Showing archive for: “EU”
If A Tree Falls in a Forest and Nobody Hears It, Did the Bush Antitrust Division Cut It Down?
The NYT ran an unsigned editorial on “Intel and Competition” that, quite frankly, doesn’t make much sense to us. It offers two basic arguments: (1) that the Bush administration DOJ is responsible for the state of Section 2 law requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate actual consumer harm, and (2) that foreign antitrust jurisdictions’ pursuit of enforcement ... If A Tree Falls in a Forest and Nobody Hears It, Did the Bush Antitrust Division Cut It Down?
CPI Webinar: Economic and Legal Analysis of Collusion
Competition Policy International has announced its next Webinar, featuring Professors Bajari and Abrantes-Metz on the economic and legal analysis of collusion. I’ve had a blast doing these lectures the last couple of weeks teaching Antitrust Economics 101, and will be finishing up the third lecture this week (after covering basic demand side and supply side ... CPI Webinar: Economic and Legal Analysis of Collusion
Hylton, Manne and Wright in Forbes on Intel, Section 2 and Monopolization in the US
Available here. Here’s an excerpt: It turns out that it is a very difficult business to identify the few cases when low prices and aggressive competition might perversely end up harming consumers in the long run rather than simply making them better off. And the cost of erroneous antitrust enforcement, such as mistakenly condemning Intel’s ... Hylton, Manne and Wright in Forbes on Intel, Section 2 and Monopolization in the US
The EU Intel Decision, Error Costs, and What Happens in the US?
Reacting to the EU fines imposed on Intel, Geoff raises a nice point about the difficulty of constructing the but-for world in antitrust cases generally, but particularly in cases where prices are falling. This discussion reminded me of Thom’s excellent post responding to the NYT editorial and an AAI working paper and putting theoretical anticompetitive ... The EU Intel Decision, Error Costs, and What Happens in the US?
Good Stuff (Including Josh Wright) on Intel in Today’s WSJ
Our own Josh Wright is quoted in the lead article in today’s Wall Street Journal. Josh opines that the European Union’s record $1.45 billion fine against Intel for lowering its prices on granting “exclusionary” rebates on microprocessors means that FTC action against Intel is “much more likely than it was two weeks ago.” And what ... Good Stuff (Including Josh Wright) on Intel in Today’s WSJ
A quick note on Intel
I am curious about something. AMD and Intel have been competing head to head for more than 15 years, at least since AMD released its Intel 386 clone in the early 90s. In that time, inarguably, microprocessor prices have plumeted and processing power and other features have increased dramatically (I’m aware that we don’t know ... A quick note on Intel
Section 2 Symposium: David Evans on ‘Tying as Antitrust’s Greatest Intellectual Embarrassment’
I’d like to propose a contest for the greatest intellectual embarrassment of antitrust. Let me name the first contestant—tying, which some of you know has been one of my favorite for years. Here’s why. First, there is no persuasive theoretical or empirical evidence that tying is a business practice that is likely to harm consumers. ... Section 2 Symposium: David Evans on ‘Tying as Antitrust’s Greatest Intellectual Embarrassment’
Section 2 Symposium: Bill Page on Microsoft’s ‘Forward-Looking’ Monopolization Remedy
The DOJ’s Section 2 Report speaks in general terms about the costs and benefits of various remedies for monopolization. It prefers “prohibitory” remedies, but holds open the possibility of “additional relief,” including “affirmative-obligation remedies. The Report specifically mentions the protocol-licensing requirement of the Microsoft final judgments (§ III.E, entered in November 2002) as an example ... Section 2 Symposium: Bill Page on Microsoft’s ‘Forward-Looking’ Monopolization Remedy
Section 2 Symposium: Tim Brennan on Predation, Exclusion, and Complement Market Monopolization
As evidenced by this on-line symposium, the handling of cases under the rubrics “monopolization,” “single firm conduct”, or “abuse of dominance” continues to be debated by the competition policy community. This debate, as evidenced by the Antitrust Division’s Sept. 2008 single firm conduct report and the FTC responses, is not restricted within the U.S. The ... Section 2 Symposium: Tim Brennan on Predation, Exclusion, and Complement Market Monopolization
Section 2 Symposium: Howard Marvel–An Economist’s View
In the wake of Bork and Posner, and Baxter and the Reagan Revolution, a consensus emerged that big could be bad, but the harm that dominant firms could do needed to be demonstrated, not simply assumed in consequence of their sheer size. Moreover, the demonstration required harm to competition. The consensus held through the Clinton ... Section 2 Symposium: Howard Marvel–An Economist’s View
Section 2 Symposium: David Evans–An Economist’s View
The treatment of unilateral conduct remains an intellectual and policy mess as we finish out the first decade of the 21st century. There were signs of hope a few years ago. The European Commission embarked on an effort to adopt an effects-based approach to unilateral conduct and to move away from the analytically-empty, object-based approach ... Section 2 Symposium: David Evans–An Economist’s View
Section 2 Symposium: Alden Abbott on the View from Within the FTC
Much ink has been spilled concerning the policy split revealed by the Justice Department’s September 2008 Report on Single Firm Conduct (“SFC”) and the Federal Trade Commission’s swift and rather critical rejoinder (issued by three of the four FTC Commissioners). (By “SFC” I refer to actions taken by a “dominant” firm or by an actual ... Section 2 Symposium: Alden Abbott on the View from Within the FTC
