Showing archive for: “Collusion & Cartels”
Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against Behavioral Antitrust
In a policy speech earlier this year, Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch of the Federal Trade Commission advocating the incorporation of behavioral economics into antitrust analysis suggested one concern that others might have with the approach was that “behavioral economics was simply liberalism masquerading as economic thinking.” The Commissioner himself has been a vocal proponent of ... Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against Behavioral Antitrust
Apple and Amazon E-Book Most Favored Nation Clauses
Connecticut AG Richard Blumenthal has reportedly contacted Apple and Amazon concerning their pricing arrangements with publishers (WSJ, CNN): Mr. Blumenthal said he has sent letters to Amazon and Apple asking them to “meet with his office” to address his concerns that agreements in place may restrict rivals from offering cheaper e-books. For instance, he said, ... Apple and Amazon E-Book Most Favored Nation Clauses
Nudging Antitrust (Part 2): Do Critiques of Behavioral Antitrust Have Any Bite?
Part 1 of this short blog series on “Nudging Antitrust,” focused on defining Commissioner Rosch’s recently articulated vision of behavioral economics as it relates to antitrust and competition policy and its differences with more “conventional” economic approaches that are bound by the rationality assumption. By the way, one should note that these more conventional approaches ... Nudging Antitrust (Part 2): Do Critiques of Behavioral Antitrust Have Any Bite?
Leegin Legislation Update
A Senate panel approved the Leegin Bill on a voice vote (HT: Main Justice). The story behind the link suggests that there is some Republican opposition brewing. I suspect there will be hearings. The Bill’s findings make the following two observations: (3) Many economic studies showed that the rule against resale price maintenance led to ... Leegin Legislation Update
A Defense of the Insurance Industry Antitrust Exemption?
The subject of antitrust exemptions has been an oft-discussed topic here at TOTM (see, e.g. here and here). In the latter of those two links I was somewhat critical of the DOJ for taking a neutral stance on the insurance industry exemption, which has now become rather wrapped up in the health care reform debate. ... A Defense of the Insurance Industry Antitrust Exemption?
Amazon vs. Macmillan: It's all about control
The Amazon vs. Macmillan controversy has been beaten to a pulp in the blogosphere. See Megan McArdle, John Scalzi, Joshua Gans, Virginia Postrel, Lynne Kiesling, Lynne Kielsing and Lynne Kiesling, among others. Pulp or no (get it? It’s a book/e-book pun), I haven’t seen anyone hit squarely on what I think is the crux of ... Amazon vs. Macmillan: It's all about control
Armentano in the WSJ, Abolition and Antitrust Fairy Tales …
Leading antitrust critic and abolitionist, Dominick Armentano, has a letter to the editor in the WSJ. The point of the letter to the editor is rather specific: that FTC’s attack on Intel is no outlier in the historical context of antitrust enforcement, contrary to the WSJ’s description. To the contrary, Armentano argues that Intel is ... Armentano in the WSJ, Abolition and Antitrust Fairy Tales …
Response to Steve Salop on credit card antitrust
Steve’s post responding to me and Josh on antitrust exemptions and buyer cartels raised a number of interesting issues. A few points in response: 1. Constantine’s book is quite a measured look at the case (not). I love how he risked everything — everything! — for the case. He and the country’s other contingency fee ... Response to Steve Salop on credit card antitrust
Response to Comments on Antitrust Exemptions and Joint Monopsony Conduct to Countervail Monopoly Power
In response to my first post on joint monopsony conduct to countervail monopoly power, Mike Ward raises the issue of justifying a merger among sellers on the basis that it will countervail alleged monopsony power. Labor unions have an antitrust exemption for just that purpose. In terms of merger policy, Tom Campbell has written an ... Response to Comments on Antitrust Exemptions and Joint Monopsony Conduct to Countervail Monopoly Power
Should Antitrust Exempt Joint Monopsony Conduct to Countervail Monopoly?
Geoff and Josh raise an interesting issue about collective market conduct by buyers. Suppose that a group of final consumers face a monopolist. Should the consumers be permitted to band together into an “association” to jointly negotiate a lower price from the monopolist? Some would say that such buyer “cooperatives” are permitted, whereas others would ... Should Antitrust Exempt Joint Monopsony Conduct to Countervail Monopoly?
What Am I Missing About Antitrust Exemptions?
Geoff mentions the pending bills on the Hill that would grant merchants an antitrust exemption to negotiate interchange fees. The insurance industry exemption has also been in the news of late in the wake of the Democrats’ threats of repeal. Here’s what I’m puzzled about. Other than self-interested parties that have a lot to gain ... What Am I Missing About Antitrust Exemptions?
Antitrust Anachronism? Randy Picker on the Microsoft-Yahoo Search Deal
I recently commented on Gordon Crovitz’s WSJ column on the Microsoft-Yahoo deal arguing that antitrust was simply too cumbersome to deal competition issues in dynamic markets like search. A short version of my take was that these concerns are often overstated in the areas of cartels and even sometimes in merger enforcement — but have ... Antitrust Anachronism? Randy Picker on the Microsoft-Yahoo Search Deal