Showing archive for: “Efficiencies”
Professor Carrier’s Response
First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Josh Wright. Only because of Josh’s creativity and tireless, flawless execution did this blog symposium come about and run so smoothly. I also would like to thank Dennis Crouch, who has generously cross-posted the symposium at PatentlyO. And I am grateful for the ... Professor Carrier’s Response
Kmiec on the Death of the GOP
I must begin this post with a clarification: I am not a Republican. Nor am I a Democrat. I really have little interest in defending one party over the other. I agree with the GOP on some matters, with the Democrats on others, and with neither party on a host of matters. In general, I ... Kmiec on the Death of the GOP
Price Discrimination Is Good, Part I
Price discrimination involves a firm taking advantage of different elasticities of demand for the same goods by charging different prices relative to marginal cost. Price discrimination is ubiquitous in our economy but remains a four letter word in policy and regulation circles. We observe price discrimination in all sorts of product markets, from small and ... Price Discrimination Is Good, Part I
Principles for Bailout Management
I had the pleasure last week of participating in a bailout panel at William & Mary Law School. The William & Mary Federalist Society, which hosted the event, asked each panelist to address three topics: what led to the current situation, how the bailout plan will (or won’t) fix things, and suggestions for implementing a ... Principles for Bailout Management
FTC v. DOJ on Section 2: Just Different Priors?
Turns out the Global Competition Policy issue on Reviewing the DOJ Report on Competition and Monopoly, in addition to the articles I pointed to in this post, has added a few more responses to the Report, the FTC Response, and what the schism might mean for antitrust enforcement over the next several years. So far ... FTC v. DOJ on Section 2: Just Different Priors?
Geradin on Loyalty Rebates
Damien Geradin has posted an interesting paper on “Separating Pro-competitive from Anti-competitive Loyalty Rebates: A Conceptual Framework.” Here’s the (long) abstract: In its submission to the recent OECD Roundtable on Bundled and Loyalty Discounts and Rebates (the “OECD Roundtable on rebates“), Korea observed that “loyalty discounts are getting growing attention both academically and practically” and ... Geradin on Loyalty Rebates
Teaching Antitrust
I’m two weeks into the semester here at UT, and the antitrust course. I’ve made a few changes to the course this year. Specifically, I’m using the new 2nd edition of the Gavil, Kovacic and Baker. So far so good on that front on adjusting to the new edition. Its an excellent textbook. In large ... Teaching Antitrust
Merging to Second Best
Luke Froeb, Mikhael Shor and Steven Tschantz have just posted an interesting looking model of mergers in auction settings where the incumbent firm has an advantage in subsequent auctions. The model captures the intuition that sometimes a mergers creating a “second-best” rival can result in more more aggressive bidding and result in lower prices even ... Merging to Second Best
Antitrust Fallacies of Fact and Theory
Steve Hurwitz as a characteristically thoughtful and provocative post over at Austrian Economists on identifying the most dangerous fallacies of fact and theory in economics that a reasonably informed layperson would believe. Steve’s nominations are that the average person believes that the “economic well-being of the average American is on the decline” (fallacy of fact) ... Antitrust Fallacies of Fact and Theory
Optimal Regulatory Design, Fragmentation, and Abolition
In response to my post about the optimal institutional design for merger enforcement and the problems associated with dual federal enforcement, a reader points me to this related paper by Jon Klick, Francesco Parisi, and Norbert Schulz in the International Review of Law and Economics which models alternatives for allocating decision-making across multiple agencies. One ... Optimal Regulatory Design, Fragmentation, and Abolition
RPM and the NIE
I’ve just spent a couple of great days in spectacular Boulder, Colorado at a conference on the New Institutional Economics (NIE). (Not sure why the “the” is required, but it always seems to be used.) The conference, organized by Colorado Law’s Phil Weiser and hosted by the Silicon Flatirons Center for Law, Technology, and Entrepreneurship, ... RPM and the NIE
The Dual Antitrust Enforcement Question
With all of the recent talk of the “optimal regulatory structure” and proposals about regulatory consolidation and reorganization (here is Glom Blogger David Zaring on the Big Reorg), I wonder if the discussion might carry over into antitrust and the recurring “dual enforcement” question. As some of our readers may know, both the DOJ and FTC ... The Dual Antitrust Enforcement Question
