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Showing archive for:  “The Law & Economics of Interchange Fees Symposium”

Symposium Wrap Up

Thanks to all of our participants and readers for the blog symposium–both the posts and the comments were engaging and thoughtful, and I hope these entries will be helpful in the ongoing debate over credit cards and interchange fees. A concluding point or two: Credit card networks are incredibly complex, and no one fully understands ... Symposium Wrap Up

The Institutional Dynamic: Understand First, Act Second—If At All

I have now had a chance to review the excellent posts on the second day, all of which have a common flavor.  They expand the universe of relative considerations that need to be taken into account to decide whether imposing caps on interchange fees enhances or reduces overall social welfare.  The narrow perspective on this ... The Institutional Dynamic: Understand First, Act Second—If At All

Merchant Collusion as an Antitrust Remedy

In my first post I discussed the potential for interchange legislation from a consumer protection perspective, that is, would the combination of disclosure requirements coupled with a reduction of interchange fees be likely to improve consumer welfare.   I concluded that from the consumer protection perspective, the case for interchange legislation was weak.  I noted that ... Merchant Collusion as an Antitrust Remedy

Competitive Payments

Most of the discussion related to pricing at the point of sale has emphasized the “cross-subsidy” between those that pay with cash and checks and those that pay with credit cards.  This discussion misses the core of the problem in a market where the use of cash and checks is rapidly declining; the central problem ... Competitive Payments

The Fee Neutrality Claim

Will reduction in interchange fees help or hurt consumers? Two posts yesterday made the conjecture that a reduction in one category of fees would only increase other fees, and that the overall sum of fees will not change. This is the fee-neutrality claim. Todd Zywicki writes: The mathematics of the situation is inescapable: card issuers ... The Fee Neutrality Claim

Allocating the Costs of Fraud

Geoffrey A. Manne is Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics and a Lecturer in Law at Lewis & Clark Law School. I take to heart Jim’s claim that fraud is too-little discussed in this realm given its cost, and thus I’ll try my hand at it. Every discussion of the industrial ... Allocating the Costs of Fraud

Assessing the Social Effects of the Use of Credit Cards

The GAO has a fairly extensive discussion of the costs and benefits of credit cards to merchants.  However, that discussion focuses on the individual benefits.  I would like to step back and put two of those benefits – increased merchant sales and fraud prevention costs – into the larger context that I discussed earlier. First, ... Assessing the Social Effects of the Use of Credit Cards

The Cost of Payments Interchange: Issues No One Talks About

I feel that at least two important issues are being left out of the raging controversy over the cost of interchange. (At this point my readers are probably deciding if I’ll follow with a pro-merchant or pro-bank POV…but guess what: here comes one of each to make my point that we’re being a bit simplistic ... The Cost of Payments Interchange: Issues No One Talks About

Interchange fees and other rules

The GAO report raises concerns about card association the level of interchange fees (that acquirers pay issuers for credit card transactions processed) but also about other card association rules such as the ‘no surcharge rule.’ That rule prevents a merchant who accepts card transactions from charging a ‘point of sale’ premium to consumers who use ... Interchange fees and other rules

Surcharging and Honor-All-Cards

Generally, merchants charge the same price regardless of the type of payment instrument used to make purchases. In many jurisdictions, merchants are not allowed to add a surcharge for payment card transactions because of legal (some states in the U.S. do not allow surcharges) or contractual (card networks generally do not allow surcharges) restrictions. But, ... Surcharging and Honor-All-Cards

The Merchants’ Insincere Concern About Cross-Consumer Subsidies

In my first post I argued that consumers as a group would likely be made worse off as a result of artificially imposed reductions in interchange fees.  This post considers a second line of attack—that even if consumers overall would be made no better off (or even worse off) as a result of regulating interchange ... The Merchants’ Insincere Concern About Cross-Consumer Subsidies

Debunking the ‘Cross-Subsidy’ Theory

In our earlier post, we observed that the GAO report on interchange got off on the wrong foot when it concluded that interchange fees were rising.  We infer from the silence which greeted our post that everyone agrees with this criticism.  Indeed, yesterday’s posts and comments appear to agree that the GAO’s report does very ... Debunking the ‘Cross-Subsidy’ Theory