Showing archive for: “Vertical Integration”
Nuechterlein: Guidelines without Guidance on Vertical Mergers
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Jonathan E. Nuechterlein (Partner, Sidley Austin LLP; former General Counsel, FTC; former Deputy General Counsel, FCC).] [Nuechterlein: I represented AT&T in United States ... Nuechterlein: Guidelines without Guidance on Vertical Mergers
Hovenkamp: The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines Are an Important Step for the Economic Analysis of Mergers
In its 2019 AT&T/Time-Warner merger decision the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals mentioned something that antitrust enforcers have known for years: We need a new set of Agency Guidelines for vertical mergers. The vertical merger Guidelines were last revised in 1984 at the height of Chicago School hostility toward harsh antitrust treatment of vertical restraints. ... Hovenkamp: The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines Are an Important Step for the Economic Analysis of Mergers
Welcome to the TOTM Blog Symposium on the 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines
The 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines: What’s in, what’s out — and do we need them anyway? February 6 & 7, 2020 Welcome! We’re delighted to kick off our two-day blog symposium on the recently released Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines from the DOJ Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission. If adopted by ... Welcome to the TOTM Blog Symposium on the 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines
Announcing the TOTM Symposium on the 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines
Truth on the Market is pleased to announce its next blog symposium: The 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines: What’s in, what’s out — and do we need them anyway? February 6 & 7, 2020 Symposium background On January 10, 2020, the DOJ Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission released Draft Joint Vertical Merger ... Announcing the TOTM Symposium on the 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines
Mr. Watson, I Want to See You … About Vertical Mergers and Price Regulation
Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, and Fiona Scott Morton don’t like vertical mergers: Vertical mergers can harm competition, for example, through input foreclosure or customer foreclosure, or by the creation of two-level entry barriers. … Competitive harms from foreclosure can occur from the merged firm exercising its increased bargaining leverage to ... Mr. Watson, I Want to See You … About Vertical Mergers and Price Regulation
The Forgotten Virtues of Doing Nothing
This guest post is by Jonathan M. Barnett, Torrey H. Webb Professor Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law. It has become virtual received wisdom that antitrust law has been subdued by economic analysis into a state of chronic underenforcement. Following this line of thinking, many commentators applauded the Antitrust Division’s unsuccessful campaign ... The Forgotten Virtues of Doing Nothing
Vertical Mergers: Fast Food, Folklore, and Fake News
In the Federal Trade Commission’s recent hearings on competition policy in the 21st century, Georgetown professor Steven Salop urged greater scrutiny of vertical mergers. He argued that regulators should be skeptical of the claim that vertical integration tends to produce efficiencies that can enhance consumer welfare. In his presentation to the FTC, Professor Salop provided ... Vertical Mergers: Fast Food, Folklore, and Fake News
The DOJ’s Approval of the CVS/Aetna Merger and Vertical Innovation by Incumbents
Last week, the DOJ cleared the merger of CVS Health and Aetna (conditional on Aetna’s divesting its Medicare Part D business), a merger that, as I previously noted at a House Judiciary hearing, “presents a creative effort by two of the most well-informed and successful industry participants to try something new to reform a troubled ... The DOJ’s Approval of the CVS/Aetna Merger and Vertical Innovation by Incumbents
More on a possible Comcast/Fox deal: Reports of the death of vertical mergers have been greatly exaggerated
A few weeks ago I posted a preliminary assessment of the relative antitrust risk of a Comcast vs Disney purchase of 21st Century Fox assets. (Also available in pdf as an ICLE Issue brief, here). On the eve of Judge Leon’s decision in the AT&T/Time Warner merger case, it seems worthwhile to supplement that assessment by ... More on a possible Comcast/Fox deal: Reports of the death of vertical mergers have been greatly exaggerated
Professor Wright’s Latest Sage Advice: Stay Away from Unfocused “Big is Bad” Rhetoric in Assessing the Proposed AT&T-Time Warner Merger
Last October 26, Heritage scholar James Gattuso and I published an essay in The Daily Signal, explaining that the proposed vertical merger (a merger between firms at different stages of the distribution chain) of AT&T and Time Warner (currently undergoing Justice Department antitrust review) may have the potential to bestow substantial benefits on consumers – ... Professor Wright’s Latest Sage Advice: Stay Away from Unfocused “Big is Bad” Rhetoric in Assessing the Proposed AT&T-Time Warner Merger
The Third Circuit pushes back on FCC’s unjustified rule on joint sales agreements
While we all wait on pins and needles for the DC Circuit to issue its long-expected ruling on the FCC’s Open Internet Order, another federal appeals court has pushed back on Tom Wheeler’s FCC for its unremitting “just trust us” approach to federal rulemaking. The case, round three of Prometheus, et al. v. FCC, involves ... The Third Circuit pushes back on FCC’s unjustified rule on joint sales agreements
The Ball-Rexam merger: The case for a competitive can market
A number of blockbuster mergers have received (often negative) attention from media and competition authorities in recent months. From the recently challenged Staples-Office Depot merger to the abandoned Comcast-Time Warner merger to the heavily scrutinized Aetna-Humana merger (among many others), there has been a wave of potential mega-mergers throughout the economy—many of them met with ... The Ball-Rexam merger: The case for a competitive can market
