Showing archive for: “UK”
Brussels Effect or Brussels Defect: Digital Regulation in Emerging Markets
The blistering pace at which the European Union put forward and adopted the Digital Markets Act (DMA) has attracted the attention of legislators across the globe. In its wake, countries such as South Africa, India, Brazil, and Turkey have all contemplated digital-market regulations inspired by the DMA (and other models of regulation, such as the ... Brussels Effect or Brussels Defect: Digital Regulation in Emerging Markets
The Case Against Self-Preferencing as a New Antitrust Offense
The practice of so-called “self-preferencing” has come to embody the zeitgeist of competition policy for digital markets, as legislative initiatives are undertaken in jurisdictions around the world that to seek, in various ways, to constrain large digital platforms from granting favorable treatment to their own goods and services. The core concern cited by policymakers is ... The Case Against Self-Preferencing as a New Antitrust Offense
The Four Ways of Spending Data
In Free to Choose, Milton Friedman famously noted that there are four ways to spend money[1]: Spending your own money on yourself. For example, buying groceries or lunch. There is a strong incentive to economize and to get full value. Spending your own money on someone else. For example, buying a gift for another. There ... The Four Ways of Spending Data
The Market Challenge to Populist Antitrust
The wave of populist antitrust that has been embraced by regulators and legislators in the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and other jurisdictions rests on the assumption that currently dominant platforms occupy entrenched positions that only government intervention can dislodge. Following this view, Facebook will forever dominate social networking, Amazon will forever dominate cloud ... The Market Challenge to Populist Antitrust
Merger Control’s Misaligned Incentives
Antitrust policymakers around the world have taken a page out of the Silicon Valley playbook and decided to “move fast and break things.” While the slogan is certainly catchy, applying it to the policymaking world is unfortunate and, ultimately, threatens to harm consumers. Several antitrust authorities in recent months have announced their intention to block ... Merger Control’s Misaligned Incentives
Oldie-but-Baddie: The Revival of an Antitrust ‘Efficiencies Offense’?
Recent antitrust forays on both sides of the Atlantic have unfortunate echoes of the oldie-but-baddie “efficiencies offense” that once plagued American and European merger analysis (and, more broadly, reflected a “big is bad” theory of antitrust). After a very short overview of the history of merger efficiencies analysis under American and European competition law, we ... Oldie-but-Baddie: The Revival of an Antitrust ‘Efficiencies Offense’?
Mandatory Interoperability Is Not a ‘Super Tool’ for Platform Competition
On both sides of the Atlantic, 2021 has seen legislative and regulatory proposals to mandate that various digital services be made interoperable with others. Several bills to do so have been proposed in Congress; the EU’s proposed Digital Markets Act would mandate interoperability in certain contexts for “gatekeeper” platforms; and the UK’s competition regulator will ... Mandatory Interoperability Is Not a ‘Super Tool’ for Platform Competition
Judge Ginsburg: On the Proposed Digital Markets Unit and the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority
Thank you, Victoria, for the invitation to respond to Mr. Coscelli and his proposal for a legislatively founded Digital Markets Unit. Mr. Coscelli is one of the most talented, successful, and creative heads a competition agency has ever had. In the case of the DMU [ed., Digital Markets Unit], however, I think he has let ... Judge Ginsburg: On the Proposed Digital Markets Unit and the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority
Consumer Welfare-Based Antitrust Enforcement is the Superior Means to Deal with Large Digital-Platform Competition Issues
There has been a rapid proliferation of proposals in recent years to closely regulate competition among large digital platforms. The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA, which will become effective in 2023) imposes a variety of data-use, interoperability, and non-self-preferencing obligations on digital “gatekeeper” firms. A host of other regulatory schemes are being considered in ... Consumer Welfare-Based Antitrust Enforcement is the Superior Means to Deal with Large Digital-Platform Competition Issues
Online Display Advertising: What’s the relevant market?
Digital advertising is the economic backbone of the Internet. It allows websites and apps to monetize their userbase without having to charge them fees, while the emergence of targeted ads allows this to be accomplished affordably and with less wasted time wasted. This advertising is facilitated by intermediaries using the “adtech stack,” through which advertisers ... Online Display Advertising: What’s the relevant market?
A Coasean Analysis of Offensive Speech
Words can wound. They can humiliate, anger, insult. University students—or, at least, a vociferous minority of them—are keen to prevent this injury by suppressing offensive speech. To ensure campuses are safe places, they militate for the cancellation of talks by speakers with opinions they find offensive, often successfully. And they campaign to get offensive professors ... A Coasean Analysis of Offensive Speech
Dynamic Merger Efficiencies: The Case of Pharmaceutical Markets
The recent launch of the international Multilateral Pharmaceutical Merger Task Force (MPMTF) is just the latest example of burgeoning cooperative efforts by leading competition agencies to promote convergence in antitrust enforcement. (See my recent paper on the globalization of antitrust, which assesses multinational cooperation and convergence initiatives in greater detail.) In what is a first, ... Dynamic Merger Efficiencies: The Case of Pharmaceutical Markets
