Breaking Up: “It’s Not You, It’s Me”, “Maybe We Should See Other People” and “with or without You”
[This post is the second in an ongoing symposium on “Should We Break Up Big Tech?” that will feature analysis and opinion from various perspectives.] [This post is authored by Philip Marsden, Bank of England & College of Europe, IG/Twitter: @competition_flaneur] Since the release of our Furman Report, I have been blessed with an uptick in #antitrusttourism. ... Breaking Up: “It’s Not You, It’s Me”, “Maybe We Should See Other People” and “with or without You”
Should Patent Hold-Out Concerns Trump Patent Hold-Up Misgivings?
Over the last few years competition authorities in the US and elsewhere have repeatedly warned about the risk of patent hold-up in the licensing of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). Concerns about such risks were front and center in the recent FTC case against Qualcomm, where the Court ultimately concluded that Qualcomm had used a series ... Should Patent Hold-Out Concerns Trump Patent Hold-Up Misgivings?
FTC v. Qualcomm: A Case of Regulatory Capture?
There is little doubt that the decision in May 2019 by the Northern District of California in FTC v. Qualcomm is of historical importance. Unless reversed or modified on appeal, the decision would require that the lead innovator behind 3G and 4G smartphone technology renegotiate hundreds of existing licenses with device producers and offer new ... FTC v. Qualcomm: A Case of Regulatory Capture?
Breaking up Amazon? Platforms, Private Labels and Entry
[This post is the first in an ongoing symposium on “Should We Break Up Big Tech?” that will feature analysis and opinion from various perspectives.] [This post is authored by Randal C. Picker, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law at The University of Chicago Law School] The European Commission just announced that it ... Breaking up Amazon? Platforms, Private Labels and Entry
A Bargaining Model v. Reality in FTC v. Qualcomm: A Reply to Kattan & Muris
Introduction In a recent article[1] Joe Kattan and Tim Muris (K&M) criticize our article[2] on the predictive power of bargaining models in antitrust, in which we used two recent applications to explore implications for uses of bargaining models in courts and antitrust agencies moving forward. Like other theoretical models used to predict competitive effects, complex bargaining models ... A Bargaining Model v. Reality in FTC v. Qualcomm: A Reply to Kattan & Muris
An Evidentiary Cornerstone of the FTC’s Antitrust Case Against Qualcomm May Have Rested on Manipulated Data
The courtroom trial in the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) antitrust case against Qualcomm ended in January with a promise from the judge in the case, Judge Lucy Koh, to issue a ruling as quickly as possible — caveated by her acknowledgement that the case is complicated and the evidence voluminous. Well, things have only gotten more ... An Evidentiary Cornerstone of the FTC’s Antitrust Case Against Qualcomm May Have Rested on Manipulated Data
Calling into Question the FTC’s Theory of the Case in FTC v. Qualcomm
This post does not attempt to answer the question of what the court should decide in FTC v. Qualcomm because we do not have access to the information that would allow us to make such a determination. Rather, we focus on economic issues confronting the court by drawing heavily from our writings in this area: ... Calling into Question the FTC’s Theory of the Case in FTC v. Qualcomm
FTC v. Qualcomm: Innovation and Competition
Just days before leaving office, the outgoing Obama FTC left what should have been an unwelcome parting gift for the incoming Commission: an antitrust suit against Qualcomm. This week the FTC — under a new Chairman and with an entirely new set of Commissioners — finished unwrapping its present, and rested its case in the trial begun ... FTC v. Qualcomm: Innovation and Competition
Amazon-Whole Foods symposium wrap-up
On Tuesday, August 28, 2018, Truth on the Market and the International Center for Law and Economics presented a blog symposium — Is Amazon’s Appetite Bottomless? The Whole Foods Merger After One Year — that looked at the concerns surrounding the closing of the Amazon-Whole Foods merger, and how those concerns had played out over ... Amazon-Whole Foods symposium wrap-up
The Amazon-Whole Foods merger: Natural and organic competition in the evolving grocery industry
What actually happened in the year following the merger is nearly the opposite: Competition among grocery stores has been more fierce than ever. “Offline” retailers are expanding — and innovating — to meet Amazon’s challenge, and many of them are booming. Disruption is never neat and tidy, but, in addition to saving Whole Foods from potential oblivion, the merger seems to have lit a fire under the rest of the industry. This result should not be surprising to anyone who understands the nature of the competitive process. But it does highlight an important lesson: competition often comes from unexpected quarters and evolves in unpredictable ways, emerging precisely out of the kinds of adversity opponents of the merger bemoaned.
Whole Foods? Seriously? Why Are We Talking About Whole Foods?
So why this deal, in this symposium, and why now? The best substantive reason I could think of is admittedly one that I personally find important. As I said, I think we should take it much more seriously as a general matter, especially in highly dynamic contexts like Silicon Valley. There has been a history of arguably pre-emptive, market-occupying vertical and conglomerate acquisitions, by big firms of smaller ones that are technologically or otherwise disruptive. The idea is that the big firms sit back and wait as some new market develops in some adjacent sector. When that new market ripens to the point of real promise, the big firm buys some significant incumbent player. The aim is not. just to facilitate its own benevolent, wholesome entry, but to set up hopefully prohibitive challenges to other de novo entrants. Love it or leave it, that theory plausibly characterizes lots and lots of acquisitions in recent decades that secured easy antitrust approval, precisely because they weren’t obviously, presently horizontal. Many people think that is true of some of Amazon’s many acquisitions, like its notoriously aggressive, near-hostile takeover of Diapers.com.
Are the antitrust laws any defense to the real dangers of mega-mergers and big technology power aggregation?
One year ago, Amazon acquired Whole Foods in a $13.7 billion deal. At the time, David Balto, a disciple of current antitrust orthodoxy, wrote: Those who are saying the Amazon-Whole Foods merger is a competition problem are leading us into the jungle without a compass and no clear objective. Antitrust law should stick to protecting consumers and ... Are the antitrust laws any defense to the real dangers of mega-mergers and big technology power aggregation?
