Nuechterlein: Guidelines without Guidance on Vertical Mergers
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Jonathan E. Nuechterlein (Partner, Sidley Austin LLP; former General Counsel, FTC; former Deputy General Counsel, FCC).] [Nuechterlein: I represented AT&T in United States ... Nuechterlein: Guidelines without Guidance on Vertical Mergers
Hovenkamp: The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines Are an Important Step for the Economic Analysis of Mergers
In its 2019 AT&T/Time-Warner merger decision the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals mentioned something that antitrust enforcers have known for years: We need a new set of Agency Guidelines for vertical mergers. The vertical merger Guidelines were last revised in 1984 at the height of Chicago School hostility toward harsh antitrust treatment of vertical restraints. ... Hovenkamp: The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines Are an Important Step for the Economic Analysis of Mergers
Welcome to the TOTM Blog Symposium on the 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines
The 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines: What’s in, what’s out — and do we need them anyway? February 6 & 7, 2020 Welcome! We’re delighted to kick off our two-day blog symposium on the recently released Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines from the DOJ Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission. If adopted by ... Welcome to the TOTM Blog Symposium on the 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines
Announcing the TOTM Symposium on the 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines
Truth on the Market is pleased to announce its next blog symposium: The 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines: What’s in, what’s out — and do we need them anyway? February 6 & 7, 2020 Symposium background On January 10, 2020, the DOJ Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission released Draft Joint Vertical Merger ... Announcing the TOTM Symposium on the 2020 Draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines
Debating the FTC v Qualcomm Amicus Brief, a Summary
Qualcomm is currently in the midst of a high-profile antitrust case against the FTC. At the heart of these proceedings lies Qualcomm’s so-called “No License, No Chips” (NLNC) policy, whereby it purportedly refuses to sell chips to OEMs that have not concluded a license agreement covering its underlying intellectual property. According to the FTC and ... Debating the FTC v Qualcomm Amicus Brief, a Summary
The Facts Show That No License/No Chips Was A Successful Policy, Not an Empty Threat – A Reply to Manne and Auer’s New Argument
In their original post, Manne and Auer argued that the antitrust argument against Qualcomm’s no license/no chips policy was based on bad economics and bad law. They now seem to have abandoned that argument and claim instead – contrary to the extensive factual findings of the district court – that, while Qualcomm threatened to cut off ... The Facts Show That No License/No Chips Was A Successful Policy, Not an Empty Threat – A Reply to Manne and Auer’s New Argument
Is FRAND Litigation a Credible Threat?: A reply to Mark Lemley, Douglas Melamed and Steven Salop
Last week, we posted a piece on TOTM, criticizing the amicus brief written by Mark Lemley, Douglas Melamed and Steven Salop in the ongoing Qualcomm litigation. The authors prepared a thoughtful response to our piece, which we published today on TOTM. In this post, we highlight the points where we agree with the amici (or ... Is FRAND Litigation a Credible Threat?: A reply to Mark Lemley, Douglas Melamed and Steven Salop
Manne and Auer’s Defense of Qualcomm’s Licensing Policy Is Deeply Flawed
Geoffrey Manne and Dirk Auer’s defense of Qualcomm’s no license/no chips policy is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how that policy harms competition. The harm is straightforward in light of facts proven at trial. In a nutshell, OEMs must buy some chips from Qualcomm or else exit the handset business, even if they would ... Manne and Auer’s Defense of Qualcomm’s Licensing Policy Is Deeply Flawed
Exclusionary Pricing Without the Exclusion: Unpacking Qualcomm’s No License, No Chips Policy
Qualcomm is currently in the midst of a high-profile antitrust case against the FTC. At the heart of these proceedings lies Qualcomm’s so-called “No License, No Chips” (NLNC) policy, whereby it purportedly refuses to sell chips to OEMs that have not concluded a license agreement covering its underlying intellectual property. According to the FTC and ... Exclusionary Pricing Without the Exclusion: Unpacking Qualcomm’s No License, No Chips Policy
Why the FTC had to Abandon the Duty to Deal Argument Against Qualcomm
On November 22, the FTC filed its answering brief in the FTC v. Qualcomm litigation. As we’ve noted before, it has always seemed a little odd that the current FTC is so vigorously pursuing this case, given some of the precedents it might set and the Commission majority’s apparent views on such issues. But this ... Why the FTC had to Abandon the Duty to Deal Argument Against Qualcomm
Efficient Cartels and the Public Interest Defence – Do They Exist?
The concept of a “good” or “efficient” cartel is generally regarded by competition authorities as an oxymoron. A cartel is seen as the worst type of antitrust violation and one that warrants zero tolerance. Agreements between competitors to raise prices and share the market are assumed unambiguously to reduce economic welfare. As such, even if ... Efficient Cartels and the Public Interest Defence – Do They Exist?
We Should Not Have Our Constitution Redesigned by Antitrust Lawyers
[TOTM: The following is the sixth in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Kristian Stout, Associate Director at the International Center for Law & Economics. There is a push underway to punish big tech ... We Should Not Have Our Constitution Redesigned by Antitrust Lawyers
