Showing archive for: “Harm to Competition”
Russian Retail Trade Law and Government Barriers to Entry
A new Russian retail trade law is scheduled to (at least partially) go into effect on February 1st. The new retail trade law, with the support of the national antitrust authority and Prime Minister Putin amongst others, has three essential features: (1) limiting the operation of chains to no more than 25 percent of total ... Russian Retail Trade Law and Government Barriers to Entry
Evading Section Two, Two Ways: The Commission's Cases Against McCormick and Intel
Yesterday, in my contribution to the Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog’s Section 5 symposium, I discussed the FTC’s use of Section 5 to evade the tough standards facing plaintiffs bringing Section 2 claims and how that evasion was likely to cost consumers by stripping out the error-cost protections embedded in modern monopolization law. I also ... Evading Section Two, Two Ways: The Commission's Cases Against McCormick and Intel
The Case Against the Section 5 Case Against Intel (Cross-Posted)
Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog is hosting a symposium on The Role of FTC Act Section 5 in Light of Intel. Today’s contributions include Dan Crane (Michigan), Keith Hylton (BU), Bob Lande (Baltimore) and me. Up tomorrow will be TOTM’s Geoff Manne, Sean Heather (US Chamber), and Herbert Hovenkamp (Iowa). My contribution is available here, ... The Case Against the Section 5 Case Against Intel (Cross-Posted)
Features v. Bugs: Intel and the Relationship Between Sections 2 and 5
There will be much to say about the Federal Trade Commission’s Intel complaint in the coming months. And we’ve said quite a bit already. But having just read the complaint and the statements from Chairman Leibowitz and Commissioner Rosch discussing the various rationales for making Section 5 the primary hook for this case, I wanted ... Features v. Bugs: Intel and the Relationship Between Sections 2 and 5
A Decision-Theoretic Rule of Reason for Minimum Resale Price Maintenance
My latest working paper, which bears the same title as this post, is now available on SSRN. In the paper, I address the challenge created by the Supreme Court’s 2007 Leegin decision, which abrogated the 96 year-old rule declaring resale price maintenance (RPM) to be per se illegal. The Leegin Court held that instances of ... A Decision-Theoretic Rule of Reason for Minimum Resale Price Maintenance
PeaceHealth and De Facto Exclusive Dealing, Part III
Josh’s thoughtful response (Bitchslap? Nah.) to my post criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s recent Masimo decision raises a number of important matters. I started to just submit a comment to Josh’s post, but then I figured a reply was post-worthy. (I don’t want the antitrust nerds who read these technical posts — and here’s to you, ... PeaceHealth and De Facto Exclusive Dealing, Part III
Should PeaceHealth Apply to De Facto Exclusive Dealing Claims?
Thom answers this question in the affirmative in his excellent post about the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Masimo and is disappointed that the Ninth Circuit rejected the discount attribution standard as the sole test for Section 2 in favor of a separate inquiry as to whether the bundled discount arrangement resulted in a substantial foreclosure ... Should PeaceHealth Apply to De Facto Exclusive Dealing Claims?
PeaceHealth Should Apply Even When a Bundled Discount Results in "De Facto" Exclusive Dealing
The Ninth Circuit, whose PeaceHealth decision moved the law on bundled discounting in the right direction, recently issued another decision on bundled discounts. That decision, Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, L.P., threatens to limit PeaceHealth‘s effectiveness. Medical device manufacturer Masimo sued Tyco for monopolizing the market for pulse oximetry devices. A monopolization action ... PeaceHealth Should Apply Even When a Bundled Discount Results in "De Facto" Exclusive Dealing
Another Way DOJ Might Pursue "Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era"
DOJ’s top antitrust enforcer Christine Varney had hardly gotten settled in her office before she repudiated the existing DOJ guidelines on policing single-firm conduct. In the spirit of Rahm Emanuel’s famous “never let a serious crisis go to waste” directive, Ms. Varney invoked the current economic crisis as grounds for her decision to throw out ... Another Way DOJ Might Pursue "Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era"
Section 2 Symposium: Tim Brennan on Predation, Exclusion, and Complement Market Monopolization
As evidenced by this on-line symposium, the handling of cases under the rubrics “monopolization,” “single firm conduct”, or “abuse of dominance” continues to be debated by the competition policy community. This debate, as evidenced by the Antitrust Division’s Sept. 2008 single firm conduct report and the FTC responses, is not restricted within the U.S. The ... Section 2 Symposium: Tim Brennan on Predation, Exclusion, and Complement Market Monopolization
Section 2 Symposium: Thom Lambert on The DOJ-FTC Divide on Bundled Discounts
A bundled discount occurs when a seller offers to sell a collection of different goods for a lower price than the aggregate price for which it would sell the constituent products individually. Such discounts pose different competitive risks than single-product discounts because, as I explained in this post, they may have an exclusionary effect even ... Section 2 Symposium: Thom Lambert on The DOJ-FTC Divide on Bundled Discounts
Section 2 Symposium: Bill Page on Microsoft and the DOJ’s General Standards of Exclusion
The DOJ’s § 2 Report offers two recommendations under the heading of “General Standards for Exclusionary Conduct.” First, for evaluating alleged acts of exclusion, the Report endorses the burden-shifting framework of the D.C. Circuit’s 2001 Microsoft decision. Second, after canvassing various standards of anticompetitive effect, the Report settles on the “disproportionality test,” under which “conduct ... Section 2 Symposium: Bill Page on Microsoft and the DOJ’s General Standards of Exclusion
