Lina Khan built her name arguing that modern antitrust enforcement was fundamentally broken. Her meteoric rise from law student to chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was fueled by calls to radically restructure how we think about competition. Under her leadership, the FTC spent four years failing to revolutionize antitrust, while succeeding on bread-and-butter cases.
Recently, in the runup to a change in administration, Khan’s FTC was in a mad dash to file cases, including its second Robinson-Patman Act complaint in a month after a 25-year hiatus. Incoming Chair Andrew Ferguson did not even have time to write his dissent before the commission’s press release went out. But rather than demonstrating the promised renaissance of antitrust enforcement, this most recent complaint against PepsiCo. reveals an agency falling back on outdated legal theories and procedural shortcuts.
The complaint alleges that Pepsi provides “unfair pricing advantages” to an unnamed large big-box retailer, while charging higher prices to competing stores. This follows last month’s similar case against Southern Glazer’s, but with a telling shift in strategy that highlights the weakness of Khan’s approach.
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936 to address concerns about large retail chains using their buying power to extract better terms from suppliers than smaller competitors could obtain. Before people worried about Amazon’s size, they worried about Walmart, and before that, about the A&P grocery chain. The RPA prohibits charging different prices to different buyers for the same products when it may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
While the FTC brought many RPA cases for several decades after the law’s passage, its enforcement has ceased in recent years (although private cases remain common), as antitrust law has focused more on consumer welfare than on protecting competitors.
The Robinson-Patman Act is often mischaracterized as a blanket ban on price differences between retailers. Section 2(a) of the act, which the FTC relied on in its Southern Glazer’s complaint, requires showing that price differences may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. That’s a meaningful hurdle, as it should be, since price differences often reflect legitimate business realities, rather than anticompetitive conduct. Unfortunately, the Southern Glazer’s complaint effectively treated price differences as per se violations of the RPA, even without any proof of consumer harm, just as antitrust law treats instances of collusion.
Perhaps recognizing these challenges, the FTC’s Pepsi complaint takes a different tack. Instead of proceeding under Section 2(a), it alleges violations of Sections 2(d) and 2(e), which address “promotional payments” and “services.” The FTC hopes to bypass any need to prove competitive harm by recasting volume discounts as promotional allowances. But this creative legal maneuver requires considerable linguistic gymnastics: calling standard pricing practices “promotional payments” simply because they encourage larger purchases.
Congress enacted Sections 2(d) and 2(e) in 1936 to prevent companies from evading the RPA’s core price-discrimination provision (Section 2(a)) by disguising preferential pricing through promotional arrangements. If a seller gives retailers the same price, but then provides one retailer special benefits like advertising payments, that could circumvent the law’s purpose.
The FTC’s complaint against Pepsi, however, stretches these provisions beyond recognition. What Pepsi calls volume discounts, the FTC recasts as “promotional payments” to trigger the stricter liability standards of 2(d) and 2(e). This matters because, unlike Section 2(a), these provisions don’t require proving harm to competition. They’re treated essentially per se violations—on par with collusion.
As Commissioner Melissa Holyoak explains in her dissent, this approach contradicts decades of precedent. Courts have consistently held that claims under Sections 2(d) and 2(e) “exclude claims that could fall within [Section 2(a)].” The reason is straightforward: allowing normal price discounts to be reframed as promotional payments would let the FTC “avoid the requirement of a substantial lessening of competition in subsection 2(a) in every case.”
The complaint’s strained effort to portray standard pricing practices as promotional arrangements highlights a broader problem. Rather than demonstrating how Pepsi’s conduct actually harms competition and consumers, the FTC is exploiting technical provisions to circumvent the need for such evidence.
The best solution would be for Congress to repeal or modernize this unworkable law, as recommended by the bipartisan Antitrust Modernization Commission in 2007. Failing that, the FTC should focus on clear cases of competitive harm proven under Section 2(a)’s standards. Using Sections 2(d) and 2(e) to attack ordinary pricing practices neither serves competition nor follows the law.
This case, rushed out in the FTC’s final days before the administration change, suggests an agency more interested in expanding its authority than protecting consumers. While wrapped in pro-competitive rhetoric, it risks forcing beverage companies to abandon pricing practices that benefit consumers.
