Showing results for: “digital markets act”
Pre-formation fiduciary duties in LLCs: Roni v. Arfa
Last year I wrote here about Roni LLC v Arfa, which I cited as an example of the “troubling lawlessness of NY LLC law.” As discussed in my blog post, the court in that case, after holding that the parties’ arms-length pre-formation business relationship did not support a fiduciary relationship, nevertheless denied defendants’ motion to dismiss ... Pre-formation fiduciary duties in LLCs: Roni v. Arfa
The legislative response to Olmstead
I wrote last year about how the Florida Supreme Court had messed with the LLC “charging order” remedy to give the creditors of the sole member of an LLC access not just to the members’ financial rights, as the statute allows, but also to the member’s governance rights, which the statute arguably forecloses. The dissenters ... The legislative response to Olmstead
Incentive pay for bank regulators
Now that regulating banker pay has been studied exhaustively, here’s something else worth studying: bank regulator pay. Fred Tung and Todd Henderson are on the case, in Pay for Regulator Performance. Here’s the abstract: Few doubt that executive compensation arrangements encouraged the excessive risk taking by banks that led to the recent Financial Crisis. Accordingly, ... Incentive pay for bank regulators
2011 Illinois Corporate Colloquium: Shadab on credit risk transfer
The 2011 Illinois Corporate Colloquium got off to a good start with Houman Shadab presenting his paper, The Good, the Bad, and the Savvy: Credit Risk Transfer Governance. Here’s the abstract: Goldman Sachs and AIG on the eve of the 2008 financial crisis were bound together through a web of credit risk transfer (CRT) contracts ... 2011 Illinois Corporate Colloquium: Shadab on credit risk transfer
Why Did Sprint Pile On the DOJ’s AT&T / T-Mobile Suit?
So, the AT&T / T-Mobile transaction gets more and more interesting. Sprint has filed a complaint challenging the transaction. I’ve been commenting on the weakness of the DOJ complaint and in particular, its heavy reliance on market structure to make inferences about competitive effects. The heavy dose of structural presumption in the DOJ complaint — ... Why Did Sprint Pile On the DOJ’s AT&T / T-Mobile Suit?
One is not a partnership
Bob Hillman and Don Weidner have a nice little paper in the form of a dialog about what you have when a partner withdraws leaving only one “partner”: Partners Without Partners: The Legal Status of Single Person Partnerships. Here’s part of the abstract: Although we have differing views on whether a single person partnership is ... One is not a partnership
Delaware bans LLC creditor derivative suits
On Friday the Delaware Supreme Court decided the important case of CML V, LLC v. Bax (see Francis Pileggi’s helpful summary). The court, per CJ Steele, held that a creditor lacks standing to sue an insolvent LLC derivatively. The court reasoned that when the Delaware LLC Act says in §18-1002 that a plaintiff in an ... Delaware bans LLC creditor derivative suits
The Spectrum Argument Lives, Debunking Letter-Gate, and Why the DOJ Is Still Wrong to Try to Stop the AT&T/T-Mobile Merger
[Cross-posted at Tech Liberation Front] Milton Mueller responded to my post Wednesday on the DOJ’s decision to halt the AT&T/T-Mobile merger by asserting that there was no evidence the merger would lead to “anything innovative and progressive” and claiming “[t]he spectrum argument fell apart months ago, as factual inquiries revealed that AT&T had more spectrum than Verizon and the ... The Spectrum Argument Lives, Debunking Letter-Gate, and Why the DOJ Is Still Wrong to Try to Stop the AT&T/T-Mobile Merger
Do Exclusionary Theories of the AT&T / T-Mobile Transaction Better Explain the Market’s Reaction to the DOJ’s Decision to Challenge the Merger?
I don’t think so. Let’s start from the beginning. In my last post, I pointed out that simple economic theory generates some pretty clear predictions concerning the impact of a merger on rival stock prices. If a merger is results in a more efficient competitor, and more intense post-merger competition, rivals are made worse off ... Do Exclusionary Theories of the AT&T / T-Mobile Transaction Better Explain the Market’s Reaction to the DOJ’s Decision to Challenge the Merger?
Why Is Sprint’s Stock Surging Upon the Announcement of the DOJ’s Challenge to the Proposed AT&T / T-Mobile Merger?
Basic economic theory underlies the conventional antitrust wisdom that if a merger makes the merging party a more effective competitorby lowering its costs, rivals facing this more effective competitor post-merger are made worse off, but consumers benefit. On the other hand, if a merger is likely to result in collusion or a unilateral price increase, ... Why Is Sprint’s Stock Surging Upon the Announcement of the DOJ’s Challenge to the Proposed AT&T / T-Mobile Merger?
A couple of quick thoughts on the DOJ’s filing to block AT&T/T-Mobile
As Josh noted, the DOJ filed a complaint today to block the merger. I’m sure we’ll have much, much more to say on the topic, but here are a few things that jump out at me from perusing the complaint: The DOJ distinguishes between the business (“Enterprise”) market and the consumer market. This is actually ... A couple of quick thoughts on the DOJ’s filing to block AT&T/T-Mobile
DOJ Files Suit to Block AT&T / T-Mobile Merger
More on this later. For now, here is the complaint and the press release: WASHINGTON – The Department of Justice today filed a civil antitrust lawsuit to block AT&T Inc.’s proposed acquisition of T-Mobile USA Inc. The department said that the proposed $39 billion transaction would substantially lessen competition for mobile wireless telecommunications services ... DOJ Files Suit to Block AT&T / T-Mobile Merger
