Showing archive for: “Harm to Competition”
Do Exclusionary Theories of the AT&T / T-Mobile Transaction Better Explain the Market’s Reaction to the DOJ’s Decision to Challenge the Merger?
I don’t think so. Let’s start from the beginning. In my last post, I pointed out that simple economic theory generates some pretty clear predictions concerning the impact of a merger on rival stock prices. If a merger is results in a more efficient competitor, and more intense post-merger competition, rivals are made worse off ... Do Exclusionary Theories of the AT&T / T-Mobile Transaction Better Explain the Market’s Reaction to the DOJ’s Decision to Challenge the Merger?
FairSearch’s Non-Sequitur Response
Our search neutrality paper has received some recent attention. While the initial response from Gordon Crovitz in the Wall Street Journal was favorable, critics are now voicing their responses. Although we appreciate FairSearch’s attempt to engage with our paper’s central claims, its response is really little more than an extended non-sequitur and fails to contribute ... FairSearch’s Non-Sequitur Response
Searching for Antitrust Remedies, Part II
In the last post, I discussed possible characterizations of Google’s conduct for purposes of antitrust analysis. A firm grasp of the economic implications of the different conceptualizations of Google’s conduct is a necessary – but not sufficient – precondition for appreciating the inconsistencies underlying the proposed remedies for Google’s alleged competitive harms. In this post, ... Searching for Antitrust Remedies, Part II
Searching for Antitrust Remedies, Part I
This is part one of a two part series of posts in which I’ll address the problems associated with discerning an appropriate antitrust remedy to alleged search engine bias. The first problem – and part – is, of course, how we should conceptualize Google’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct; in the next part, I will address how ... Searching for Antitrust Remedies, Part I
Sacrificing Consumer Welfare in the Search Bias Debate, Part II
I did not intend for this to become a series (Part I), but I underestimated the supply of analysis simultaneously invoking “search bias” as an antitrust concept while waving it about untethered from antitrust’s institutional commitment to protecting consumer welfare. Harvard Business School Professor Ben Edelman offers the latest iteration in this genre. We’ve criticized ... Sacrificing Consumer Welfare in the Search Bias Debate, Part II
Brantley and its Implications for the Proposed Consumer Choice Antitrust Standard
Thom‘s excellent post highlights the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Brantley and describes its implications both in terms of rejecting Professor Elhauge’s claim that metering ties and mere surplus extraction amount to competitive harm for the purposes of antitrust and also for the future of the quasi-per se rule of tying. Thom, in my view ... Brantley and its Implications for the Proposed Consumer Choice Antitrust Standard
Ninth Circuit Moves Tying Doctrine in the Right Direction. Will SCOTUS Follow?
The Ninth Circuit recently issued a decision that pushes the doctrine governing tying in the right direction. If appealed, the decision could provide the Roberts Court with an opportunity to do for tying what its Leegin decision did for resale price maintenance: reduce error costs by bringing an overly prohibitory liability rule in line with economic learning. First, some ... Ninth Circuit Moves Tying Doctrine in the Right Direction. Will SCOTUS Follow?
Sprint’s (Ironic?) Campaign for Competition
Sprint, perhaps the most vigorous opponent of the proposed AT&T/T-Mobile merger, has been extolling the values of competition lately. Last Thursday and again today, the company ran full-page ads in the Wall Street Journal featuring the following text (which was apparently penned by Helen Steiner Rice): Competition is everything. Competition is the steady hand at our back, pushing ... Sprint’s (Ironic?) Campaign for Competition
Sacrificing Consumer Welfare in the Search Bias Debate
Eric Clemons and Nehal Madhani have a posted a series of short blog posts on the Huffington Post focusing on Google, antitrust, and more specifically, vertical integration and search (Part I, Part II, and Part III). The articles contain much of the standard hand-wringing about vertical integration and its impact on consumer welfare. This is ... Sacrificing Consumer Welfare in the Search Bias Debate
Net neutrality and Trinko
Commentators who see Trinko as an impediment to the claim that antitrust law can take care of harmful platform access problems (and thus that prospective rate regulation (i.e., net neutrality) is not necessary), commit an important error in making their claim–and it is a similar error committed by those who advocate for search neutrality regulation, as ... Net neutrality and Trinko
Google, Antitrust, and First Principles
I’ve read with interest over the last few days the commentary on Microsoft’s filing of a formal complaint with the EU, Microsoft’s defense of its actions, and the various stories around the web. Geoff and Paul appropriately focus on the error-cost concerns associated with intervention in high-tech markets; Paul also emphasizes the ironies associated with ... Google, Antitrust, and First Principles
Search Bias and Antitrust
There is an antitrust debate brewing concerning Google and “search bias,” a term used to describe search engine results that preference the content of the search provider. For example, Google might list Google Maps prominently if one searches “maps” or Microsoft’s Bing might prominently place Microsoft affiliated content or products. Apparently both antitrust investigations and ... Search Bias and Antitrust
