Showing archive for: “Platforms”
Case closed: Google wins (for now)
The European Commission and its supporters were quick to claim victory following last week’s long-awaited General Court of the European Union ruling in the Google Shopping case. It’s hard to fault them. The judgment is ostensibly an unmitigated win for the Commission, with the court upholding nearly every aspect of its decision. However, the broader ... Case closed: Google wins (for now)
Judge Ginsburg: On the Proposed Digital Markets Unit and the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority
Thank you, Victoria, for the invitation to respond to Mr. Coscelli and his proposal for a legislatively founded Digital Markets Unit. Mr. Coscelli is one of the most talented, successful, and creative heads a competition agency has ever had. In the case of the DMU [ed., Digital Markets Unit], however, I think he has let ... Judge Ginsburg: On the Proposed Digital Markets Unit and the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority
Consumer Welfare-Based Antitrust Enforcement is the Superior Means to Deal with Large Digital-Platform Competition Issues
There has been a rapid proliferation of proposals in recent years to closely regulate competition among large digital platforms. The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA, which will become effective in 2023) imposes a variety of data-use, interoperability, and non-self-preferencing obligations on digital “gatekeeper” firms. A host of other regulatory schemes are being considered in ... Consumer Welfare-Based Antitrust Enforcement is the Superior Means to Deal with Large Digital-Platform Competition Issues
The Contestable Platform Paradox
Why do digital industries routinely lead to one company having a very large share of the market (at least if one defines markets narrowly)? To anyone familiar with competition policy discussions, the answer might seem obvious: network effects, scale-related economies, and other barriers to entry lead to winner-take-all dynamics in platform industries. Accordingly, it is ... The Contestable Platform Paradox
‘New Madison Approach’ Should Be Retained to Promote American Innovation
The leading contribution to sound competition policy made by former Assistant U.S. Attorney General Makan Delrahim was his enunciation of the “New Madison Approach” to patent-antitrust enforcement—and, in particular, to the antitrust treatment of standard essential patent licensing (see, for example, here, here, and here). In short (citations omitted): The New Madison Approach (“NMA”) advanced ... ‘New Madison Approach’ Should Be Retained to Promote American Innovation
5 Thoughts on the Senate’s Proposed Platform Self-Preferencing Ban
A bipartisan group of senators unveiled legislation today that would dramatically curtail the ability of online platforms to “self-preference” their own services—for example, when Apple pre-installs its own Weather or Podcasts apps on the iPhone, giving it an advantage that independent apps don’t have. The measure accompanies a House bill that included similar provisions, with ... 5 Thoughts on the Senate’s Proposed Platform Self-Preferencing Ban
Why There Needs to Be More, not Less, Consolidation in Video Streaming
Slow and inadequate oversight risks the streaming market going the same route as cable—where consumers have little power, few options, and where consolidation and concentration reign supreme. A number of threats to competition are clear, as discussed in this section, including: (1) market power issues surrounding content and (2) the role of platforms in “gatekeeping” ... Why There Needs to Be More, not Less, Consolidation in Video Streaming
Is There Any Market Power in Online Display Advertising?
A lawsuit filed by the State of Texas and nine other states in December 2020 alleges, among other things, that Google has engaged in anticompetitive conduct related to its online display-advertising business. Broadly, the Texas complaint (previously discussed in this TOTM symposium) alleges that Google possesses market power in ad-buying tools and in search, illustrated ... Is There Any Market Power in Online Display Advertising?
Using the Hypothetical Monopolist Test to Define the Relevant Market for Ad Tech
Policymakers’ recent focus on how Big Tech should be treated under antitrust law has been accompanied by claims that companies like Facebook and Google hold dominant positions in various “markets.” Notwithstanding the tendency to conflate whether a firm is large with whether it hold a dominant position, we must first answer the question most of ... Using the Hypothetical Monopolist Test to Define the Relevant Market for Ad Tech
Online Display Advertising: What’s the relevant market?
Digital advertising is the economic backbone of the Internet. It allows websites and apps to monetize their userbase without having to charge them fees, while the emergence of targeted ads allows this to be accomplished affordably and with less wasted time wasted. This advertising is facilitated by intermediaries using the “adtech stack,” through which advertisers ... Online Display Advertising: What’s the relevant market?
A Coasean Analysis of Offensive Speech
Words can wound. They can humiliate, anger, insult. University students—or, at least, a vociferous minority of them—are keen to prevent this injury by suppressing offensive speech. To ensure campuses are safe places, they militate for the cancellation of talks by speakers with opinions they find offensive, often successfully. And they campaign to get offensive professors ... A Coasean Analysis of Offensive Speech
Antitrust Dystopia and Antitrust Nostalgia
The dystopian novel is a powerful literary genre. It has given us such masterpieces as Nineteen Eighty-Four, Brave New World, and Fahrenheit 451. Though these novels often shed light on the risks of contemporary society and the zeitgeist of the era in which they were written, they also almost always systematically overshoot the mark (intentionally ... Antitrust Dystopia and Antitrust Nostalgia
