Showing archive for: “Vertical Restraints & Self-Preferencing”
The Law & Economics of the Capital One-Discover Merger
Capital One Financial announced plans late last month to acquire Discover Financial Services in a $35.3 billion deal that would give Capital One its own credit-card payment network, while simultaneously allowing the company to expand its deposit base, credit-card offerings, and rewards programs. Conversely, credit analysts like Matt Schulz of LendingTree note that “if Capital ... The Law & Economics of the Capital One-Discover Merger
The DMA’s Missing Presumption of Innocence
The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) will come into effect March 7, forcing a handful of digital platforms to change their market conduct in some unprecedented ways. The law effectively judges them guilty (with a very limited, formalistic trial), and brands them “gatekeepers” based purely on size. It then sentences them to far-reaching, one-size-fits-all antitrust-style ... The DMA’s Missing Presumption of Innocence
Whose Failure Is the Failed Amazon/iRobot Merger?
The European Commission told Amazon in November 2023 of its preliminary view that the company’s proposed acquisition of iRobot restricted competition in the market for robot vacuum cleaners (RVCs) and could hamper rival RVC suppliers’ ability to compete effectively. The deal, the Commission asserted, would give Amazon incentive to foreclose iRobot’s competitors by engaging in ... Whose Failure Is the Failed Amazon/iRobot Merger?
How the FTC’s Amazon Case Gerrymanders Relevant Markets and Obscures Competitive Processes
As Greg Werden has noted, the process of defining the relevant market in an antitrust case doesn’t just finger which part of the economy is allegedly affected by the challenged conduct, but it also “identifies the competitive process alleged to be harmed.” Unsurprisingly, plaintiffs in such proceedings (most commonly, antitrust enforcers) often seek to set ... How the FTC’s Amazon Case Gerrymanders Relevant Markets and Obscures Competitive Processes
A European Commission Challenge to iRobot’s Acquisition Is Unjustified and Would Harm Dynamic Competition
Once again, a major competition agency, the European Commission, appears poised to take an anticompetitive enforcement action—in this case, blocking Amazon’s acquisition of consumer robotic-manufacturer iRobot. iRobot, headquartered in Bedford, Massachusetts, is an American success story: Founded in 1990 by Massachusetts Institute of Technology roboticists with the vision of making practical robots a reality, iRobot ... A European Commission Challenge to iRobot’s Acquisition Is Unjustified and Would Harm Dynamic Competition
Four Problems with the Supreme Court’s Refusal To Hear the Epic v Apple Dispute
The U.S. Supreme Court this week rejected both parties’ petitions for certiorari in appeals of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals’ Epic Games v Apple decision. Many observers—including Epic CEO Tim Sweeney—have marked this as an unmitigated loss for Epic. That’s partly right. The district court had correctly rejected Epic’s federal antitrust claims against ... Four Problems with the Supreme Court’s Refusal To Hear the Epic v Apple Dispute
The View from Turkey: A TOTM Q&A with Kerem Cem Sanli
How did you come to be interested in the regulation of digital markets? I am a full-time professor in competition law at Bilgi University in Istanbul. I first became interested in the application of competition law in digital markets when a PhD student of mine, Cihan Dogan, wrote his PhD thesis on the topic in ... The View from Turkey: A TOTM Q&A with Kerem Cem Sanli
Gatekeeping, the DMA, and the Future of Competition Regulation
The European Commission late last month published the full list of its “gatekeeper” designations under the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta, and Microsoft—the six designated gatekeepers—now have six months to comply with the DMA’s list of obligations and restrictions with respect to their core platform services (CPS), or they stand to ... Gatekeeping, the DMA, and the Future of Competition Regulation
Is Amazon’s Scale a Harm?
Under the leadership of its professional anti-Amazoner Chair Lina Khan, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has finally filed its antitrust complaint against Amazon. No, not the complaint about how it’s unfair to take six clicks to cancel your Prime membership. This is the big one. It mostly revolves around sellers needing to use Amazon’s fulfillment ... Is Amazon’s Scale a Harm?
FTC’s Amazon Complaint: Perhaps the Greatest Affront to Consumer and Producer Welfare in Antitrust History
“Seldom in the history of U.S. antitrust law has one case had the potential to do so much good [HARM] for so many people.” – Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Bureau of Competition Deputy Director John Newman, quoted in a Sept. 26 press release announcing the FTC’s lawsuit against Amazon (correction IN ALL CAPS is mine) ... FTC’s Amazon Complaint: Perhaps the Greatest Affront to Consumer and Producer Welfare in Antitrust History
The FTC Tacks Into the Gale, Battening No Hatches: Part 2
Part 1 of this piece can be found here. Emergence of the ‘Neo-Brandeisians’ Thus, matters unfolded until the curtain began to descend on the second Obama term in 2016. In the midst of presidential primary season, a targeted political challenge to the prevailing economic approach to antitrust first came to light. No one has yet ... The FTC Tacks Into the Gale, Battening No Hatches: Part 2
The FTC Tacks Into the Gale, Battening No Hatches: Part 1
The Evolution of FTC Antitrust Enforcement – Highlights of Its Origins and Major Trends 1910-1914 – Creation and Launch The election of 1912, which led to the creation of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), occurred at the apex of the Progressive Era. Since antebellum times, Grover Cleveland had been the only Democrat elected as president. ... The FTC Tacks Into the Gale, Battening No Hatches: Part 1
