Showing archive for: “Collusion & Cartels”
The Upsides of Collusion and Concentration
Conspiracies and collusion often (always?) get a bad rap. Adam Smith famously derided “people of the same trade” for their inclination to conspire against the public or contrive to raise prices. Today, such conspiracies and contrivances are per se illegal and felonies punishable under the Sherman Act. It is well known and widely accepted that ... The Upsides of Collusion and Concentration
Efficient Cartels and the Public Interest Defence – Do They Exist?
The concept of a “good” or “efficient” cartel is generally regarded by competition authorities as an oxymoron. A cartel is seen as the worst type of antitrust violation and one that warrants zero tolerance. Agreements between competitors to raise prices and share the market are assumed unambiguously to reduce economic welfare. As such, even if ... Efficient Cartels and the Public Interest Defence – Do They Exist?
Competition Law as a Swiss Army Knife (Move Fast and Break Things?)
[TOTM: The following is the fourth in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Valentin Mircea, a Senior Partner at Mircea and Partners Law Firm, Bucharest, Romania. The enforcement of competition rules in the European ... Competition Law as a Swiss Army Knife (Move Fast and Break Things?)
Towards a Democratic Antitrust
This symposium discusses the “The Politicization of Antitrust.” As the invite itself stated, this is an umbrella topic that encompasses a wide range of subjects: from incorporating environmental or labor concerns in antitrust enforcement, to political pressure in enforcement decision-making, to national security laws (CFIUS-type enforcement), protectionism, federalism, and more. This contribution will focus on ... Towards a Democratic Antitrust
The Politicization of Antitrust Blog Symposium
The operative text of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a scant 100 words: Section 1: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract ... The Politicization of Antitrust Blog Symposium
New Paper Reveals “Stealth” Consolidation But Competitive Effects Remain Hidden
Thomas Wollmann has a new paper — “Stealth Consolidation: Evidence from an Amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act” — in American Economic Review: Insights this month. Greg Ip included this research in an article for the WSJ in which he claims that “competition has declined and corporate concentration risen through acquisitions often too small to draw ... New Paper Reveals “Stealth” Consolidation But Competitive Effects Remain Hidden
Boom, bust, and collusion: Does it really matter?
A recent working paper by Hashmat Khan and Matthew Strathearn attempts to empirically link anticompetitive collusion to the boom and bust cycles of the economy. The level of collusion is higher during a boom relative to a recession as collusion occurs more frequently when demand is increasing (entering into a collusive arrangement is more profitable ... Boom, bust, and collusion: Does it really matter?
The International Competition Network at Seventeen
Introduction Last week I attended the 17th Annual Conference of the International Competition Network (ICN) held in New Delhi, India from March 21-23. The Delhi Conference highlighted the key role of the ICN in promoting global convergence toward “best practices” in substantive and procedural antitrust analysis by national antitrust (“competition”) agencies. The ICN operates as ... The International Competition Network at Seventeen
Foreign Export Cartels, Comity, and the Separation of Powers
Over the last two decades, the United States government has taken the lead in convincing jurisdictions around the world to outlaw “hard core” cartel conduct. Such cartel activity reduces economic welfare by artificially fixing prices and reducing the output of affected goods and services. At the same, the United States has acted to promote international ... Foreign Export Cartels, Comity, and the Separation of Powers
Fourth Annual Heritage Foundation Antitrust Conference: A Quick Summary
On January 23rd, the Heritage Foundation convened its Fourth Annual Antitrust Conference, “Trump Antitrust Policy after One Year.” The entire Conference can be viewed online (here). The Conference featured a keynote speech, followed by three separate panels that addressed developments at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), at the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division (DOJ), and in ... Fourth Annual Heritage Foundation Antitrust Conference: A Quick Summary
The Unreasonable Demands of Antitrust Populism
A panelist brought up an interesting tongue-in-cheek observation about the rising populist antitrust movement at a Heritage antitrust event this week. To the extent that the new populist antitrust movement is broadly concerned about effects on labor and wage depression, then, in principle, it should also be friendly to cartels. Although counterintuitive, employees have long ... The Unreasonable Demands of Antitrust Populism
The antitrust laws are not some meta-legislation authorizing whatever regulation activists want: Labor market edition
In a recent post at the (appallingly misnamed) ProMarket blog (the blog of the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business — George Stigler is rolling in his grave…), Marshall Steinbaum keeps alive the hipster-antitrust assertion that lax antitrust enforcement — this time in the labor market — is to blame ... The antitrust laws are not some meta-legislation authorizing whatever regulation activists want: Labor market edition
