Showing archive for: “Unilateral Conduct”
The FTC’s Cardinal Health Settlement is Bad Antitrust Medicine and Highlights the Need for Additional Antitrust Guidance
On April 17, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) voted three-to-two to enter into a consent agreement In the Matter of Cardinal Health, Inc., requiring Cardinal Health to disgorge funds as part of the settlement in this monopolization case. As ably explained by dissenting Commissioners Josh Wright and Maureen Ohlhausen, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ... The FTC’s Cardinal Health Settlement is Bad Antitrust Medicine and Highlights the Need for Additional Antitrust Guidance
The 2015 International Competition Network’s (ICN) Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter on Tying and Bundling
In a recent post, I presented an overview of the ICN’s recent Annual Conference in Sydney, Australia. Today I briefly summarize and critique a key product approved by the Conference, a new chapter 6 of the ICN’s Workbook on Unilateral Conduct, devoted to tying and bundling. (My analysis is based on a hard copy final ... The 2015 International Competition Network’s (ICN) Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter on Tying and Bundling
International Competition Network (ICN) 2015 Annual Conference: A Higher Profile for Competition Advocacy
The ICN’s 14 Annual Conference, held in Sydney, Australia, from April 28th through May 1st, as usual, provided a forum for highlighting the work of ICN working groups on cartels, mergers, unilateral conduct, agency effectiveness, and advocacy. The Conference approved multiple working group products, including a guidance document on investigative process that reflects key investigative ... International Competition Network (ICN) 2015 Annual Conference: A Higher Profile for Competition Advocacy
Debunking the Myth of a Data Barrier to Entry for Online Services
Recent years have seen an increasing interest in incorporating privacy into antitrust analysis. The FTC and regulators in Europe have rejected these calls so far, but certain scholars and activists continue their attempts to breathe life into this novel concept. Elsewhere we have written at length on the scholarship addressing the issue and found the ... Debunking the Myth of a Data Barrier to Entry for Online Services
A Cost-Benefit Framework for Antitrust Enforcement Policy
Debates among modern antitrust experts focus primarily on the appropriate indicia of anticompetitive behavior, the particular methodologies that should be applied in assessing such conduct, and the best combination and calibration of antitrust sanctions (fines, jail terms, injunctive relief, cease and desist orders). Given a broad consensus that antitrust rules should promote consumer welfare (albeit ... A Cost-Benefit Framework for Antitrust Enforcement Policy
Need for Chinese Antitrust Reform (and IP and Price-Related Concerns) Spotlighted at ABA Beijing Conference
The American Bar Association’s (ABA) “Antitrust in Asia: China” Conference, held in Beijing May 21-23 (with Chinese Government and academic support), cast a spotlight on the growing economic importance of China’s six-year old Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). The Conference brought together 250 antitrust practitioners and government officials to discuss AML enforcement policy. These included the leaders ... Need for Chinese Antitrust Reform (and IP and Price-Related Concerns) Spotlighted at ABA Beijing Conference
Predatory pricing reform rides the Marrakech Express
As I noted in my prior post, two weeks ago the 13th Annual Conference of the International Competition Network (ICN) released two new sets of recommended best practices. Having focused on competition assessment in my prior blog entry, I now turn to the ICN’s predatory pricing recommendations. Aggressive price cutting is the essence of competitive ... Predatory pricing reform rides the Marrakech Express
Lessons from Marrakech for US regulatory reform: All aboard the train
I thank Truth on the Market (and especially Geoff Manne) for adding me as a regular TOTM blogger, writing on antitrust, IP, and regulatory policy. I am a newly minted Senior Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, and alumnus of BlackBerry and the Federal Trade Commission. Representatives of over 100 competition agencies from around the ... Lessons from Marrakech for US regulatory reform: All aboard the train
Tad Lipsky on Lessons From the Section 2 Context
The FTC’s struggle to provide guidance for its enforcement of Section 5’s Unfair Methods of Competition (UMC) clause (or not – some oppose the provision of forward guidance by the agency, much as one occasionally heard opposition to the concept of merger guidelines in 1968 and again in 1982) could evoke a much broader long-run ... Tad Lipsky on Lessons From the Section 2 Context
James Cooper on a Sensible Limit to the FTC’s Section 5 Authority
In this posting, I sketch out a sensible limitation to the FTC’s Section 5 authority. This domain should be narrow, focusing only on harmful conduct that but for the application of Section 5 would remain un-remedied. As a threshold matter, the FTC explicitly should renounce its reliance on early Section 5 case law like S&H ... James Cooper on a Sensible Limit to the FTC’s Section 5 Authority
FairSearch’s Non-Sequitur Response
Our search neutrality paper has received some recent attention. While the initial response from Gordon Crovitz in the Wall Street Journal was favorable, critics are now voicing their responses. Although we appreciate FairSearch’s attempt to engage with our paper’s central claims, its response is really little more than an extended non-sequitur and fails to contribute ... FairSearch’s Non-Sequitur Response
Searching for Antitrust Remedies, Part II
In the last post, I discussed possible characterizations of Google’s conduct for purposes of antitrust analysis. A firm grasp of the economic implications of the different conceptualizations of Google’s conduct is a necessary – but not sufficient – precondition for appreciating the inconsistencies underlying the proposed remedies for Google’s alleged competitive harms. In this post, ... Searching for Antitrust Remedies, Part II
