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Showing results for:  “digital markets act”

Section 2 Symposium: Bill Kolasky on Proving Market Power

The market power section of the Department’s Single Firm Conduct report is one of the strongest sections of the report.  It provides an exceptionally clear discussion of the market power element under Section 2.  It recognizes, in particular, that a violation of Section 2 requires more than mere market power, but rather a finding of ... Section 2 Symposium: Bill Kolasky on Proving Market Power

Section 2 Symposium: Josh Wright on An Evidence Based Approach to Exclusive Dealing and Loyalty Discounts

The primary anticompetitive concern with exclusive dealing contracts is that a monopolist might be able to utilize exclusivity to fortify its market position, raise rivals’ costs of distribution, and ultimately harm consumers.  The unifying economic logic of these anticompetitive models of exclusivity is that the potential entrant (or current rival) must attract a sufficient mass ... Section 2 Symposium: Josh Wright on An Evidence Based Approach to Exclusive Dealing and Loyalty Discounts

Section 2 Symposium: Tim Brennan on Predation, Exclusion, and Complement Market Monopolization

As evidenced by this on-line symposium, the handling of cases under the rubrics “monopolization,” “single firm conduct”, or “abuse of dominance” continues to be debated by the competition policy community. This debate, as evidenced by the Antitrust Division’s Sept. 2008 single firm conduct report and the FTC responses, is not restricted within the U.S. The ... Section 2 Symposium: Tim Brennan on Predation, Exclusion, and Complement Market Monopolization

Section 2 Symposium: Howard Marvel on Safe Harbors for Short Term Exclusive Dealing Contracts

Exclusive dealing prevents the bait-and-switch behavior by dealers who convert customers drawn by one brand to the products of its rivals. Despite the red flag of “exclusive” in its title, the practice is ordinarily uncontroversial, indeed innocuous. Automobile manufacturers often pay incentives to encourage dealers to deal exclusively in their vehicles. Business format franchising ensures ... Section 2 Symposium: Howard Marvel on Safe Harbors for Short Term Exclusive Dealing Contracts

Section 2 Symposium: Dan Crane on Buyer-Instigated Bundled Discounts

Bundled discounts have been one of the hottest monopolization topics of the last decade. Much of the trouble began with the Third Circuit’s en banc decision in LePage’s v. 3M, which reversed an earlier 2-1 panel decision which in turn had overturned a plaintiff’s jury verdict largely based on 3M’s bundled discounts. After the Solicitor ... Section 2 Symposium: Dan Crane on Buyer-Instigated Bundled Discounts

Section 2 Symposium: Thom Lambert on The DOJ-FTC Divide on Bundled Discounts

A bundled discount occurs when a seller offers to sell a collection of different goods for a lower price than the aggregate price for which it would sell the constituent products individually. Such discounts pose different competitive risks than single-product discounts because, as I explained in this post, they may have an exclusionary effect even ... Section 2 Symposium: Thom Lambert on The DOJ-FTC Divide on Bundled Discounts

Section 2 Symposium: Herbert Hovenkamp on Predatory Pricing and Bundled Discounts

The baseline for testing predatory pricing in the Section 2 Report is average avoidable cost (AAC), together with recoupment as a structural test (Report, p. 65). The AAC test or reasonably close variations, such as average variable cost or short-run marginal cost, seems about right. However, differences among them can become very technical and fine. ... Section 2 Symposium: Herbert Hovenkamp on Predatory Pricing and Bundled Discounts

Section 2 Symposium: Bruce Kobayashi on Predatory Pricing and the Relevant Measure of Cost

Dimming the Court’s Brooke Group Bright Line Administrable Rule? As noted in my earlier post, the Supreme Court’s Brooke Group rule is held out as the primary example of an administrable bright line rule aimed at controlling the costs of type I error. In practice, the Brooke Group above cost rule is not as bright ... Section 2 Symposium: Bruce Kobayashi on Predatory Pricing and the Relevant Measure of Cost

Section 2 Symposium: Bill Page on Microsoft and the DOJ’s General Standards of Exclusion

The DOJ’s § 2 Report offers two recommendations under the heading of “General Standards for Exclusionary Conduct.” First, for evaluating alleged acts of exclusion, the Report endorses the burden-shifting framework of the D.C. Circuit’s 2001 Microsoft decision. Second, after canvassing various standards of anticompetitive effect, the Report settles on the “disproportionality test,” under which “conduct ... Section 2 Symposium: Bill Page on Microsoft and the DOJ’s General Standards of Exclusion

Section 2 Symposium: Bill Kolasky on a Stepwise Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct

The most controversial part of the Justice Department’s Single Firm Conduct Report is the Department’s proposed use of what it terms a “substantial disproportionality” test for exclusionary conduct. Under this test, the Justice Department would bring a case only if the harm to consumers and competition caused by a dominant or near-dominant firm’s conduct is ... Section 2 Symposium: Bill Kolasky on a Stepwise Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct

Section 2 Symposium: Thom Lambert on Defining and Identifying Exclusionary Conduct

There’s a fundamental problem with Section 2 of the Sherman Act: nobody really knows what it means. More specifically, we don’t have a very precise definition for “exclusionary conduct,” the second element of a Section 2 claim. The classic definition from the Supreme Court’s Grinnell decision — “the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power ... Section 2 Symposium: Thom Lambert on Defining and Identifying Exclusionary Conduct

Symposium

Section 2 Symposium

We’re very pleased to be able to kick off Truth on the Market’s symposium on Section 2 and the Section 2 Report.  We’ve put together a lineup that includes current and former agency representatives, economists, practicing lawyers, and academics in the hopes of creating an environment conductive to a productive discussion of not only the ... Section 2 Symposium