Showing results for: “ribstein”
Ribstein on Unincorporated Firms
Motivated by a slate of forthcoming articles, books, and various projects involving unincorporated firms, Professor Ribstein has announced his plans to begin blogging more extensively about partnership, LLCs and agency issues over at Ideoblog. This is good news to anybody interested in issues of business law and finance more generally. Two early installments in this ... Ribstein on Unincorporated Firms
Professor Bainbridge's Complete Guide to Sarbanes-Oxley
Is available here. Here is the description: Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to major corporate and accounting scandals–and many consider the act to be the most significant change in corporate governance and securities regulations in the past seventy years. SOX requirements have brought about far-reaching changes for public corporations, private corporations, and nonprofits. ... Professor Bainbridge's Complete Guide to Sarbanes-Oxley
Shareholder Voting on Executive Comp. – What’s the downside?
There was an article this morning on CCN announcing Aflac’s decision to let shareholders vote on executive compensation.  A board resolution was passed to give “shareholders the right to a non-binding vote on executive pay packages that will take effect in 2009.” I veiw this step by Aflac’s executives as very savvy. Why bother leaving oneself exposed to shareholder ... Shareholder Voting on Executive Comp. – What’s the downside?
Is There Really Less Securities Fraud? And If So, Should We Thank the Feds?
Securities fraud class-actions are down. In an op-ed in yesterday’s WSJ, Joseph Grundfest observed that both the number of such actions and the dollar value of total damages claims have dropped dramatically since mid-2005. Why has this decline occurred? Grundfest considers several possible reasons. First, the decline might be due to the criminal prosecution of ... Is There Really Less Securities Fraud? And If So, Should We Thank the Feds?
Manne on Shareholder Democracy
Henry Manne is back with another article in the WSJ. This time Manne goes toe-to-toe with the “corporate democrats.” Profs Ribstein (“Shareholder democracy is just one of the burdens that public corporations have to bear these days”) and Bainbridge (“it’s a brilliant spanking of the shareholder activists, which I highly commend to your attention”) have ... Manne on Shareholder Democracy
Two in the WSJ
Airlines and Antitrust. Kenneth Starr on Sarbox. The punchline: Even the statute’s co-author, Rep. Mike Oxley, has conceded that Sarbanes-Oxley was hastily written and enacted. In its rush to “do something” about corporate scandals, Congress overstepped the bounds of its authority. It is time to call Congress back, both to help our economy and reaffirm ... Two in the WSJ
Hey- That’s Robert Monks!!!
I needed a catchy title, to compete with Mann’s title below. I could find no way to work “crack whore” into my title, however. But I figured mentioning Robert Monks – shareholder activist qua shareholder primacy radical – would have a small bit of the same impact. (Mind you, Robert Monks is a very very ... Hey- That’s Robert Monks!!!
Thoughts on Walker on Backdating
Professor Ribstein responds to David Walker’s backdating article, which Bill highlighted here at TOTM a few weeks ago. Larry’s take? This is a useful paper as far as it goes. The problem is that it has missed a significant chunk of the “literature” on this rapidly developing topic that has developed in our rapidly developing ... Thoughts on Walker on Backdating
No, Matt, executive compensation is not all about norms
[UPDATE: In order to avoid linking glitches we removed the quotes from around the phrase, “all about norms” in the original title. This post thus has a different url than the original but is otherwise the same.] In a post titled, “Backdating: Yes, Virginia, Execs Do Want Inflated Pay,â€? over at PrawfsBlawg, Matt Bodie weighs ... No, Matt, executive compensation is not all about norms
Henderson on Executive Compensation in Bankruptcy
Todd Henderson’s paper finds that compensation arrangements of solvent and insolvent firms are similar to each other. The empirical strategy involves the assumption that firms in bankruptcy are a useful control group for testing agency theory explanations of executive compensation because those costs are significantly lower for insolvent firms. I don’t know enough about bankruptcy ... Henderson on Executive Compensation in Bankruptcy
Explaining Backdating (and Jenkins Channels Manne Again)
Holman Jenkins reports that a group of economists led by Milton Friedman and Harry Markowitz are getting behind the idea of putting an end to the expensing of options. It is a great column. Jenkins goes on to discuss options backdating and makes the following points, which will sound unfamiliar to TOTM readers: “In no ... Explaining Backdating (and Jenkins Channels Manne Again)
SSRN Top Tens for Corporate, Corporate Governance, and Securities Law
The current SSRN top tens for corporate, corporate governance, and securities law are after the jump.
