Showing archive for: “Telecom”
“You don’t get to be the umpire and have a team”: should we regulate the activities of digital platforms in neighboring markets?
This guest post is by Patrick Todd, an England-qualified solicitor and author on competition law/policy in digital markets. The above quote is not about Democrat-nominee hopeful Elizabeth Warren’s policy views on sport. It is in fact an analogy to her proposal of splitting Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (“GAFA”) apart from their respective ancillary lines ... “You don’t get to be the umpire and have a team”: should we regulate the activities of digital platforms in neighboring markets?
What Can the Stock Market Tell Us About the T-Mobile/Sprint Merger?
On Monday evening, around 6:00 PM Eastern Standard Time, news leaked that the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had decided to allow the T-Mobile/Sprint merger to go through, giving the companies a victory over a group of state attorneys general trying to block the deal. Thomas Philippon, a professor ... What Can the Stock Market Tell Us About the T-Mobile/Sprint Merger?
Manne & Stout 1: The Illogic of a Contract/Merger Equivalency Assumption in the Assessment of Vertical Mergers
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Geoffrey A. Manne (President & Founder, ICLE; Distinguished Fellow, Northwestern University Center on Law, Business, and Economics ); and Kristian Stout (Associate Director, ... Manne & Stout 1: The Illogic of a Contract/Merger Equivalency Assumption in the Assessment of Vertical Mergers
Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 4 (Microsoft)
The DOJ and 20 state AGs sued Microsoft on May 18, 1998 for unlawful maintenance of its monopoly position in the PC market. The government accused the desktop giant of tying its operating system (Windows) and its web browser (Internet Explorer). Microsoft had indeed become dominant in the PC market by the late 1980s: But ... Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 4 (Microsoft)
The Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 3 (AT&T)
The case against AT&T began in 1974. The government alleged that AT&T had monopolized the market for local and long-distance telephone service as well as telephone equipment. In 1982, the company entered into a consent decree to be broken up into eight pieces (the “Baby Bells” plus the parent company), which was completed in 1984. ... The Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 3 (AT&T)
The Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 2 (IBM)
The Department of Justice began its antitrust case against IBM on January 17, 1969. The DOJ sued under the Sherman Antitrust Act, claiming IBM tried to monopolize the market for “general-purpose digital computers.” The case lasted almost thirteen years, ending on January 8, 1982 when Assistant Attorney General William Baxter declared the case to be ... The Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 2 (IBM)
The Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 1
Big Tech continues to be mired in “a very antitrust situation,” as President Trump put it in 2018. Antitrust advocates have zeroed in on Facebook, Google, Apple, and Amazon as their primary targets. These advocates justify their proposals by pointing to the trio of antitrust cases against IBM, AT&T, and Microsoft. Elizabeth Warren, in announcing ... The Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 1
The Upsides of Collusion and Concentration
Conspiracies and collusion often (always?) get a bad rap. Adam Smith famously derided “people of the same trade” for their inclination to conspire against the public or contrive to raise prices. Today, such conspiracies and contrivances are per se illegal and felonies punishable under the Sherman Act. It is well known and widely accepted that ... The Upsides of Collusion and Concentration
Is FRAND Litigation a Credible Threat?: A reply to Mark Lemley, Douglas Melamed and Steven Salop
Last week, we posted a piece on TOTM, criticizing the amicus brief written by Mark Lemley, Douglas Melamed and Steven Salop in the ongoing Qualcomm litigation. The authors prepared a thoughtful response to our piece, which we published today on TOTM. In this post, we highlight the points where we agree with the amici (or ... Is FRAND Litigation a Credible Threat?: A reply to Mark Lemley, Douglas Melamed and Steven Salop
Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 3): Where is the Harm?
This is the third in a series of TOTM blog posts discussing the Commission’s recently published Google Android decision (the first post can be found here, and the second here). It draws on research from a soon-to-be published ICLE white paper. (Comparison of Google and Apple’s smartphone business models. Red $ symbols represent money invested; ... Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 3): Where is the Harm?
Mr. Watson, I Want to See You … About Vertical Mergers and Price Regulation
Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, and Fiona Scott Morton don’t like vertical mergers: Vertical mergers can harm competition, for example, through input foreclosure or customer foreclosure, or by the creation of two-level entry barriers. … Competitive harms from foreclosure can occur from the merged firm exercising its increased bargaining leverage to ... Mr. Watson, I Want to See You … About Vertical Mergers and Price Regulation
It’s Time to Let STELA Go Off Into the Sunset and Reform Video Marketplace Regulation
Every 5 years, Congress has to reauthorize the sunsetting provisions of the Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act (STELA). And the deadline for renewing the law is quickly approaching (Dec. 31). While sunsetting is, in the abstract, seemingly a good thing to ensure rules don’t become outdated, there are an interlocking set of interest groups ... It’s Time to Let STELA Go Off Into the Sunset and Reform Video Marketplace Regulation
