Showing archive for: “Mergers & Merger Enforcement”
Innovation-driven market structure in the ag-biotech industry
Dynamic versus static competition Ever since David Teece and coauthors began writing about antitrust and innovation in high-tech industries in the 1980s, we’ve understood that traditional, price-based antitrust analysis is not intrinsically well-suited for assessing merger policy in these markets. For high-tech industries, performance, not price, is paramount — which means that innovation is key: ... Innovation-driven market structure in the ag-biotech industry
Antitrust review of ag-biotech mergers: Appropriability versus cannibalization
This symposium offers a good opportunity to look again into the complex relation between concentration and innovation in antitrust policy. Whilst the details of the EC decision in Dow/Dupont remain unknown, the press release suggests that the issue of “incentives to innovate” was central to the review. Contrary to what had leaked in the antitrust ... Antitrust review of ag-biotech mergers: Appropriability versus cannibalization
Mergers, innovation, and agricultural biotechnology: Putting the squeeze on growers and consumers?
Innovation Competition in the Spotlight Innovation is more and more in the spotlight as questions grow about concentration and declining competition in the U.S. economy. These questions come not only from advocates for more vigorous competition enforcement but also, increasingly, from those who adhere to the school of thought that consolidation tends to generate procompetitive ... Mergers, innovation, and agricultural biotechnology: Putting the squeeze on growers and consumers?
Finding your way in the seeds/agro-chem mergers labyrinth
The recently notified mergers in the seed and agro-chem industry raise difficult questions that competition authorities around the world would need to tackle in the following months. Because of the importance of their markets’ size, the decision reached by US and EU competition authorities would be particularly significant for the merging parties, but the perspective ... Finding your way in the seeds/agro-chem mergers labyrinth
Innovation trends in agriculture and their implications for M&A analysis
The US agriculture sector has been experiencing consolidation at all levels for decades, even as the global ag economy has been growing and becoming more diverse. Much of this consolidation has been driven by technological changes that created economies of scale, both at the farm level and beyond. Likewise, the role of technology has changed ... Innovation trends in agriculture and their implications for M&A analysis
Patents and mergers
How should patents be taken into consideration in merger analysis? When does the combining of patent portfolios lead to anticompetitive concerns? Two principles should guide these inquiries. First, as the Supreme Court held in its 2006 decision Independent Ink, ownership of a patent does not confer market power. This ruling came in the context of ... Patents and mergers
Contestability theory in the real world
Though concentration seems to be an increasingly popular metric for discussing antitrust policy (a backward move in my opinion, given the theoretical work by Harold Demsetz and others many years ago in this area), contestability is still the standard for evaluating antitrust issues from an economic standpoint. Contestability theory, most closely associated with William Baumol, ... Contestability theory in the real world
Understanding innovation markets in antitrust analysis
Today, three of the largest proposed mergers — Bayer/Monsanto, Dow/Dupont, and ChemChina/Syngenta — face scrutiny in both the U.S. and Europe over concerns that the mergers will slow innovation in crop biotechnology and crop protection. The incorporation of innovation effects in the antitrust analysis of these agricultural/biotech mergers is quickly becoming more mainstream in both the U.S. ... Understanding innovation markets in antitrust analysis
Significant Impediment To Industry Innovation: A novel theory of harm in EU merger policy?
In Brussels, the talk of the town is that the European Commission (“Commission”) is casting a new eye on the old antitrust conjecture that prophesizes a negative relationship between industry concentration and innovation. This issue arises in the context of the review of several mega-mergers in the pharmaceutical and AgTech (i.e., seed genomics, biochemicals, “precision ... Significant Impediment To Industry Innovation: A novel theory of harm in EU merger policy?
FTC Economists’ Paper Discredits Claims of Inappropriately “Weak” Merger Enforcement
During 2016 it became fashionable in certain circles to decry “lax” merger enforcement and to call for a more aggressive merger enforcement policy (see, for example, the American Antitrust Institute’s September 2016 paper on competition policy, critiqued by me in this blog post). Interventionists promoting “tougher” merger enforcement have cited Professor John Kwoka’s 2015 book, ... FTC Economists’ Paper Discredits Claims of Inappropriately “Weak” Merger Enforcement
When Past Is Not Prologue: The Weakness of the Economic Evidence Against Health Insurance Mergers
I just posted a new ICLE white paper, co-authored with former ICLE Associate Director, Ben Sperry: When Past Is Not Prologue: The Weakness of the Economic Evidence Against Health Insurance Mergers. Yesterday the hearing in the DOJ’s challenge to stop the Aetna-Humana merger got underway, and last week phase 1 of the Cigna-Anthem merger trial ... When Past Is Not Prologue: The Weakness of the Economic Evidence Against Health Insurance Mergers
Acting AAG’s Policy Speech Sends the Wrong Signals on Antitrust Enforcement (or “a Wild Ride Back to the Fifties and Sixties”)
In a September 20 speech at the high profile Georgetown Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, Acting Assistant Attorney General Renata Hesse sent the wrong signals to the business community and to foreign enforcers (see here) regarding U.S. antitrust policy. Admittedly, a substantial part of her speech was a summary of existing U.S. antitrust doctrine. In certain ... Acting AAG’s Policy Speech Sends the Wrong Signals on Antitrust Enforcement (or “a Wild Ride Back to the Fifties and Sixties”)
