Showing archive for: “Corporate Governance”
Why Don’t People Talk About Breaking Up Microsoft?
[This post is the seventh in an ongoing symposium on “Should We Break Up Big Tech?” that features analysis and opinion from various perspectives.] [This post is authored by Alec Stapp, Research Fellow at the International Center for Law & Economics] Should we break up Microsoft? In all the talk of breaking up “Big Tech,” ... Why Don’t People Talk About Breaking Up Microsoft?
There’s nothing “conservative” about Trump’s views on free speech and the regulation of social media
Yesterday was President Trump’s big “Social Media Summit” where he got together with a number of right-wing firebrands to decry the power of Big Tech to censor conservatives online. According to the Wall Street Journal: Mr. Trump attacked social-media companies he says are trying to silence individuals and groups with right-leaning views, without presenting specific ... There’s nothing “conservative” about Trump’s views on free speech and the regulation of social media
An Evidentiary Cornerstone of the FTC’s Antitrust Case Against Qualcomm May Have Rested on Manipulated Data
The courtroom trial in the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) antitrust case against Qualcomm ended in January with a promise from the judge in the case, Judge Lucy Koh, to issue a ruling as quickly as possible — caveated by her acknowledgement that the case is complicated and the evidence voluminous. Well, things have only gotten more ... An Evidentiary Cornerstone of the FTC’s Antitrust Case Against Qualcomm May Have Rested on Manipulated Data
Deadweight loss from no monopoly
The once-mighty Blockbuster video chain is now down to a single store, in Bend, Oregon. It appears to be the only video rental store in Bend, aside from those offering “adult” features. Does that make Blockbuster a monopoly? It seems almost silly to ask if the last firm in a dying industry is a monopolist. ... Deadweight loss from no monopoly
This Too Shall Pass: Unassailable Monopolies That Were, in Hindsight, Eminently Assailable
[N]ew combinations are, as a rule, embodied, as it were, in new firms which generally do not arise out of the old ones but start producing beside them; … in general it is not the owner of stagecoaches who builds railways. – Joseph Schumpeter, January 1934 Elizabeth Warren wants to break up the tech giants ... This Too Shall Pass: Unassailable Monopolies That Were, in Hindsight, Eminently Assailable
More Evidence Against the Common Ownership Problem
I posted this originally on my own blog, but decided to cross-post here since Thom and I have been blogging on this topic. “The U.S. stock market is having another solid year. You wouldn’t know it by looking at the shares of companies that manage money.” That’s the lead from Charles Stein on Bloomberg’s Markets’ ... More Evidence Against the Common Ownership Problem
The Amazon-Whole Foods merger: Natural and organic competition in the evolving grocery industry
What actually happened in the year following the merger is nearly the opposite: Competition among grocery stores has been more fierce than ever. “Offline” retailers are expanding — and innovating — to meet Amazon’s challenge, and many of them are booming. Disruption is never neat and tidy, but, in addition to saving Whole Foods from potential oblivion, the merger seems to have lit a fire under the rest of the industry. This result should not be surprising to anyone who understands the nature of the competitive process. But it does highlight an important lesson: competition often comes from unexpected quarters and evolves in unpredictable ways, emerging precisely out of the kinds of adversity opponents of the merger bemoaned.
The Amazon / Whole Foods overreaction: Antitrust populism exposed
The gist of these arguments is simple. The Amazon / Whole Foods merger would lead to the exclusion of competitors, with Amazon leveraging its swaths of data and pricing below costs. All of this begs a simple question: have these prophecies come to pass? The problem with antitrust populism is not just that it leads to unfounded predictions regarding the negative effects of a given business practice. It also ignores the significant gains which consumers may reap from these practices. The Amazon / Whole foods offers a case in point.
The European Commission’s Google Android decision takes a mistaken, ahistorical view of the smartphone market
What to make of Wednesday’s decision by the European Commission alleging that Google has engaged in anticompetitive behavior? In this post, I contrast the European Commission’s (EC) approach to competition policy with US antitrust, briefly explore the history of smartphones and then discuss the ruling. Asked about the EC’s decision the day it was announced, ... The European Commission’s Google Android decision takes a mistaken, ahistorical view of the smartphone market
Correcting the Federalist Society Review’s Mischaracterization of How to Regulate
Ours is not an age of nuance. It’s an age of tribalism, of teams—“Yer either fer us or agin’ us!” Perhaps I should have been less surprised, then, when I read the unfavorable review of my book How to Regulate in, of all places, the Federalist Society Review. I had expected some positive feedback from ... Correcting the Federalist Society Review’s Mischaracterization of How to Regulate
Dear Antitrusters: Bias Is Ubiquitous. Stick to the Merits.
A recent tweet by Lina Khan, discussing yesterday’s American Express decision, exemplifies an unfortunate trend in contemporary antitrust discourse. Khan wrote: The economists cited by the Second Circuit (whose opinion SCOTUS affirms) for the analysis of ‘two-sided’ [markets] all had financial links to the credit card sector, as we point out in FN 4 [link ... Dear Antitrusters: Bias Is Ubiquitous. Stick to the Merits.
Problems With the Theory of Anticompetitive Harm from Common Ownership
Mike Sykuta and I have been blogging about our recent paper on so-called “common ownership” by institutional investors like Vanguard, BlackRock, Fidelity, and State Street. Following my initial post, Mike described the purported problem with institutional investors’ common ownership of small stakes in competing firms. As Mike explained, the theory of anticompetitive harm holds that small-stakes ... Problems With the Theory of Anticompetitive Harm from Common Ownership
