Showing archive for: “Law & Economics”
Licensed to Wait: The High Cost of Spectrum Delay
America’s wireless future is on hold, pending another study. Federal agencies control much of the spectrum needed to build it—and the process for opening those frequencies rewards incumbents for taking their time. Sustaining U.S. leadership in wireless technology requires more spectrum—the radio frequencies that carry wireless signals—for fifth- and sixth-generation mobile networks (5G and 6G), ... Licensed to Wait: The High Cost of Spectrum Delay
Fraud, Platforms, and the Art of Getting Ahead of Yourself
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) wants to stop impersonation scams. Fair enough. But calling a new regulatory venture an “update” doesn’t make it one, and spotting a real problem doesn’t tell you which rules—if any—will solve it. A little more homework would help. On Sept. 24, the FTC announced an advance notice of proposed rulemaking ... Fraud, Platforms, and the Art of Getting Ahead of Yourself
The Case of the Missing Sale: The FTC’s Personalized-Pricing Blind Spot
Suppose a retailer charges $10 for a service. One customer values it at $11 and buys it. Another values it at $8 and walks away. The retailer sends the second customer a $3 coupon. She pays $7, gets something worth $8 to her, and the retailer makes a sale it otherwise would have missed. The ... The Case of the Missing Sale: The FTC’s Personalized-Pricing Blind Spot
‘The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence,’ by Niko Matouschek and Imran Rasul
Marriage is a natural subject for law & economics scholars. From Gary Becker’s “A Treatise on the Family” (1981) to Margaret Brinig’s “From Contract to Covenant” (2000), scholars have expanded our understanding of romantic love by examining it through an economic lens. Some object that bringing law & economics into marriage risks coarsening and cheapening ... ‘The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence,’ by Niko Matouschek and Imran Rasul
‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design,’ by Robert Scott and George Triantis
Economists and lawyers know that almost every contract is incomplete. Contracts routinely omit or leave undefined important terms, and they rarely anticipate every circumstance that might frustrate performance. The reason is simple: It makes little sense to spend $1,000 drafting a provision that has an expected value of only $100. Parties therefore leave lower-value contingencies ... ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design,’ by Robert Scott and George Triantis
Your Price May Vary: The FTC’s Personalized-Pricing Puzzle
A price that knows your name may be creepy. It may also be a bargain. That ambiguity sits at the heart of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) proposed enforcement policy statement on personalized pricing, which opens with a candid admission: The practice is “not well understood,” and its effects on consumers remain “unclear.” That uncertainty ... Your Price May Vary: The FTC’s Personalized-Pricing Puzzle
‘Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of Indian-White Relations’ by Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney
The traditional domain of law & economics is the courtroom, the legislature, and the administrative agency. But in their 1994 article, “Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of Indian-White Relations,” Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney took the theoretical tools developed to explain modern legal disputes and set out to settle a wider continent. When European ... ‘Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of Indian-White Relations’ by Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney
The Evaluative Emptiness of the Economic Approach to Law
Law & economics traces its intellectual roots to the University of Chicago. That lineage still shapes how the field is understood. Chicago price theory—especially Gary Becker’s (1976) systematic application of maximization, equilibrium, and stable preferences across social life, and George Stigler’s (1992, p. 459) suggestion that “every durable social institution or practice is efficient, or ... The Evaluative Emptiness of the Economic Approach to Law
‘What is Law? A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order,’ by Gillian Hadfield and Barry Weingast
“What Is Law? A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order” by Gillian K. Hadfield and Barry R. Weingast asks whether legal order requires a centralized enforcement agency. The paper argues it does not. It presents a model in which a system of decentralized enforcement, carried out collectively by individual agents, sustains legal order. ... ‘What is Law? A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order,’ by Gillian Hadfield and Barry Weingast
NPU: Political Economy Without Economics
It appears that a new branch has forked off from the “hipster” neo-Brandeisian approach toward regulation, which styles itself as the study of “networks, platforms, and utilities” (NPU). Beginning with the 2022 publication of the “Networks, Platforms, and Utilities: Law and Policy” casebook by Morgan Ricks, Ganesh Sitaraman, Shelley Welton, and Lev Menand, NPU has ... NPU: Political Economy Without Economics
Why Armen Alchian Is the GOAT
Tyler Cowen has a new online book out titled “GOAT: Who is the Greatest Economist of All Time, and Why Does it Matter?” While there are potential problems in treating ideas like basketball, the project is a fun, fast read overall. As the author of a newsletter with frequent gifs, I’m all for encouraging light-hearted ... Why Armen Alchian Is the GOAT
Biweekly FTC Roundup: Antitrust Woodstock Edition
Last week’s roundup was postponed because I was kibbitzing at the spring meeting of the American Bar Association (ABA) Antitrust Section. For those outside the antitrust world, the spring meeting is the annual antitrust version of Woodstock. For those inside the antitrust world: Antitrust Woodstock is not really a thing. At the planetary-orbit level, the ... Biweekly FTC Roundup: Antitrust Woodstock Edition
