Showing archive for: “Harm to Competition”
Section 2 Symposium: Bill Kolasky on a Stepwise Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct
The most controversial part of the Justice Department’s Single Firm Conduct Report is the Department’s proposed use of what it terms a “substantial disproportionality” test for exclusionary conduct. Under this test, the Justice Department would bring a case only if the harm to consumers and competition caused by a dominant or near-dominant firm’s conduct is ... Section 2 Symposium: Bill Kolasky on a Stepwise Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct
Section 2 Symposium: Thom Lambert on Defining and Identifying Exclusionary Conduct
There’s a fundamental problem with Section 2 of the Sherman Act: nobody really knows what it means. More specifically, we don’t have a very precise definition for “exclusionary conduct,” the second element of a Section 2 claim. The classic definition from the Supreme Court’s Grinnell decision — “the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power ... Section 2 Symposium: Thom Lambert on Defining and Identifying Exclusionary Conduct
Section 2 Symposium: Howard Marvel–An Economist’s View
In the wake of Bork and Posner, and Baxter and the Reagan Revolution, a consensus emerged that big could be bad, but the harm that dominant firms could do needed to be demonstrated, not simply assumed in consequence of their sheer size. Moreover, the demonstration required harm to competition. The consensus held through the Clinton ... Section 2 Symposium: Howard Marvel–An Economist’s View
Should the Supreme Court Grant Cert in Rambus (Revisited, and Cross-Posted at Patently-O)
[Rutgers Professor Michael Carrier recently posted as a guest at Patently-O arguing in favor of the FTC’s position in Rambus and the Supreme Court granting certiorari. I thought Professor Crouch might be interested in sharing with his readers a different perspective on the merits of the FTC’s petition for cert in Rambus sketched out in ... Should the Supreme Court Grant Cert in Rambus (Revisited, and Cross-Posted at Patently-O)
Should the Supreme Court Grant Cert in Rambus?
As noted, the FTC has exercised its right under 15 USC 56(a)(3) to petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the D.C. Circuit in its FTC v. Rambus. The FTC press release is here. The petition is here. The questions presented, as framed by the Commission are: 1. Whether deceptive conduct ... Should the Supreme Court Grant Cert in Rambus?
The Costs of International Antitrust Enforcement and Superficial Convergence
There is an interesting profile on Intel in the WSJ. While the profile focuses on some of the technological and competitive challenges facing Intel and CEO Paul Otellini, the CEO mentions the proliferation of antitrust laws across the globe, and the uncertainty associated with regulatory costs in such an environment, as one of the major potential impediments facing ... The Costs of International Antitrust Enforcement and Superficial Convergence
Odd FTC Consent in Vertical Licensing Case
The FTC announced a complaint today challenging Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co.’s proposed acquisition of an exclusive sublicense from Luitpold Pharmaceuticals, who is in turn a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese firm Daiichi Sankyo Company. The sublicense would allow Fresenius to manufacturer and supply the intravenous iron drug Venofer to dialysis clinics in ... Odd FTC Consent in Vertical Licensing Case
Inter-Agency Scuffling Over Section 2: What Role for Economists and Economics at the FTC and DOJ?
Much has already been written about the strained relationship between the FTC and DOJ in antitrust matters. There is no more entertaining description of these strains than Chairman Kovacic’s description of the sister agencies as “an archipelago of policy makers with very inadequate ferry service between the islands” and “too many instances when you go ... Inter-Agency Scuffling Over Section 2: What Role for Economists and Economics at the FTC and DOJ?
Dr. Miles is Dead. Now What?
As regular readers of this blog will know, I was pretty stoked when the Supreme Court finally overruled its infamous Dr. Miles decision. The Leegin Court’s holding that minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) is not per se illegal constituted a major step toward an economically rational and theoretically coherent approach to vertical restraints. (And on ... Dr. Miles is Dead. Now What?
Baker on Market Concentration and Horizontal Mergers
Jonathan Baker (American University) has posted Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Mergers to SSRN. Baker’s article is another of the entries which will be appearing in the forthcoming Antitrust Law and Economics volume edited by Keith Hylton (Elgar Publishing) (see this post for links to others). Here is the abstract: This handbook ... Baker on Market Concentration and Horizontal Mergers
FTC to Dr. Miles: "I Wish I Knew How to Quit You!"
In April 2000, the FTC issued a Complaint against women’s shoe distributor Nine West, claiming that Nine West had engaged in minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) (i.e., the setting of minimum prices that retailers could charge for its shoes). Apparently, Nine West was providing retailers with lists of “off limits” or “non-promote” shoes that weren’t ... FTC to Dr. Miles: "I Wish I Knew How to Quit You!"
All We Are Saying Is Give PeaceHealth a Chance.
Josh had a characteristically thoughtful post last week on safe harbors for loyalty and bundled discounts. I didn’t comment on the post, with which I generally agree, because I was busy writing an amicus brief (also signed by Dan Crane, Richard Epstein, Tom Morgan, and Danny Sokol) in an attempt to preserve a different safe ... All We Are Saying Is Give PeaceHealth a Chance.
