Efficient Cartels and the Public Interest Defence – Do They Exist?
The concept of a “good” or “efficient” cartel is generally regarded by competition authorities as an oxymoron. A cartel is seen as the worst type of antitrust violation and one that warrants zero tolerance. Agreements between competitors to raise prices and share the market are assumed unambiguously to reduce economic welfare. As such, even if ... Efficient Cartels and the Public Interest Defence – Do They Exist?
We Should Not Have Our Constitution Redesigned by Antitrust Lawyers
[TOTM: The following is the sixth in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Kristian Stout, Associate Director at the International Center for Law & Economics. There is a push underway to punish big tech ... We Should Not Have Our Constitution Redesigned by Antitrust Lawyers
Big Ink vs. Bigger Tech
[TOTM: The following is the fifth in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Ramsi Woodcock, Assistant Professor, College of Law, and Assistant Professor, Department of Management at Gatton College of Business & Economics, University ... Big Ink vs. Bigger Tech
Competition Law as a Swiss Army Knife (Move Fast and Break Things?)
[TOTM: The following is the fourth in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Valentin Mircea, a Senior Partner at Mircea and Partners Law Firm, Bucharest, Romania. The enforcement of competition rules in the European ... Competition Law as a Swiss Army Knife (Move Fast and Break Things?)
Towards a Democratic Antitrust
This symposium discusses the “The Politicization of Antitrust.” As the invite itself stated, this is an umbrella topic that encompasses a wide range of subjects: from incorporating environmental or labor concerns in antitrust enforcement, to political pressure in enforcement decision-making, to national security laws (CFIUS-type enforcement), protectionism, federalism, and more. This contribution will focus on ... Towards a Democratic Antitrust
Does Political Power Follow Economic Power?
[TOTM: The following is the third in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Geoffrey A. Manne, president and founder of the International Center for Law & Economics, and Alec Stapp, Research Fellow at the ... Does Political Power Follow Economic Power?
“Politicization of Antitrust:” An Opportunity
[TOTM: The following is the first in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Steven J. Cernak, Partner at Bona Law and Adjunct Professor, University of Michigan Law School and Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley ... “Politicization of Antitrust:” An Opportunity
The Politicization of Antitrust Blog Symposium
The operative text of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a scant 100 words: Section 1: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract ... The Politicization of Antitrust Blog Symposium
