Showing archive for: “Platforms”
Hunting for Labor-Market Monopsonies (and Giffen Goods)
If you wander into an undergraduate economics class on the right day at the right time, you might catch the lecturer talking about Giffen goods: the rare case where demand curves can slope upward. The Irish potato famine is often used as an example. As the story goes, potatoes were a huge part of the ... Hunting for Labor-Market Monopsonies (and Giffen Goods)
The Market for Speech Governance: Free Speech Strikes Back?
The tentatively pending sale of Twitter to Elon Musk has been greeted with celebration by many on the right, along with lamentation by some on the left, regarding what it portends for the platform’s moderation policies. Musk, for his part, has announced that he believes Twitter should be a free-speech haven and that it needs ... The Market for Speech Governance: Free Speech Strikes Back?
The Paradox of Choice Meets the Information Age
Barry Schwartz’s seminal work “The Paradox of Choice” has received substantial attention since its publication nearly 20 years ago. In it, Schwartz argued that, faced with an ever-increasing plethora of products to choose from, consumers often feel overwhelmed and seek to limit the number of choices they must make. In today’s online digital economy, a ... The Paradox of Choice Meets the Information Age
Application of the Proper ‘Outer Boundary’ of Antitrust Liability for Alleged Refusals to Deal in New York v Facebook
Introduction The States brought an antitrust complaint against Facebook alleging that various conduct violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The ICLE brief addresses the States’ allegations that Facebook refused to provide access to an input, a set of application-programming interfaces that developers use in order to access Facebook’s network of social-media users (Facebook’s Platform), ... Application of the Proper ‘Outer Boundary’ of Antitrust Liability for Alleged Refusals to Deal in New York v Facebook
Lina Khan’s Privacy Proposals Are at Odds with Market Principles and Consumer Welfare
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is at it again, threatening new sorts of regulatory interventions in the legitimate welfare-enhancing activities of businesses—this time in the realm of data collection by firms. Discussion In an April 11 speech at the International Association of Privacy Professionals’ Global Privacy Summit, FTC Chair Lina Khan set forth a litany ... Lina Khan’s Privacy Proposals Are at Odds with Market Principles and Consumer Welfare
Attention Markets: They Know Them When they See Them
A raft of progressive scholars in recent years have argued that antitrust law remains blind to the emergence of so-called “attention markets,” in which firms compete by converting user attention into advertising revenue. This blindness, the scholars argue, has caused antitrust enforcers to clear harmful mergers in these industries. It certainly appears the argument is ... Attention Markets: They Know Them When they See Them
Assessing Less Restrictive Alternatives and Interbrand Competition in Epic v Apple
The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) filed an amicus brief on behalf of itself and 26 distinguished law & economics scholars with the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in the hotly anticipated and intensely important Epic Games v Apple case. A fantastic group of attorneys from White & Case generously assisted us ... Assessing Less Restrictive Alternatives and Interbrand Competition in Epic v Apple
In Apple v Epic, 9th Circuit Should Remember that Antitrust Forbids Enhancing, not Exercising, Market Power
On March 31, I and several other law and economics scholars filed an amicus brief in Epic Games v. Apple, which is on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit. In this post, I summarize the central arguments of the brief, which was joined by Alden Abbott, Henry Butler, Alan Meese, Aurelien ... In Apple v Epic, 9th Circuit Should Remember that Antitrust Forbids Enhancing, not Exercising, Market Power
Suggested Redline Edits to the DOJ’s Letter to Judiciary Committee Leadership
The Biden administration finally has taken a public position on parallel House (H.R. 3816) and Senate (S. 2992) bills that would impose new welfare-reducing regulatory constraints on the ability of large digital platforms to engage in innovative business practices that benefit consumers and the economy. The administration’s articulation of its position—set forth in a March ... Suggested Redline Edits to the DOJ’s Letter to Judiciary Committee Leadership
Final DMA: Now We Know Where We’re Going, but We Still Don’t Know Why
After years of debate and negotiations, European Lawmakers have agreed upon what will most likely be the final iteration of the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”), following the March 24 final round of “trilogue” talks. For the uninitiated, the DMA is one in a string of legislative proposals around the globe intended to “rein in” tech ... Final DMA: Now We Know Where We’re Going, but We Still Don’t Know Why
The DMA and Antitrust: A Liaison Dangereuse
As the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) has entered the final stage of its approval process, one matter the inter-institutional negotiations appears likely to leave unresolved is how the DMA’s the relationship with competition law affects the very rationale and legal basis for the intervention. The DMA is explicitly grounded on the questionable assumption ... The DMA and Antitrust: A Liaison Dangereuse
Does the Market Know Something the FTC Doesn’t?
During the exceptional rise in stock-market valuations from March 2020 to January 2022, both equity investors and antitrust regulators have implicitly agreed that so-called “Big Tech” firms enjoyed unbeatable competitive advantages as gatekeepers with largely unmitigated power over the digital ecosystem. Investors bid up the value of tech stocks to exceptional levels, anticipating no competitive ... Does the Market Know Something the FTC Doesn’t?
