Andy, could you please tell us about your professional background?
I am a law professor with an SJD degree from Northwestern University in the United States. My field of study is antitrust law and law & economics. From 2007-2010, I served as commissioner of the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC). After that, I resumed my teaching and researching career until being nominated by the prime minister to serve as the vice chair of the TFTC in 2021. My second term as vice chair started in February 2025. Currently, I am also the acting chair of the TFTC.
Most of our readers are probably not very familiar with what’s going on in the world of antitrust in Taiwan. Could you give us a high-level overview?
Antitrust law in Taiwan is made up of two parts. The first consists of mergers, abuse of dominance, and cartels, which is the “antitrust” part of the Taiwan Fair Trade Act (TFTA). The second part consists of provisions on “unfair competition.” In many countries, these two things are distinct. In Taiwan, unfair competition is a very important part of the TFTC’s enforcement agenda. In fact, more than 50% of cases are on unfair competition, such as false advertising and deceptive and patently unfair conduct.
Regarding the antitrust part, cartel investigation and sanction is central to our enforcement efforts. The markets covered range from daily necessities, health care, publishing, and financial and professional services to telecommunications and high-tech industries. Article 15 of the TFTA provides exemptions for cartels. Businesses who believe their collective business arrangements are competition-enhancing or could be justified by the rationale stipulated in the provision can file written applications with the TFTC for exemptions. To address the challenges posed by the lack of direct evidence in proving collusive agreements, we introduced several years ago the leniency program and antitrust reward fund to the TFTA to encourage whistleblowing by cartel members and reporting by the general public of suspected collusive behavior. To date, both systems have operated smoothly, consistently bringing cases to our attention.
Merger—or “combination,” which is the term used in the TFTA—is broadly defined in Article 10 of the TFTA to encompass not only stock or asset acquisition, but also contractual arrangements or cross-company influences that effectively lead to convergence of economic power. We use both market-share and business-turnover thresholds for filing pre-merger notifications. Cases are reviewed under the various frameworks based on the type of merger: horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate.
We rarely block mergers, with the most recent exception being the December 2024 proposed acquisition by UberEats of FoodPanda, the two leading food-delivery platforms in Taiwan. We impose conduct remedies in a relatively small percentage of cleared mergers to ensure that post-merger competition can be maintained or enhanced. We never impose divestiture as a merger remedy, even though there are ongoing discussions on the need to employ structural remedies more frequently.
There are few cases involving abuses of monopoly power—defined, among other criteria, as a firm holding more than 50% market share in the relevant market. Most violations have involved former state-owned entities allegedly leveraging their dominant power accumulated over the years to exclude new entrants after the industries were deregulated. Additionally, abuse cases could also involve parties with market power less dominant than a monopolist but significant enough to generate the potential to affect market competition. Vertical constraints fall within this category. In this context, we have handled numerous cases related to resale price maintenance, territorial restrictions, tying, and exclusive dealing. We apply the rule-of-reason approach to review vertical cases and to examine whether their net competitive effects would be beneficial or harmful to market competition.
On a conceptual level, do you think that ‘unfair’ conduct rules and antitrust law work well together? In other words: is procompetitive conduct always fair, and vice versa?
When interpreting both laws, we are supposed to be bound by the same legislative purposes and the uniform definitions of key statutory terms provided in the TFTA. Provisions on false advertising (Article 21) and deceptive and patently unfair conduct (Article 25) are stipulated in Chapter 3 of the TFTA, titled “Unfair Competition.” Therefore, it is the impact on competition—a term the TFTA defines as attracting business opportunities by price or nonprice strategies and meant to be applied to all violations specified in the act—rather than the perceived unfairness experienced by consumers from the alleged conduct that should guide our analysis.
Take false advertising as an example. In a competition-centered framework, false advertising is considered “unfair” only when the information gap between sellers and buyers regarding product quality or sale terms is so significant that it misleads a substantial number of uninformed buyers to divert their business to a seller who has inflated transaction value by manipulating the informational asymmetry. This kind of marketing strategy is punishable under competition law because it undermines the principle of competition on the merits. We also need to be mindful of the role and extent of informational competition among competitors in counteracting misinformation. By disseminating truthful information, competitors can help consumers make informed decisions and mitigate the impact of deceptive advertising. I think, following this line of reasoning, we have more consistent enforcement results that align antitrust law with unfair-competition law, rather than focusing predominantly on the unfair or unethical nature of the advertising itself.
What types of cases have the TFTC been focusing on lately?
With regards to unfair competition, we have addressed numerous cases of false advertising in the pre-sale housing market, where properties are sold before construction is completed.
Over the past few years, the channels through which marketing messages are disseminated in Taiwan has changed significantly. Digital platforms have surpassed traditional media—including newspapers, magazines (both print and digital), and television—as the primary source that Taiwanese are introduced to new products and services. The rapid dissemination of misinformation online allows content to be posted, altered, or erased without leaving sufficient incriminating evidence to draw the attention of enforcement agencies. Notably, it has also transformed the ways advertisements are presented to their targeted audience.
One of the most striking recent trends is the rise of influencer-endorsed advertising, which has become increasingly prevalent. We had our first case involving influencer-endorsed advertising last year. After careful deliberation by the commissioners, we ultimately decided to prohibit the conduct and imposed sanctions on the influencer. But significant challenges remain. From an enforcement perspective, the first question is how to define “influencer” under competition law. Even if we can establish some quantitative thresholds, such as measuring the daily traffic to the influencer’s platforms, we still need to address one fundamental question: are those endorsements conducted merely for experience-sharing purposes, or are they driven by profit-seeking motives?
Digital technology has also transformed the enforcement landscape for cases involving patently unfair conduct. We have observed a growing number of cases alleging that businesses exploit online keyword searches or search engine optimization (SEO) techniques to capitalize on well-established trademarks or trade names. This tactic allows businesses with lesser-known brands to intercept and redirect online traffic to them, effectively free-riding on the reputation of more recognized businesses. In such cases, we have cautioned against the bait-and-switch effects of these marketing strategies, while acknowledging their potential benefits in providing more information and options for consumers. Ultimately, the legal conclusions depend on the tradeoff of these two competing effects and their overall market impacts.
Regarding antitrust provisions, competitive issues arising from digital platforms and industries have been a key focus of the TFTC. In 2022, we published a white paper on competition policy in the digital economy. This paper synthesized our past cases and analyzed their relevance for future enforcement in this sector, covering 14 key competitive issues. We aimed for this resource to guide businesses in complying with the TFTA in the context of digital competition. The white paper advocates for an issue-driven enforcement approach based on an optimized rule of reason for digital competition issues. While acknowledging the value of the enforcement experiences from other jurisdictions, it emphasizes the critical importance of local nexus for meaningful and effective competition-law enforcement. Therefore, a careful examination of the rationale behind reforms of other jurisdictions’ competition laws, paired with robust local empirical analysis, is essential before considering policy changes.
Prior to the white paper’s publication, the TFTC had already had the experience of addressing digital-related cases on various occasions under the existing enforcement framework. I would like to highlight two representative cases.
The first case was a 2015 case involving the issue of self-preferencing by Google in the digital-map market in Taiwan. Competitors asserted that Google abused its market power in the search-engine market by displaying search results that prominently featured thumbnails of Google Maps at the top of the first page. These thumbnails allowed users to connect directly to the official websites of the searched services with a simple click on the Google Maps feature. Competitors argued that this self-preferencing arrangement limited the visibility of their own services to search-engine users, thereby excluding competition in the digital-map-services market.
In that case, the TFTC recognized the two-sided market characteristics of Google’s search engine and its potential market power. Nevertheless, we maintained that viable alternatives existed to counteract the restrictions stemming from Google’s prioritization of its own search results. For example, users could still access desired hyperlinks through search functions offered by other engines or portal sites. Alternatively, they could enter the destination URL directly into their browsers or save it as a bookmark for future access.
Furthermore, the TFTC found no evidence that Google intended to sacrifice short-term profits for long-term market power. Before the allegations, Google had never displayed its competitors’ digital-map services, meaning it had nothing to lose by prioritizing its own. Moreover, since Google’s digital-map service was free, its decision not to feature competitors’ services on the first page or at the top of the list incurred no financial losses.
The TFTC also argued that, given the premise of free services, compelling Google to prominently feature its competitors’ services would be an irrational business strategy. The competition authority emphasized the need for caution when requiring businesses to accommodate their competitors’ interests in such cases.
I see. What was the second case about?
The second case concerned Google’s mandatory pre-installation of its apps on devices in 2021. Device manufacturers were required to pre-install a suite of Google applications without the option to selectively choose or reject individual apps. The TFTC reviewed this under the legal framework of a tying arrangement. While acknowledging Google’s significant market power from the Android operating-system software and its Play Store, and recognizing the pre-installation requirement as a tying arrangement, the commission ultimately concluded that Google’s practices were justified by legitimate business considerations.
First, the TFTC considered the pre-installation requirement essential to sustain Google’s incentive to continually enhance the Android operating system and its Play Store. Allowing manufacturers to selectively install apps could diminish overall advertising revenue, thereby limiting the financial resources available for Google to invest in upgrades and quality improvements.
Second, the TFTC conducted a market survey on consumer-usage patterns. This survey revealed that users of Google’s Android system and its Play Store did not perceive themselves as being locked into the pre-installed apps. In fact, users routinely removed or downloaded alternative applications from various sources as needed. This suggested that users were not significantly restricted to the initial set of apps provided.
Finally, the majority of device manufacturers in Taiwan did not oppose the pre-installation requirement, as it helped reduce the challenges and costs associated with app fragmentation. They asserted that this requirement reduced their own app-development efforts and streamlined system integration, which they believed ultimately benefited device sales.
As you know, there have been similar cases in the European Union: Google Shopping and Google Android. In both cases, however, the European Commission (and ultimately the courts) found against Google. Are the differences in the EU & TFTC’s conclusions in the Google cases based on facts, law, or economic analysis?
I believe the legal standards for tying or exclusive-dealing arrangements are similar in both regimes, but differences in factual and market conditions led the two jurisdictions to reach opposite conclusions. Unlike the EU, the TFTC—based on its market surveys and investigative findings—defined the relevant product market for mobile operating systems to include both Google’s licensable Android system and Apple’s non-licensable iOS. Under this market definition, Google maintained an average market share of approximately 50%.
In addition, our survey on consumer-usage patterns revealed that 48.9% of the interviewed users had downloaded apps with functions similar to the pre-installed Google apps. This finding suggested that the “status quo bias” effect may not be as strong as observed in the EU. Moreover, more than 90% of interviewed users identified Google Search as their preferred search engine. Among iOS users, nearly 90% had downloaded and used Google Search or YouTube even without pre-installation. Furthermore, 52% of the respondents, including Android and iOS users, stated that the pre-installation of Google Search enhances convenience and improves users’ experiences.
It seems that Taiwan has been ramping up its enforcement in digital markets. Where is the impetus to act in digital markets coming from?
It usually comes from competing businesses and app developers. They argued that Google and Apple exercise near-monopoly power, making their negotiations “unfair.” Complaints thus primarily come from the business community. Consumer complaints, though relatively few, typically focus on the fairness of pricing for the products or services offered.
Although the ultimate goal of antitrust law is to protect competition, not competitors, in practice, the application of this principle can be nuanced. The TFTC takes business complaints—particularly those from companies crucial to Taiwan’s economy—seriously. Nonetheless, this does not alter the guiding principle of our antitrust law, which remains focused on safeguarding competition, not competitors. On this basis, the TFTC typically will request the complainants to provide some initial evidence to substantiate whether their allegations of competitive harms were well-founded before initiating an investigation.
From a cost-benefit perspective, do you think that it is right to focus on digital markets? Are these markets more prone to anticompetitive conduct?
The white paper underscored our recognition of significant new enforcement challenges for the TFTC and reaffirmed our commitment to address them. But this does not imply that enforcement resources should be allocated predominantly toward enforcing the TFTA in digital markets. At present, non-digital cases continue to outnumber digital cases within our agency.
The rationale for prioritizing enforcement efforts in digital markets over non-digital markets lies not in the greater anticompetitive potential of similar business arrangements, but in the relative effectiveness of the remedies imposed to mitigate their anticompetitive effects. In the white paper, we concluded that most of the digital competition issues could be addressed within the existing analytical framework, with optimized and sharpened digital enforcement skills.
Nevertheless, this enforcement position has been criticized for being inactive and unmindful of the irreversibility of the harms inflicted. Critics argue that digital markets characterized by network and “tipping” effects make inaction in those markets more detrimental than in non-digital markets. This is a legitimate concern, and the TFTC remains vigilant to any theoretical or practical developments that either substantiate or undermine it. But this is an issue where cost-benefit analysis should play a role. Undoubtedly, this is a complex matter requiring sophisticated legal and economic investigations and analysis.
That said, at a very high level, I find the renowned Hand formula in law & economics provides a simplified yet very useful conceptual guideline to help navigate through this intricate intellectual debate. Under Hand formula, establishing a duty of care and liability for tortious conduct requires showing that the burden of precaution (B) is less than the losses (L) incurred by the victim from the conduct, multiplied by the probability (P) that the conduct will occur—that is, when B < L x P.
Much ink has been spilled on the interplay between B and L in the context of digital competition, particularly regarding the effects from vigorous enforcement. But less attention has been given to the extent to which P influences the exercise of this equation. This oversight is unfortunate, as the probability that a given conduct will arise and cause competitive harm in digital markets is not only crucial for the cost-benefit assessment of legal intervention, but also closely linked to the necessity of structural presumptions and ex-ante regulations in addressing digital competition issues.
What sort of evidence do you look for?
To initiate an investigation, we seek evidence that provides a reasonable basis to believe a violation might have occurred. At this stage, we do not require the evidence to be fully concrete; it must, however, create a reasonable belief or suspicion that the alleged conduct could lead to the anticompetitive effects asserted by the complainant.
A more rigorous standard of proof will be applied to the investigative process leading to the final decision in a case. In essence, we look for evidence regarding the impact on market concentration, the entry and exit of existing or potential competitors, market contestability and, particularly, the price and output effects of the conduct or arrangements under review. We gather the relevant evidence through our own investigations or market inquiries, submission from the complainants and investigated parties, expert opinions from industry stakeholders, professionals, other government agencies, and public consultations. We don’t, however, have the authority to conduct dawn raids—an enforcement mechanism that the TFTC has unsuccessfully sought for years to implement in the TFTA.
Some say that antitrust procedure has become overly complex and that winning a case is exceedingly difficult. Do you agree? Is it typically difficult to demonstrate anticompetitive harm before Taiwanese courts?
Winning cases is important for enforcement agencies, as it is one of the key indicators of agency performance. In this regard, the TFTC has maintained a consistently high success rate, averaging more than 90% in court rulings.
It is, however, also true that it has become increasingly challenging for the TFTC to explain anticompetitive harm—particularly that established from economic evidence and reasoning—to the judge. As our understanding of the market expands and the economic tools available for its analysis advance, it is foreseeable that trial proceedings may be prolonged and the burden of proof for the enforcement agencies in litigation will be heightened as well. Enforcement agencies must adapt accordingly to navigate these evolving complexities effectively.
To mitigate this challenge, the TFTC held its first outreach workshop last year on economic analysis and competition law for judges. The workshop aimed to present complex economic theories and models frequently applied in our decisions in an accessible manner, strengthening judges’ ability to assess these concepts in legal proceedings. We have received positive feedback from the workshop participants and have decided to hold the second session this year.
Apart from the two cases you mentioned earlier, have there been other notable digital markets cases in Taiwan?
I would highlight the merger between UberEats and FoodPanda. The case involved the two leading digital food-delivery service providers in Taiwan. If cleared, UberEats would have controlled 90% of the market for food delivery via digital platform. We blocked the merger based on concerns about potential price increases following the merger and the creation of insurmountable entry barriers for smaller competitors resulting from excessive market concentration. UberEats attempted to present additional commitments to address these concerns, but we ultimately determined that the risks to competition were too significant and rejected their proposals.
The case highlighted that focusing on local nexus and adopting the issue-driven approach recommended in our white paper does not necessarily lead to lax enforcement or imply leniency toward business. During our review, the merging parties proposed decisions and studies by other jurisdictions to justify a broadly defined market, including takeout by consumers and delivery directly by the restaurants. But the TFTC did not accept those because our local market survey indicated that the preference for digital-platform delivery far outweighed both consumer takeout and direct restaurant delivery in Taiwan. We also requested the merging parties to submit the evidence that could support their claim that the merger is innovation-enhancing. But the evidence they provided was insufficient to convince the commissioners. Following extensive deliberation, the commissioners decided to prohibit the merger.
One additional point to note is that this case became high-profile in Taiwan not so much because of its significant competitive impacts as due to its implications for couriers’ interests. Public discussion largely centered on the issues of labor protection. Couriers were very concerned that the merger would transform the digital food-delivery market into a typical monopoly. As a result, their bargaining position vis-a-vis the platforms might be weakened by the merger. In the end, as we decided to block the merger, we did not delve into the specifics of the labor issues in the case.
That is a great segue to discuss another hot topic: labor antitrust…
To be candid, I still feel lingering regret that we did not seize the opportunity to examine the input-supply issue implicated in the UberEats/FoodPanda case. I believe the review would have benefited the TFTC by deepening its understanding of the market dynamics and the competitive implications in the buy-side market. This, in turn, would significantly contribute to the development of a more comprehensive enforcement roadmap to enhance the quality of our decisions.
Competitive issues in the buy-side market remain an underexplored field for antitrust enforcers, practitioners, and academia in Taiwan. Nevertheless, its importance continues to grow, as evidenced by the increasing number of cases involving disputes over retailers’ misuse of bargaining power against upstream suppliers, as well as the recruitment or organizational rules adopted by sports leagues. Currently, most such cases in Taiwan are examined mainly under the analytical framework of unfair competition. Consequently, the “fairness” of the contractual terms between the powerful buyers and their suppliers, rather than the competitive impacts of these arrangements on upstream and downstream markets, frequently dominate the TFTC’s analysis.
Take “slotting allowance” as an example, where large retail outlets require suppliers to pay additional fees to secure more favorable shelf space. The TFTC typically centers its analysis on the “reasonableness” and “proportionality” of these fees to determine whether they constitute “patently unfair” practices under Article 25 of the TFTA. Much less attention has been given to the probability that suppliers are able to avoid these unfair charges by selling to competing retailers in the relevant buying markets, or whether such fees are strategically employed to discriminate against specific suppliers by raising their operational costs in the upstream market, ultimately excluding their competition. This conduct-centered approach rather than effects-based approach has unfortunately misled the public into associating the TFTA with a standalone regulatory framework aimed at protecting upstream market participants’ interests.
It would have been valuable for the TFTC to examine in the UberEats/FoodPanda case whether the couriers had alternative contracting options to provide their delivery services, including non-digital service buyers, and to determine the relevant upstream market accordingly. Based on these findings, the TFTC could then assess whether it is necessary to consider the interlocking effects between the upstream courier market and the downstream food-delivery market, or to treat the two markets separately and independently.
If the TFTC opts for an integrated approach to this issue, it inevitably will require specifying the standards to evaluate overall interlocking effects, be it the consumer welfare standard or other alternatives. Moreover, this review process could serve as a constructive dialogue with the public, clarifying the extent and limits of how antitrust law can facilitate the protection of labor interests while protecting market competition.
What do you think about the proposed ban on noncompete agreements in the United States?
In my view, prohibiting noncompete agreements presents greater challenges and controversy than banning no-poach arrangements, which fundamentally function as cartel agreements. Noncompete agreements are frequently used by technology firms to protect proprietary knowledge shared with employees during training. They serve as a crucial tool to prevent dissemination of confidential and competitively sensitive information to rivals.
Prohibiting noncompetes could disincentivize tech firms’ investment in employee training. Moreover, in high-tech industries—where the cluster effect draws companies, talent, and resources to specific geographic areas, leading to increased innovation, productivity, and economic growth—the impacts from prohibiting noncompetes on talent mobility and competition may not be as substantial as anticipated. Consequently, empirical research is necessary to substantiate the real-world implications of such policy changes.
What can you say about Taiwan’s plans concerning digital regulation? Is Taiwan considering regulation similar to the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA)?
While some antitrust researchers and scholars routinely suggest the need for DMA-type legislation to better regulate digital platforms specifically, and the digital market more generally, no such proposals are currently before our Congress.
The TFTC continues to adhere to the policy recommendations outlined in our white paper—meaning we don’t recommend imposing rigid, preemptive regulations on digital markets at this time. Instead, the TFTC will focus its enforcement resources on sharpening its digital-enforcement skills and deepening its understanding of the market through more in-depth market studies.
Toward this end, the TFTC has already conducted market surveys on the digital-advertising market and consumer-usage patterns in the app market. Building on these findings, we have revised our guidelines on market definition, incorporating the concepts of two-sided markets and network effects as essential elements to define relevant markets in digital cases.
We have also proposed amendments to the Taiwan Fair Trade Act to formally include the authority to conduct market studies. Furthermore, we have commissioned several research projects with universities, and actively collaborated with scholars and professors to enhance our case-review capabilities and the quality of our decisions. Notably, one of our commissioned projects on algorithmic collusion—a collaboration with two economists and one mathematician—just won the “Best Antitrust Soft Law Award” from the renowned publishing house Concurrences.
Inspired by the Australian government’s Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code, some legislators in Congress have proposed similar bills in Taiwan. As such, I anticipate that discussions around this proposed legislation will emerge in the near future. The TFTC’s stance on such initiatives is to encourage voluntary negotiations between media organizations and digital platforms. Additionally, we have provided guidance to media outlets in Taiwan on how to apply for cartel exemptions if they intend to engage in collective bargaining with digital platforms. We have also advised them to report to the TFTC if there are instances of boycotts or other retaliatory actions by digital giants during the negotiation process. In such cases, the TFTC will conduct investigations based on the TFTA.
What is your view of the DMA?
While I am not well-positioned to comment on the DMA’s effectiveness, it is crucial for jurisdictions considering similar legislation to examine the two preconditions that justify such ex-ante regulations within the context of digital markets.
First, by explicitly setting forth dos and don’ts, the DMA is essentially a collection of per-se rules. As the U.S. Supreme Court had already outlined in its early rulings, the per-se rule was predicated on the assumption that, in most cases, the conduct or business arrangements subject to the rule are inherently anticompetitive without any redeeming virtue. But in a highly dynamic and evolving market such as the digital market, the question of whether and how an enforcement agency can develop such a belief remains open to further exploration and analysis.
This is an empirical issue that must be validated before the rules are implemented and applied. Through years of enforcement and investigative experience, this conviction may have been firmly established in the EU. Nevertheless, it may not necessarily apply to other jurisdictions with diverse market structures and varying degrees of technological progress.
Second, the DMA functions as a quasi-public-utility regulation, implicitly treating the gatekeeping digital platforms as monopolistic infrastructures. Their obligations to ensure open access and facilitate interoperability are treated as essential for effective market competition. But unlike traditional public-utility regulation, typically justified by high fixed costs and the cost-reducing effects of natural monopolies, the “winner-take-all” dynamics in digital marketplaces often stem from intense innovation competition. This phenomenon is rarely seen in conventional public utilities. Misguided regulations or structural presumptions could weaken firms’ incentives to invest, hinder the emergence of new products, and ultimately reduce consumer welfare in the long run.
We’ve heard a lot about industrial policy and antitrust lately. Do you have any thoughts on what an industrial-policy approach to antitrust in Taiwan would entail?
The TFTA contains two provisions authorizing the TFTC to evaluate and review the interplay between antitrust law and industrial policies and regulations.
The first is Article 45, which addresses the relationship between competition policy and intellectual property (IP) policy. It stipulates that “no provision of the TFTA shall apply to any proper conduct in connection with the exercise of rights pursuant to the provisions of the Copyright Act, Trademark Act, Patent Act or other Intellectual property laws.”
Article 46 provides that, if the conduct of an enterprise is regulated by other laws or orders issued under those laws, and such regulation does not conflict with the legislative purpose of the Fair Trade Act, then the provisions of those other laws or orders shall take precedence. The key component of this article is the requirement that regulation must not “conflict with the legislative purposes.”
But Article 1 of the TFTA provides a broad and somewhat ambiguous definition of the act’s legislative purposes. If these purposes are interpreted expansively, the TFTA could be readily superseded by industrial policies. According to Article 1, the legislative purpose of the TFTA includes maintaining trading order, protecting consumer interests, ensuring free and fair competition, and—perhaps its most intriguing aspect—promoting economic stability and prosperity.
In practice, tensions between antitrust law and industrial policy frequently emerge during merger reviews and cartel investigations. In cartel cases, parties under investigation regularly argue that collaboration among competitors is essential to achieve the objectives set forth in industrial policies. For example, during an investigation into the fixing of minimum fees by bar associations in Taiwan, the associations defended their pricing scheme by stressing its role in preserving service quality and advancing the public-interest objectives outlined in the Attorneys Act.
In merger reviews, merging parties also seek to convince the TFTC to clear their mergers by emphasizing potential societal benefits, such as preserving job opportunities or promoting the use of green energy, even when the mergers pose anti-competitive risks.
In response, I believe the TFTC has correctly adhered to a competition-centered approach when evaluating those justifications. To appropriately apply Article 46 and strengthen competition advocacy, the TFTC issued guidelines for its application. Under these guidelines, the TFTC reviews the legislative history of the laws or regulations in conflict with the TFTA to determine whether mechanisms are in place to prevent that competition from being undermined. Specifically, the TFTC examines whether the laws or regulations contain internal safeguards to protect market competition and, if necessary, to introduce measures to maintain or restore competition.
The TFTC also evaluates the market conditions in which these laws and regulations are applied. When a market is highly concentrated, poses significant entry barriers, and exhibits tendencies toward monopoly, it is more likely that such laws or regulations would conflict with the legislative purposes of the TFTA. In such cases, the TFTC finds it essential to provide competition advocacy to sector regulators. In making determinations based on these guidelines, the TFTC works closely with sector regulators. Their insights often play a critical role in assessing the competitive impacts of industrial-policy regulations.
