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Why FTC Competition Rulemaking Likely Will Fail

I. Introduction In over a century of existence, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been a policy leader in developing American thinking about and in enforcing antitrust and consumer protection laws pursuant to several specific statutory mandates. It has also promulgated a substantial number of consumer protection rules, dealing with a wide variety of practices. ... Why FTC Competition Rulemaking Likely Will Fail

Do Slotting Contracts Harm Consumers?

Warning: shameless plug of my own research to follow! Slotting allowances, or payments for shelf space, have been a central part of my research agenda for the last several years. My work with Ben Klein, The Economics of Slotting Contracts, presents a procompetitive theoretical explanation (and some aggregate data in support of our theory) for ... Do Slotting Contracts Harm Consumers?

Calling into Question the FTC’s Theory of the Case in FTC v. Qualcomm

This post does not attempt to answer the question of what the court should decide in FTC v. Qualcomm because we do not have access to the information that would allow us to make such a determination. Rather, we focus on economic issues confronting the court by drawing heavily from our writings in this area: ... Calling into Question the FTC’s Theory of the Case in FTC v. Qualcomm

Antitrust, Obsolescence and the "New Economy" (Again)

Gordon Crovitz (WSJ) plays the new economy card on antitrust.  Its a familiar wrap for those in the antitrust community that hit its peak in the original Microsoft days with virtually every competition policy scholar and commentator chiming in with an opinion about whether the internet and network effects and so forth rendered antitrust obsolete.  ... Antitrust, Obsolescence and the "New Economy" (Again)

Hazlett on the Apple e-books case: The Apple case is a throwback to Dr. Miles, and that’s not a good thing

The Apple e-books case is throwback to Dr. Miles, the 1911 Supreme Court decision that managed to misinterpret the economics of competition and so thwart productive activity for over a century. The active debate here at TOTM reveals why. The District Court and Second Circuit have employed a per se rule to find that the ... Hazlett on the Apple e-books case: The Apple case is a throwback to Dr. Miles, and that’s not a good thing

Political Philosophy, Competition, and Competition Law: The Road to and from Neoliberalism, Part 2

In just over a century since its dawn, liberalism had reshaped much of the world along the lines of individualism, free markets, private property, contract, trade, and competition. A modest laissez-faire political philosophy that had begun to germinate in the minds of French Physiocrats in the early 18th century had, scarcely 150 years later, inspired ... Political Philosophy, Competition, and Competition Law: The Road to and from Neoliberalism, Part 2

Facebook and the Pros and Cons of Ex Post Merger Reviews

The Federal Trade Commission and 46 state attorneys general (along with the District of Columbia and the Territory of Guam) filed their long-awaited complaints against Facebook Dec. 9. The crux of the arguments in both lawsuits is that Facebook pursued a series of acquisitions over the past decade that aimed to cement its prominent position ... Facebook and the Pros and Cons of Ex Post Merger Reviews

Intermediaries: The Hero We Need?

In policy discussions about the digital economy, a background assumption that frequently underlies the discourse is that intermediaries and centralization always and only serve as a cost to consumers, and to society more generally. Thus, one commonly sees arguments that consumers would be better off if they could freely combine products from different trading partners. ... Intermediaries: The Hero We Need?

Online Display Advertising: What’s the relevant market?

Digital advertising is the economic backbone of the Internet. It allows websites and apps to monetize their userbase without having to charge them fees, while the emergence of targeted ads allows this to be accomplished affordably and with less wasted time wasted. This advertising is facilitated by intermediaries using the “adtech stack,” through which advertisers ... Online Display Advertising: What’s the relevant market?

Amazon/Whole Foods: What Me Worry?

Brandeis is back, with today’s neo-Brandeisians reflexively opposing virtually all mergers involving large firms. For them, industry concentration has grown to crisis proportions and breaking up big companies should be the animating goal not just of antitrust policy but of U.S. economic policy generally. The key to understanding the neo-Brandeisian opposition to the Whole Foods/Amazon mergers is that it has nothing to do with consumer welfare, and everything to do with a large firm animus. Sabeel Rahman, a Roosevelt Institute scholar, concedes that big firms give us higher productivity, and hence lower prices, but he dismisses the value of that. He writes, “If consumer prices are our only concern, it is hard to see how Amazon, Comcast, and companies such as Uber need regulation.” And this gets to the key point regarding most of the opposition to the merger: it had nothing to do with concerns about monopolistic effects on economic efficiency or consumer prices.  It had everything to do with opposition to big firm for the sole reason that they are big.

Whole Foods? Seriously? Why Are We Talking About Whole Foods?

So why this deal, in this symposium, and why now? The best substantive reason I could think of is admittedly one that I personally find important. As I said, I think we should take it much more seriously as a general matter, especially in highly dynamic contexts like Silicon Valley. There has been a history of arguably pre-emptive, market-occupying vertical and conglomerate acquisitions, by big firms of smaller ones that are technologically or otherwise disruptive. The idea is that the big firms sit back and wait as some new market develops in some adjacent sector. When that new market ripens to the point of real promise, the big firm buys some significant incumbent player. The aim is not. just to facilitate its own benevolent, wholesome entry, but to set up hopefully prohibitive challenges to other de novo entrants. Love it or leave it, that theory plausibly characterizes lots and lots of acquisitions in recent decades that secured easy antitrust approval, precisely because they weren’t obviously, presently horizontal. Many people think that is true of some of Amazon’s many acquisitions, like its notoriously aggressive, near-hostile takeover of Diapers.com.

Antitrust Populists Don’t Seem to Care About the Poor

Antitrust populists like Biden White House official Tim Wu and author Matt Stoller decry the political influence of large firms. But instead of advocating for policies that tackle this political influence directly, they seek reforms to antitrust enforcement that aim to limit the economic advantages of these firms, believing that will translate into political enfeeblement. ... Antitrust Populists Don’t Seem to Care About the Poor