Showing archive for: “Platforms”
Thank you, Stigler Center, for the Compliment. Now Here’s Why You’re Wrong.
This guest post is by Neil Chilson, Senior Research Fellow for Technology and Innovation at Charles Koch Institute and former Chief Technologist at the Federal Trade Commission. Is it rude to respond to a compliment with a rebuttal? I’m afraid that’s what I’m about to do. The antitrust reformers at the University of Chicago’s Stigler ... Thank you, Stigler Center, for the Compliment. Now Here’s Why You’re Wrong.
“You don’t get to be the umpire and have a team”: should we regulate the activities of digital platforms in neighboring markets?
This guest post is by Patrick Todd, an England-qualified solicitor and author on competition law/policy in digital markets. The above quote is not about Democrat-nominee hopeful Elizabeth Warren’s policy views on sport. It is in fact an analogy to her proposal of splitting Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (“GAFA”) apart from their respective ancillary lines ... “You don’t get to be the umpire and have a team”: should we regulate the activities of digital platforms in neighboring markets?
Inevitable Monopolies and More Maverick Madness
In antitrust lore, mavericks are magical creatures that bring order to a world on the verge of monopoly. Because they are so hard to find in the wild, some researchers have attempted to create them in the laboratory. While the alchemists couldn’t turn lead into gold, they did discover zinc. Similarly, although modern day researchers ... Inevitable Monopolies and More Maverick Madness
The FTC Still Has a Long Way to Go on its “Common Law” of Data Security
Since the LabMD decision, in which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals told the FTC that its orders were unconstitutionally vague, the FTC has been put on notice that it needs to reconsider how it develops and substantiates its claims in data security enforcement actions brought under Section 5. Thus, on January 6, the FTC ... The FTC Still Has a Long Way to Go on its “Common Law” of Data Security
What Can the Stock Market Tell Us About the T-Mobile/Sprint Merger?
On Monday evening, around 6:00 PM Eastern Standard Time, news leaked that the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had decided to allow the T-Mobile/Sprint merger to go through, giving the companies a victory over a group of state attorneys general trying to block the deal. Thomas Philippon, a professor ... What Can the Stock Market Tell Us About the T-Mobile/Sprint Merger?
Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 4): The Commission’s Economic Analysis
This is the fourth, and last, in a series of TOTM blog posts discussing the Commission’s recently published Google Android decision (the first post can be found here, and the second here, and the third here). It draws on research from a soon-to-be published ICLE white paper. The previous parts of this series have mostly ... Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 4): The Commission’s Economic Analysis
Manne & Stout 2: Against Incorporating a Contract/Merger Equivalency Assumption in Vertical Merger Guidelines
In our first post, we discussed the weaknesses of an important theoretical underpinning of efforts to expand vertical merger enforcement (including, possibly, the proposed guidelines): the contract/merger equivalency assumption. In this post we discuss the implications of that assumption and some of the errors it leads to — including some incorporated into the proposed guidelines. ... Manne & Stout 2: Against Incorporating a Contract/Merger Equivalency Assumption in Vertical Merger Guidelines
Manne & Stout 1: The Illogic of a Contract/Merger Equivalency Assumption in the Assessment of Vertical Mergers
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Geoffrey A. Manne (President & Founder, ICLE; Distinguished Fellow, Northwestern University Center on Law, Business, and Economics ); and Kristian Stout (Associate Director, ... Manne & Stout 1: The Illogic of a Contract/Merger Equivalency Assumption in the Assessment of Vertical Mergers
Sher: Implications of the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines for Vertical Mergers Involving Technology Start-Ups
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Scott Sher (Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati) and Matthew McDonald (Associate, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati).] On January 10, 2020, the United ... Sher: Implications of the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines for Vertical Mergers Involving Technology Start-Ups
Fruits: Messy Mergers and Muddled Guidelines (Or, “Orange You Glad I Didn’t Say Banana?”)
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Eric Fruits (Chief Economist, International Center for Law & Economics and Professor of Economics, Portland State University).] Vertical mergers are messy. They’re messy ... Fruits: Messy Mergers and Muddled Guidelines (Or, “Orange You Glad I Didn’t Say Banana?”)
Cernak: Who Bears the Burden on Elimination of Double Marginalization in the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines?
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Steven J. Cernak (Partner, Bona Law; Adjunct Professor, University of Michigan Law School and Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School; former ... Cernak: Who Bears the Burden on Elimination of Double Marginalization in the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines?
Brennan: Guidance on Enforcement Against “Pure” Vertical Mergers: It’s Complicated
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Timothy J. Brennan (Professor, Public Policy and Economics, University of Maryland; former Chief Economist, FCC; former economist, DOJ Antitrust Division).] The DOJ Antitrust ... Brennan: Guidance on Enforcement Against “Pure” Vertical Mergers: It’s Complicated
