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Announcing the TOTM Symposium on the 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines

Truth on the Market is pleased to announce its next blog symposium: The 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines: What’s in, what’s out — and do we need them anyway? February 6 & 7, 2020 Symposium background On January 10, 2020, the DOJ Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission released Draft Joint Vertical Merger ... Announcing the TOTM Symposium on the 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines

The Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 2 (IBM)

The Department of Justice began its antitrust case against IBM on January 17, 1969. The DOJ sued under the Sherman Antitrust Act, claiming IBM tried to monopolize the market for “general-purpose digital computers.” The case lasted almost thirteen years, ending on January 8, 1982 when Assistant Attorney General William Baxter declared the case to be ... The Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 2 (IBM)

The Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 1

Big Tech continues to be mired in “a very antitrust situation,” as President Trump put it in 2018. Antitrust advocates have zeroed in on Facebook, Google, Apple, and Amazon as their primary targets. These advocates justify their proposals by pointing to the trio of antitrust cases against IBM, AT&T, and Microsoft. Elizabeth Warren, in announcing ... The Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 1

Symposium

The 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines: Whatโ€™s in, whatโ€™s out โ€” and do we need them anyway?

On January 10, 2020, the DOJ and FTC released their draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. “Challenging anticompetitive vertical mergers is essential to vigorous enforcement. The agencies’ vertical merger policy has evolved substantially since the issuance of the 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and our guidelines should reflect the current enforcement approach. Greater transparency about the complex ... The 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines: Whatโ€™s in, whatโ€™s out โ€” and do we need them anyway?

The Upsides of Collusion and Concentration

Conspiracies and collusion often (always?) get a bad rap. Adam Smith famously derided “people of the same trade” for their inclination to conspire against the public or contrive to raise prices. Today, such conspiracies and contrivances are per se illegal and felonies punishable under the Sherman Act. It is well known and widely accepted that ... The Upsides of Collusion and Concentration

FTC v. AbbVie โ€“ Questioning the Agencyโ€™s Enforcement Authority

A pending case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit has raised several interesting questions about the FTC enforcement approach and patent litigation in the pharmaceutical industry.  The case, FTC v. AbbVie, involves allegations that AbbVie (and Besins) filed sham patent infringement cases against generic manufacturer Teva (and Perrigo) for the purpose ... FTC v. AbbVie โ€“ Questioning the Agencyโ€™s Enforcement Authority

Debating the FTC v Qualcomm Amicus Brief, a Summary

Qualcomm is currently in the midst of a high-profile antitrust case against the FTC. At the heart of these proceedings lies Qualcomm’s so-called “No License, No Chips” (NLNC) policy, whereby it purportedly refuses to sell chips to OEMs that have not concluded a license agreement covering its underlying intellectual property. According to the FTC and ... Debating the FTC v Qualcomm Amicus Brief, a Summary

The Facts Show That No License/No Chips Was A Successful Policy, Not an Empty Threat โ€“ A Reply to Manne and Auerโ€™s New Argument

In their original post, Manne and Auer argued that the antitrust argument against Qualcomm’s no license/no chips policy was based on bad economics and bad law. They now seem to have abandoned that argument and claim instead – contrary to the extensive factual findings of the district court – that, while Qualcomm threatened to cut off ... The Facts Show That No License/No Chips Was A Successful Policy, Not an Empty Threat โ€“ A Reply to Manne and Auerโ€™s New Argument

Is FRAND Litigation a Credible Threat?: A reply to Mark Lemley, Douglas Melamed and Steven Salop

Last week, we posted a piece on TOTM, criticizing the amicus brief written by Mark Lemley, Douglas Melamed and Steven Salop in the ongoing Qualcomm litigation. The authors prepared a thoughtful response to our piece, which we published today on TOTM.  In this post, we highlight the points where we agree with the amici (or ... Is FRAND Litigation a Credible Threat?: A reply to Mark Lemley, Douglas Melamed and Steven Salop

Manne and Auerโ€™s Defense of Qualcommโ€™s Licensing Policy Is Deeply Flawed

Geoffrey Manne and Dirk Auer’s defense of Qualcomm’s no license/no chips policy is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how that policy harms competition.  The harm is straightforward in light of facts proven at trial. In a nutshell, OEMs must buy some chips from Qualcomm or else exit the handset business, even if they would ... Manne and Auerโ€™s Defense of Qualcommโ€™s Licensing Policy Is Deeply Flawed

Exclusionary Pricing Without the Exclusion: Unpacking Qualcommโ€™s No License, No Chips Policy

Qualcomm is currently in the midst of a high-profile antitrust case against the FTC. At the heart of these proceedings lies Qualcomm’s so-called “No License, No Chips” (NLNC) policy, whereby it purportedly refuses to sell chips to OEMs that have not concluded a license agreement covering its underlying intellectual property. According to the FTC and ... Exclusionary Pricing Without the Exclusion: Unpacking Qualcommโ€™s No License, No Chips Policy

Why the FTC had to Abandon the Duty to Deal Argument Against Qualcomm

On November 22, the FTC filed its answering brief in the FTC v. Qualcomm litigation. As we’ve noted before, it has always seemed a little odd that the current FTC is so vigorously pursuing this case, given some of the precedents it might set and the Commission majority’s apparent views on such issues. But this ... Why the FTC had to Abandon the Duty to Deal Argument Against Qualcomm