Showing archive for: “Vertical Restraints & Self-Preferencing”
Politics Has No Place in Antitrust Enforcement, Left or Right
The goal of US antitrust law is to ensure that competition continues to produce positive results for consumers and the economy in general. We published a letter co-signed by twenty three of the U.S.’s leading economists, legal scholars and practitioners, including one winner of the Nobel Prize in economics (full list of signatories here), to ... Politics Has No Place in Antitrust Enforcement, Left or Right
“You don’t get to be the umpire and have a team”: should we regulate the activities of digital platforms in neighboring markets?
This guest post is by Patrick Todd, an England-qualified solicitor and author on competition law/policy in digital markets. The above quote is not about Democrat-nominee hopeful Elizabeth Warren’s policy views on sport. It is in fact an analogy to her proposal of splitting Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (“GAFA”) apart from their respective ancillary lines ... “You don’t get to be the umpire and have a team”: should we regulate the activities of digital platforms in neighboring markets?
Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 4): The Commission’s Economic Analysis
This is the fourth, and last, in a series of TOTM blog posts discussing the Commission’s recently published Google Android decision (the first post can be found here, and the second here, and the third here). It draws on research from a soon-to-be published ICLE white paper. The previous parts of this series have mostly ... Making Sense of the Google Android Decision (part 4): The Commission’s Economic Analysis
Manne & Stout 2: Against Incorporating a Contract/Merger Equivalency Assumption in Vertical Merger Guidelines
In our first post, we discussed the weaknesses of an important theoretical underpinning of efforts to expand vertical merger enforcement (including, possibly, the proposed guidelines): the contract/merger equivalency assumption. In this post we discuss the implications of that assumption and some of the errors it leads to — including some incorporated into the proposed guidelines. ... Manne & Stout 2: Against Incorporating a Contract/Merger Equivalency Assumption in Vertical Merger Guidelines
Manne & Stout 1: The Illogic of a Contract/Merger Equivalency Assumption in the Assessment of Vertical Mergers
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Geoffrey A. Manne (President & Founder, ICLE; Distinguished Fellow, Northwestern University Center on Law, Business, and Economics ); and Kristian Stout (Associate Director, ... Manne & Stout 1: The Illogic of a Contract/Merger Equivalency Assumption in the Assessment of Vertical Mergers
White: The Missing Market Definition Standard in the Draft Vertical Guidelines
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Lawrence J. White (Robert Kavesh Professor of Economics, New York University; former Chief Economist, DOJ Antitrust Division).] The DOJ/FTC Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines ... White: The Missing Market Definition Standard in the Draft Vertical Guidelines
Rybnicek: The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines Would Do More Harm Than Good
In an area where it may seem that agreement is rare, there is near universal agreement on the benefits of withdrawing the DOJ’s 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The 1984 Guidelines do not reflect current agency thinking on vertical mergers and are not relied upon by businesses or practitioners to anticipate how the agencies may review ... Rybnicek: The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines Would Do More Harm Than Good
Sher: Implications of the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines for Vertical Mergers Involving Technology Start-Ups
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Scott Sher (Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati) and Matthew McDonald (Associate, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati).] On January 10, 2020, the United ... Sher: Implications of the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines for Vertical Mergers Involving Technology Start-Ups
Pozen: The Missed Opportunity for International Harmonization in the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Sharis Pozen (Partner, Clifford Chance; former Vice President of Global Competition Law and Policy, GE; former Acting Assistant Attorney General, DOJ Antitrust Division); ... Pozen: The Missed Opportunity for International Harmonization in the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines
Fruits: Messy Mergers and Muddled Guidelines (Or, “Orange You Glad I Didn’t Say Banana?”)
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Eric Fruits (Chief Economist, International Center for Law & Economics and Professor of Economics, Portland State University).] Vertical mergers are messy. They’re messy ... Fruits: Messy Mergers and Muddled Guidelines (Or, “Orange You Glad I Didn’t Say Banana?”)
Cernak: Who Bears the Burden on Elimination of Double Marginalization in the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines?
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Steven J. Cernak (Partner, Bona Law; Adjunct Professor, University of Michigan Law School and Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School; former ... Cernak: Who Bears the Burden on Elimination of Double Marginalization in the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines?
Brennan: Guidance on Enforcement Against “Pure” Vertical Mergers: It’s Complicated
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Timothy J. Brennan (Professor, Public Policy and Economics, University of Maryland; former Chief Economist, FCC; former economist, DOJ Antitrust Division).] The DOJ Antitrust ... Brennan: Guidance on Enforcement Against “Pure” Vertical Mergers: It’s Complicated
