Showing archive for: “EU”
Symposium Wrap Up: The 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines: What’s in, what’s out — and do we need them anyway?
Last Thursday and Friday, Truth on the Market hosted a symposium analyzing the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines from the FTC and DOJ. The relatively short draft guidelines provided ample opportunity for discussion, as evidenced by the stellar roster of authors thoughtfully weighing in on the topic. We want to thank all of the participants for their ... Symposium Wrap Up: The 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines: What’s in, what’s out — and do we need them anyway?
Rybnicek: The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines Would Do More Harm Than Good
In an area where it may seem that agreement is rare, there is near universal agreement on the benefits of withdrawing the DOJ’s 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The 1984 Guidelines do not reflect current agency thinking on vertical mergers and are not relied upon by businesses or practitioners to anticipate how the agencies may review ... Rybnicek: The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines Would Do More Harm Than Good
Pozen: The Missed Opportunity for International Harmonization in the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Sharis Pozen (Partner, Clifford Chance; former Vice President of Global Competition Law and Policy, GE; former Acting Assistant Attorney General, DOJ Antitrust Division); ... Pozen: The Missed Opportunity for International Harmonization in the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines
Slade: The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines Are a Step in the Right Direction, But Uneven on Critical Issues
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Margaret E. Slade (Professor Emeritus, Vancouver School of Economics, The University of British Columbia).] A revision of the DOJ’s Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines is ... Slade: The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines Are a Step in the Right Direction, But Uneven on Critical Issues
Kolasky: The DOJ and FTC Should Revise Their Proposed Vertical Merger Guidelines to Emulate the EU’s
On January 10, the Department of Justice (DOJ) withdrew the 1984 DOJ Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and, together with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), released new draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (“DOJ/FTC draft guidelines”) on which it seeks public comment by February 26.[1] In announcing these new draft guidelines, Makan Delrahim, the Assistant Attorney General for ... Kolasky: The DOJ and FTC Should Revise Their Proposed Vertical Merger Guidelines to Emulate the EU’s
The State AGs’ Investigation Against Google Needs to Put Consumers First
In mid-November, the 50 state attorneys general (AGs) investigating Google’s advertising practices expanded their antitrust probe to include the company’s search and Android businesses. Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, the lead on the case, was supportive of the development, but made clear that other states would manage the investigations of search and Android separately. While ... The State AGs’ Investigation Against Google Needs to Put Consumers First
Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 3): Where is the Harm?
This is the third in a series of TOTM blog posts discussing the Commission’s recently published Google Android decision (the first post can be found here, and the second here). It draws on research from a soon-to-be published ICLE white paper. (Comparison of Google and Apple’s smartphone business models. Red $ symbols represent money invested; ... Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 3): Where is the Harm?
Efficient Cartels and the Public Interest Defence – Do They Exist?
The concept of a “good” or “efficient” cartel is generally regarded by competition authorities as an oxymoron. A cartel is seen as the worst type of antitrust violation and one that warrants zero tolerance. Agreements between competitors to raise prices and share the market are assumed unambiguously to reduce economic welfare. As such, even if ... Efficient Cartels and the Public Interest Defence – Do They Exist?
Competition Law as a Swiss Army Knife (Move Fast and Break Things?)
[TOTM: The following is the fourth in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Valentin Mircea, a Senior Partner at Mircea and Partners Law Firm, Bucharest, Romania. The enforcement of competition rules in the European ... Competition Law as a Swiss Army Knife (Move Fast and Break Things?)
Towards a Democratic Antitrust
This symposium discusses the “The Politicization of Antitrust.” As the invite itself stated, this is an umbrella topic that encompasses a wide range of subjects: from incorporating environmental or labor concerns in antitrust enforcement, to political pressure in enforcement decision-making, to national security laws (CFIUS-type enforcement), protectionism, federalism, and more. This contribution will focus on ... Towards a Democratic Antitrust
Does Political Power Follow Economic Power?
[TOTM: The following is the third in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Geoffrey A. Manne, president and founder of the International Center for Law & Economics, and Alec Stapp, Research Fellow at the ... Does Political Power Follow Economic Power?
The Politicization of Antitrust Blog Symposium
The operative text of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a scant 100 words: Section 1: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract ... The Politicization of Antitrust Blog Symposium
