Showing archive for: “Corporate Governance”
A bright spot in the bleak financial industry regulatory firmament
Between the various power grabs and dubious regulatory proposals (each more dubious than the last!) from the likes of Geithner, Bernanke, Frank (.pdf), Dodd, etc., etc. you’d be excused for thinking the financial news from Washington (remember when financial news used to come from New York?) was all bad and growing only worse. But there ... A bright spot in the bleak financial industry regulatory firmament
Shouldn't I Just Be Happy My Name is Spelled Correctly?
I’m not generally a big fan of blogging to complain about law reviews or the way that my work has been interpreted by others. I’m generally of the view that the risk of having my work misinterpreted within a reasonable range is my own to bear, and that if it happens, it’s probably due to ... Shouldn't I Just Be Happy My Name is Spelled Correctly?
An Addendum on Jones v. Harris in Response to Professor Birdthistle: Ex Ante Competition, Cognitive Biases and Behavioral Economics
Professor Birdthistle has a very thoughtful reply to my earlier post over at the Conglomerate on Jones v. Harris and behavioral economics. I thank Professor Birdthistle for his reply. I’ve learned a great deal about Jones v. Harris from reading his posts at the Conglomerate and have no doubt that I’ll learn more from this ... An Addendum on Jones v. Harris in Response to Professor Birdthistle: Ex Ante Competition, Cognitive Biases and Behavioral Economics
Jones v. Harris and Some Ramblings on Burdens of Proof, Empirical Evidence, and Behavioral Law and Economics
Much has been made about the importance of Jones v. Harris as a battle in the ongoing war between behavioral economics and rational choice/neoclassical framework (see, e.g. the NYT). If the case if to be about the appropriate economic methodology or model for assessing legal questions, it is definitely an interesting turn to have Judge ... Jones v. Harris and Some Ramblings on Burdens of Proof, Empirical Evidence, and Behavioral Law and Economics
The optimal level of risk is not zero
I have said it before and I’ll say it again: All of this hand wringing over executive compensation seems to exist in a parallel world where corporate executives have no risk aversion, where there is no real competition for managerial talent, and where firms can only take on too much–never too little–risk. And this in ... The optimal level of risk is not zero
Too Big To Fail as an Antitrust Concept
There has been a lot of talk recently about the possibility that lax antitrust gave rise to the financial crisis or that antitrust could be used as a proactive weapon to prevent mergers and acquisitions that would create entities “too big to fail.” George Priest recently took AAG Varney to task for suggesting that there ... Too Big To Fail as an Antitrust Concept
Commissioner Rosch, Rhetoric, and the Relationship Between Economics and Antitrust
Economic theory is essential to antitrust law. It is economic analysis that constrains antitrust law and harnesses it so that it is used to protect consumers rather than competitors. And the relationship between economics and antitrust is responsible for the successful evolution of antitrust from its economically incoherent origins to its present state. In my ... Commissioner Rosch, Rhetoric, and the Relationship Between Economics and Antitrust
Government Ownership of GM: Hands-Off Rhetoric Versus Jawboning Reality
In his recent speech on the GM bankruptcy, President Obama reassured Americans that the government, which now holds 60% of GM’s stock, is not going to try to take over management of the company: What we are not doing, what I have no interest in doing, is running GM. GM will be run by a ... Government Ownership of GM: Hands-Off Rhetoric Versus Jawboning Reality
Revisionist corporate governance
If you haven’t been living under a rock recently, you’ve seen an incredible amount of hand wringing–and proposed regulation–around “excessive compensation.” I’m a little too lazy to amass all the relevant links here, but both the administration and the congress are introducing regulations/bills and talking about the issue extensively. Commentators, too, have gotten in on ... Revisionist corporate governance
Supreme Court Nominee Judge Sonia Sotomayor and Corporate and Securities Law
I have been asked a few times today to opine, as a corporate and securities law scholar, on President Obama’s nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor for the Supreme Court. (Cnn.com has a couple of quotes reflecting my thoughts.) I have three main comments: First, this is a pivotal time in American securities and corporate law jurisprudence. ... Supreme Court Nominee Judge Sonia Sotomayor and Corporate and Securities Law
Zywicki on Chrysler and The Rule of Law
My colleague Todd Zywicki has a must read op-ed in the WSJ. Here’s an excerpt: The Obama administration’s behavior in the Chrysler bankruptcy is a profound challenge to the rule of law. Secured creditors — entitled to first priority payment under the “absolute priority rule” — have been browbeaten by an American president into accepting ... Zywicki on Chrysler and The Rule of Law
Section 2 Symposium: David Evans on ‘Tying as Antitrust’s Greatest Intellectual Embarrassment’
I’d like to propose a contest for the greatest intellectual embarrassment of antitrust. Let me name the first contestant—tying, which some of you know has been one of my favorite for years. Here’s why. First, there is no persuasive theoretical or empirical evidence that tying is a business practice that is likely to harm consumers. ... Section 2 Symposium: David Evans on ‘Tying as Antitrust’s Greatest Intellectual Embarrassment’
