Showing archive for: “Error Costs”
U.S. Antitrust Enforcement and Error Costs: The Supreme Court and the Obama Administration
My article with Thom Lambert arguing that the Supreme Court – but not the Obama Administration – has substantially adopted an error cost approach to antitrust enforcement, appears in the newly released September 2015 issue of the Journal of Competition Law and Economics. To whet your appetite, I am providing the abstract: In his seminal ... U.S. Antitrust Enforcement and Error Costs: The Supreme Court and the Obama Administration
The essence of Josh Wright’s FTC tenure was to ensure that benefits outweigh costs; the rest is commentary
As the organizer of this retrospective on Josh Wright’s tenure as FTC Commissioner, I have the (self-conferred) honor of closing out the symposium. When Josh was confirmed I wrote that: The FTC will benefit enormously from Josh’s expertise and his error cost approach to antitrust and consumer protection law will be a tremendous asset to ... The essence of Josh Wright’s FTC tenure was to ensure that benefits outweigh costs; the rest is commentary
Josh Wright and the Limits of Antitrust
Alden Abbott and I recently co-authored an article, forthcoming in the Journal of Competition Law and Economics, in which we examined the degree to which the Supreme Court and the federal enforcement agencies have recognized the inherent limits of antitrust law. We concluded that the Roberts Court has admirably acknowledged those limits and has for ... Josh Wright and the Limits of Antitrust
The FTC’s Cardinal Health Settlement is Bad Antitrust Medicine and Highlights the Need for Additional Antitrust Guidance
On April 17, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) voted three-to-two to enter into a consent agreement In the Matter of Cardinal Health, Inc., requiring Cardinal Health to disgorge funds as part of the settlement in this monopolization case. As ably explained by dissenting Commissioners Josh Wright and Maureen Ohlhausen, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ... The FTC’s Cardinal Health Settlement is Bad Antitrust Medicine and Highlights the Need for Additional Antitrust Guidance
The 2015 International Competition Network’s (ICN) Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter on Tying and Bundling
In a recent post, I presented an overview of the ICN’s recent Annual Conference in Sydney, Australia. Today I briefly summarize and critique a key product approved by the Conference, a new chapter 6 of the ICN’s Workbook on Unilateral Conduct, devoted to tying and bundling. (My analysis is based on a hard copy final ... The 2015 International Competition Network’s (ICN) Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter on Tying and Bundling
FTC Staff Report on Google: Much Ado About Nothing
The Wall Street Journal reported yesterday that the FTC Bureau of Competition staff report to the commissioners in the Google antitrust investigation recommended that the Commission approve an antitrust suit against the company. While this is excellent fodder for a few hours of Twitter hysteria, it takes more than 140 characters to delve into the ... FTC Staff Report on Google: Much Ado About Nothing
Highlights from Josh Wright’s Interview in The Antitrust Source
Anyone interested in antitrust enforcement policy (and what TOTM reader isn’t?) should read FTC Commissioner Josh Wright’s interview in the latest issue of The Antitrust Source. The extensive (22 page!) interview covers a number of topics and demonstrates the positive influence Commissioner Wright is having on antitrust enforcement and competition policy in general. Commissioner Wright’s ... Highlights from Josh Wright’s Interview in The Antitrust Source
A Cost-Benefit Framework for Antitrust Enforcement Policy
Debates among modern antitrust experts focus primarily on the appropriate indicia of anticompetitive behavior, the particular methodologies that should be applied in assessing such conduct, and the best combination and calibration of antitrust sanctions (fines, jail terms, injunctive relief, cease and desist orders). Given a broad consensus that antitrust rules should promote consumer welfare (albeit ... A Cost-Benefit Framework for Antitrust Enforcement Policy
SUPREMES PRESERVE FRAUD ON THE MARKET (AND BAIL OUT CLASS ACTION PLAINTIFFS) – TIME FOR CONGRESS TO KILL IT
On June 23 the Supreme Court regrettably declined the chance to stem the abuses of private fraud-based class action securities litigation. In Halliburton v. EPJ Fund (June 23, 2014), a six-Justice Supreme Court majority (Chief Justice Roberts writing for the Court, joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) reversed the Fifth Circuit and held ... SUPREMES PRESERVE FRAUD ON THE MARKET (AND BAIL OUT CLASS ACTION PLAINTIFFS) – TIME FOR CONGRESS TO KILL IT
Predatory pricing reform rides the Marrakech Express
As I noted in my prior post, two weeks ago the 13th Annual Conference of the International Competition Network (ICN) released two new sets of recommended best practices. Having focused on competition assessment in my prior blog entry, I now turn to the ICN’s predatory pricing recommendations. Aggressive price cutting is the essence of competitive ... Predatory pricing reform rides the Marrakech Express
Commissioner Wright Nails It on Minimum RPM
FTC Commissioner Josh Wright is on a roll. A couple of days before his excellent Ardagh/Saint Gobain dissent addressing merger efficiencies, Wright delivered a terrific speech on minimum resale price maintenance (RPM). The speech, delivered in London to the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, signaled that Wright will seek to correct the FTC’s ... Commissioner Wright Nails It on Minimum RPM
My New Paper on Defining Exclusionary Conduct
In our recent blog symposium on Section 5 of the FTC Act, Latham & Watkins partner Tad Lipsky exposed one of antitrust’s dark little secrets: Nobody really knows what Sherman Act Section 2 forbids. The provision bans monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize, and courts have articulated formal elements for each claim. But the ... My New Paper on Defining Exclusionary Conduct
