered information systems. The Bureau is proposing to adopt official interpretations to the proposed regulation.

In short, the CFPB NPRM, if implemented, would impose new and onerous costs on payday lenders with respect to each loan, arising out of:  (1) determination of the borrower’s ability to pay; (2) identification of the borrower’s other outstanding loans; (3) the practical inability to recover required payments from a defaulting consumer’s account (due to required consumer authorization and notice obligations); and (4) the registration of information systems and requirements for obtaining various sorts of consumer information from those systems.  In the aggregate, these costs would likely make a large number of payday loan programs unprofitable – thereby (1) driving those loans out of the market and harming legitimate lenders while also (2) denying credit to, and thereby reducing the welfare of, the consumers who would be denied their best feasible source of credit.

As Heritage Foundation scholar Norbert Michel put it in a June 2, 2016 Daily Signal article:

The CFPB’s [NPRM] regulatory solution . . . centers on an absurd concept: ability to repay. Basically, the new rules force lenders to certify that consumers have the ability to repay their loan, turning the idea of voluntary exchange on its head.

Here, too, the new rules are based on the flawed idea that firms typically seek out consumers who can’t possibly pay what they owe. It doesn’t take a graduate degree to figure out that’s not a viable long-term business strategy.

None of this matters to the CFPB. Shockingly, neither does the CFPB’s own evidence.

In sum, the CFPB NPRM provides yet one more good reason for Congress to seriously consider abolishing the CFPB (legislation introduced by the House and Senate in 2015 would do this), with consumer protection authority authorities currently exercised by the Bureau returned to the seven agencies that originally administered them.   While we are awaiting congressional action, however, the CFPB would be well-advised (assuming it truly desires to promote economic welfare) to reconsider its latest ill-considered initiative and withdraw the NPRM as soon as possible.

by Geoffrey A. Manne, Joshua D. Wright and Todd J. Zywicki

Cross-posted at Business in the Beltway (at Forbes.com) and The Volokh Conspiracy.

In a recent commentary at Forbes.com, former Clinton administration economist Robert Shapiro argues that some 250,000 jobs would be created, and consumers would save $27 billion annually, by reducing the interchange fee charged to merchants for transactions made by consumers using credit and debit cards.  If true, these are some incredible numbers.

But incredible is indeed the correct characterization for his calculations.  Shapiro’s claims, based on a recent study he co-authored, rest on tendentious accounting, questionable assumptions, and—most crucially—a misunderstanding of the economics of interchange fees.  Political price caps on interchange fees won’t help the economy or create jobs—but they will make consumers poorer.

First, Shapiro estimates the employment impact of a redistribution of fees using the same stimulus multiplier that the Obama administration uses to tout the effect of its stimulus package.  But it is completely inappropriate to simply “plug in” the multiplier for government stimulus to calculate the effect of a reduction of interchange fees —unless the interchange fees currently paid to banks somehow simply disappear from the economy, contributing nothing to job creation, lowering the cost of capital, or increasing access to credit.  Even assuming that some portion of the fees are pure profit for card issuers, those profits must be paid out to shareholders or employees, invested, or used to bolster bank balance sheets (which provides capital for lending).  So, unlike the stimulus, this is at best merely a politically-mandated wealth (and employment) redistribution from card issuers to merchants, and any calculation of apparent economic gain must be offset by a similar calculation of loss on the other side.  Having ignored this offset, Shapiro’s conclusions are completely untenable.

But Shapiro also misunderstands the economics of payment card networks and the role of the interchange fee within them.  For example, Shapiro estimates that 70% of merchant savings from reduced interchange fees would be passed on to consumers in the form of lower retail prices.  But that is pure speculation.  In Australia, where regulators imposed price controls on interchange in 2003, fees paid by merchants have fallen but consumers have seen no reduction in the prices that they pay.  And where merchants have been permitted to impose surcharges on credit users, the surcharge can, and often does, substantially exceed the interchange fee cost.  It is not for nothing that merchants have spent millions trying to push interchange fee regulation through Congress.

In addition, Shapiro suggests that interchange fees are excessive in light of the “transaction and processing costs of using credit and debit cards.”  But his estimation of these costs is dramatically off-base.  Not only does he appear to exclude the cost of the delay between the time merchants receive payment (almost immediately) and when consumers pay their bills (at the end of a billing cycle), he ignores what may be the most significant single cost of consumer credit operations (and corresponding benefit to merchants): the cost of credit loss. Continue Reading…