Showing archive for: “EU”
Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 3): Where is the Harm?
This is the third in a series of TOTM blog posts discussing the Commission’s recently published Google Android decision (the first post can be found here, and the second here). It draws on research from a soon-to-be published ICLE white paper. (Comparison of Google and Apple’s smartphone business models. Red $ symbols represent money invested; ... Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 3): Where is the Harm?
Efficient Cartels and the Public Interest Defence – Do They Exist?
The concept of a “good” or “efficient” cartel is generally regarded by competition authorities as an oxymoron. A cartel is seen as the worst type of antitrust violation and one that warrants zero tolerance. Agreements between competitors to raise prices and share the market are assumed unambiguously to reduce economic welfare. As such, even if ... Efficient Cartels and the Public Interest Defence – Do They Exist?
Competition Law as a Swiss Army Knife (Move Fast and Break Things?)
[TOTM: The following is the fourth in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Valentin Mircea, a Senior Partner at Mircea and Partners Law Firm, Bucharest, Romania. The enforcement of competition rules in the European ... Competition Law as a Swiss Army Knife (Move Fast and Break Things?)
Towards a Democratic Antitrust
This symposium discusses the “The Politicization of Antitrust.” As the invite itself stated, this is an umbrella topic that encompasses a wide range of subjects: from incorporating environmental or labor concerns in antitrust enforcement, to political pressure in enforcement decision-making, to national security laws (CFIUS-type enforcement), protectionism, federalism, and more. This contribution will focus on ... Towards a Democratic Antitrust
Does Political Power Follow Economic Power?
[TOTM: The following is the third in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Geoffrey A. Manne, president and founder of the International Center for Law & Economics, and Alec Stapp, Research Fellow at the ... Does Political Power Follow Economic Power?
The Politicization of Antitrust Blog Symposium
The operative text of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a scant 100 words: Section 1: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract ... The Politicization of Antitrust Blog Symposium
A New Office of Technology Assessment: The Wrong Answer to the Wrong Question at the Wrong Time
Congress needs help understanding the fast moving world of technology. That help is not going to arise by reviving the Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”), however. The OTA is an idea for another age, while the tweaks necessary to shore up the existing technology resources available to Congress are relatively modest. Although a new OTA ... A New Office of Technology Assessment: The Wrong Answer to the Wrong Question at the Wrong Time
Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 2): Ignoring Google’s Competitors
This is the second in a series of TOTM blog posts discussing the Commission’s recently published Google Android decision (the first post can be found here). It draws on research from a soon-to-be published ICLE white paper. (Left, Android 10 Website; Right, iOS 13 Website) In a previous post, I argued that the Commission failed ... Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 2): Ignoring Google’s Competitors
Private Antitrust: What Hipsters Can Learn from Hulk Hogan
Antitrust populists have a long list of complaints about competition policy, including: laws aren’t broad enough or tough enough, enforcers are lax, and judges tend to favor defendants over plaintiffs or government agencies. The populist push got a bump with the New York Times coverage of Lina Khan’s “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox” in which she advocated ... Private Antitrust: What Hipsters Can Learn from Hulk Hogan
Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 1): Four Problems with the EU Commission’s Market Definition
This is the first in a series of TOTM blog posts discussing the Commission’s recently published Google Android decision. It draws on research from a soon-to-be published ICLE white paper. The European Commission’s recent Google Android decision will surely go down as one of the most important competition proceedings of the past decade. And yet, ... Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 1): Four Problems with the EU Commission’s Market Definition
Economics is Dead. Long Live Economics! A Review of The Economists’ Hour
John Maynard Keynes wrote in his famous General Theory that “[t]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, ... Economics is Dead. Long Live Economics! A Review of The Economists’ Hour
On the Antitrust Risks of Four to Three Mergers: A Case Study of a Potential ThyssenKrupp/Kone Merger
Today, Reuters reports that Germany-based ThyssenKrupp has received bids from three bidding groups for a majority stake in the firm’s elevator business. Finland’s Kone teamed with private equity firm CVC to bid on the company. Private equity firms Blackstone and Carlyle joined with the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board to submit a bid. A third ... On the Antitrust Risks of Four to Three Mergers: A Case Study of a Potential ThyssenKrupp/Kone Merger
