Showing results for: “digital markets act”
Attention Markets: They Know Them When they See Them
A raft of progressive scholars in recent years have argued that antitrust law remains blind to the emergence of so-called “attention markets,” in which firms compete by converting user attention into advertising revenue. This blindness, the scholars argue, has caused antitrust enforcers to clear harmful mergers in these industries. It certainly appears the argument is ... Attention Markets: They Know Them When they See Them
No More Kings? Due Process and Regulation Without Representation Under the UK Competition Bill
What should a competition law for 21st century look like? This point is debated across many jurisdictions. The Digital Markets, Competition, and Consumers Bill (DMCC) would change UK competition law’s approach to large platforms. The bill’s core point is to place the UK Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) Digital Markets Unit (DMU) on a statutory footing with ... No More Kings? Due Process and Regulation Without Representation Under the UK Competition Bill
How to Regulate: Externalities
Following is the second in a series of posts on my forthcoming book, How to Regulate: A Guide for Policy Makers (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017). The initial post is here. As I mentioned in my first post, How to Regulate examines the market failures (and other private ordering defects) that have traditionally been invoked as ... How to Regulate: Externalities
Against the Jones Act
Economist Josh Hendrickson asserts that the Jones Act is properly understood as a Coasean bargain. In this view, the law serves as a subsidy to the U.S. maritime industry through its restriction of waterborne domestic commerce to vessels that are constructed in U.S. shipyards, U.S.-flagged, and U.S.-crewed. Such protectionism, it is argued, provides the government ... Against the Jones Act
Regulating Competition at the FTC
Introduction In November 2021, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published a draft strategic plan for fiscal years 2022-2026 that previewed its vision for enforcement without the rule of reason guiding the analysis and without consumer welfare defining the objective. The draft plan dropped a longstanding commitment from the FTC’s previous strategic plans to foster “vigorous ... Regulating Competition at the FTC
App Stores as Public Utilities?
In a new paper, Giuseppe Colangelo and Oscar Borgogno investigate whether antitrust policy is sufficiently flexible to keep up with the dynamics of digital app stores, and whether regulatory interventions are required in order to address their unique features. The authors summarize their findings in this blog post. App stores are at the forefront of ... App Stores as Public Utilities?
Bringing the Error Cost Framework to the Agency: Commissioner Wright’s Proposed Policy Statement on Section 5 Unfair Methods of Competition Enforcement
FTC Commissioner Wright issued today his Policy Statement on enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act against Unfair Methods of Competition (UMC)—the one he promised in April. Wright introduced the Statement in an important policy speech this morning before the Executive Committee Meeting of the New York State Bar Association’s Antitrust Section. Both the Statement ... Bringing the Error Cost Framework to the Agency: Commissioner Wright’s Proposed Policy Statement on Section 5 Unfair Methods of Competition Enforcement
Why Congress Should Reject the FTC’s Request for a Trinko Exemption
One of the most significant issues in current US antitrust policy has been the Federal Trade Commission’s attempt to avoid some of the rigorous requirements imposed by Section 2 of the Sherman Act in monopolization cases by expanding FTC authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). This issue is nothing new. ... Why Congress Should Reject the FTC’s Request for a Trinko Exemption
Should the Supreme Court Grant Cert in Rambus (Revisited, and Cross-Posted at Patently-O)
[Rutgers Professor Michael Carrier recently posted as a guest at Patently-O arguing in favor of the FTC’s position in Rambus and the Supreme Court granting certiorari. I thought Professor Crouch might be interested in sharing with his readers a different perspective on the merits of the FTC’s petition for cert in Rambus sketched out in ... Should the Supreme Court Grant Cert in Rambus (Revisited, and Cross-Posted at Patently-O)
Should the Supreme Court Grant Cert in Rambus?
As noted, the FTC has exercised its right under 15 USC 56(a)(3) to petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the D.C. Circuit in its FTC v. Rambus. The FTC press release is here. The petition is here. The questions presented, as framed by the Commission are: 1. Whether deceptive conduct ... Should the Supreme Court Grant Cert in Rambus?
Posner’s Definition of a "Private Sector" Response
Many observers have been shocked by the level of government involvement in the U.S. economy in recent days. Among other things, the government has (1) bailed out an insurance company that got “too big to fail,” (2) decided to spend up to $700 billion buying the distressed assets of financial firms (and apparently directly investing ... Posner’s Definition of a "Private Sector" Response
7 Big Questions About the Open App Markets Act
With just a week to go until the U.S. midterm elections, which potentially herald a change in control of one or both houses of Congress, speculation is mounting that congressional Democrats may seek to use the lame-duck session following the election to move one or more pieces of legislation targeting the so-called “Big Tech” companies. ... 7 Big Questions About the Open App Markets Act
