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In a weekend interview with the Washington Post, Donald Trump vowed to force drug companies to negotiate directly with the government on prices in Medicare and Medicaid.  It’s unclear what, if anything, Trump intends for Medicaid; drug makers are already required to sell drugs to Medicaid at the lowest price they negotiate with any other buyer.  For Medicare, Trump didn’t offer any more details about the intended negotiations, but he’s referring to his campaign proposals to allow the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to negotiate directly with manufacturers the prices of drugs covered under Medicare Part D.

Such proposals have been around for quite a while.  As soon as the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 was enacted, creating the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit, many lawmakers began advocating for government negotiation of drug prices. Both Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders favored this approach during their campaigns, and the Obama Administration’s proposed budget for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 included a provision that would have allowed the HHS to negotiate prices for a subset of drugs: biologics and certain high-cost prescription drugs.

However, federal law would have to change if there is to be any government negotiation of drug prices under Medicare Part D. Congress explicitly included a “noninterference” clause in the MMA that stipulates that HHS “may not interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP sponsors, and may not require a particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs.”

Most people don’t understand what it means for the government to “negotiate” drug prices and the implications of the various options.  Some proposals would simply eliminate the MMA’s noninterference clause and allow HHS to negotiate prices for a broad set of drugs on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries.  However, the Congressional Budget Office has already concluded that such a plan would have “a negligible effect on federal spending” because it is unlikely that HHS could achieve deeper discounts than the current private Part D plans (there are 746 such plans in 2017).  The private plans are currently able to negotiate significant discounts from drug manufacturers by offering preferred formulary status for their drugs and channeling enrollees to the formulary drugs with lower cost-sharing incentives. In most drug classes, manufacturers compete intensely for formulary status and offer considerable discounts to be included.

The private Part D plans are required to provide only two drugs in each of several drug classes, giving the plans significant bargaining power over manufacturers by threatening to exclude their drugs.  However, in six protected classes (immunosuppressant, anti-cancer, anti-retroviral, antidepressant, antipsychotic and anticonvulsant drugs), private Part D plans must include “all or substantially all” drugs, thereby eliminating their bargaining power and ability to achieve significant discounts.  Although the purpose of the limitation is to prevent plans from cherry-picking customers by denying coverage of certain high cost drugs, giving the private Part D plans more ability to exclude drugs in the protected classes should increase competition among manufacturers for formulary status and, in turn, lower prices.  And it’s important to note that these price reductions would not involve any government negotiation or intervention in Medicare Part D.  However, as discussed below, excluding more drugs in the protected classes would reduce the value of the Part D plans to many patients by limiting access to preferred drugs.

For government negotiation to make any real difference on Medicare drug prices, HHS must have the ability to not only negotiate prices, but also to put some pressure on drug makers to secure price concessions.  This could be achieved by allowing HHS to also establish a formulary, set prices administratively, or take other regulatory actions against manufacturers that don’t offer price reductions.  Setting prices administratively or penalizing manufacturers that don’t offer satisfactory reductions would be tantamount to a price control.  I’ve previously explained that price controls—whether direct or indirect—are a bad idea for prescription drugs for several reasons. Evidence shows that price controls lead to higher initial launch prices for drugs, increased drug prices for consumers with private insurance coverage,  drug shortages in certain markets, and reduced incentives for innovation.

Giving HHS the authority to establish a formulary for Medicare Part D coverage would provide leverage to obtain discounts from manufacturers, but it would produce other negative consequences.  Currently, private Medicare Part D plans cover an average of 85% of the 200 most popular drugs, with some plans covering as much as 93%.  In contrast, the drug benefit offered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), one government program that is able to set its own formulary to achieve leverage over drug companies, covers only 59% of the 200 most popular drugs.  The VA’s ability to exclude drugs from the formulary has generated significant price reductions. Indeed, estimates suggest that if the Medicare Part D formulary was restricted to the VA offerings and obtained similar price reductions, it would save Medicare Part D $510 per beneficiary.  However, the loss of access to so many popular drugs would reduce the value of the Part D plans by $405 per enrollee, greatly narrowing the net gains.

History has shown that consumers don’t like their access to drugs reduced.  In 2014, Medicare proposed to take antidepressants, antipsychotic and immunosuppressant drugs off the protected list, thereby allowing the private Part D plans to reduce offerings of these drugs on the formulary and, in turn, reduce prices.  However, patients and their advocates were outraged at the possibility of losing access to their preferred drugs, and the proposal was quickly withdrawn.

Thus, allowing the government to negotiate prices under Medicare Part D could carry important negative consequences.  Policy-makers must fully understand what it means for government to negotiate directly with drug makers, and what the potential consequences are for price reductions, access to popular drugs, drug innovation, and drug prices for other consumers.

During 2016 it became fashionable in certain circles to decry “lax” merger enforcement and to call for a more aggressive merger enforcement policy (see, for example, the American Antitrust Institute’s September 2016 paper on competition policy, critiqued by me in this blog post).  Interventionists promoting “tougher” merger enforcement have cited Professor John Kwoka’s 2015 book, Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies in support of the proposition that U.S. antitrust enforcers have been “excessively tolerant” in analyzing proposed mergers.

In that regard, a recent paper by two outstanding FTC economists (Michael Vita and David Osinski) is well worth noting.  It makes a strong (and, in my view, persuasive) case that Kwoka’s research is fatally flawed.  The following excerpt, drawn from the introduction and conclusion of the paper (Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies:  A Critical Review), merits close attention:

John Kwoka’s recently published Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies (2015) has received considerable attention from both antitrust practitioners and academics. The book features a meta-analysis of retrospective studies of consummated mergers, joint ventures, and other horizontal arrangements. Based on summary statistics derived from these studies, Kwoka concludes that domestic antitrust agencies are excessively tolerant in their merger enforcement; that merger remedies are ineffective at mitigating market power; and that merger enforcement has become increasingly lax over time. We review both his evidence and his empirical methods, and conclude that serious deficiencies in both undermine the basis for these conclusions. . . .

We sympathize with the goal of using retrospective analyses to assess the performance of the antitrust agencies and to identify possible improvements. Unfortunately, Kwoka has drawn inferences and reached conclusions about contemporary merger enforcement policy that are unjustified by his data and his methods. His critique of negotiated remedies in merger cases relies on a small number of transactions; a close reading reveals that a number of them are silent on the effectiveness of the associated remedies. His data sample lacks diversity, relying heavily on a small number of studies conducted on a small and unrepresentative set of industries. His statistical methodology departs from well-established techniques for conducting meta-analyses, making it impossible for readers to assess the strength of his evidence using standard statistical tools. His conclusions about the growing permissiveness of enforcement policies lack substantiation. Overall, we are unpersuaded that his evidence can support such broad and general policy conclusions.

Hopefully, the new leadership at the Federal Trade Commission and at the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division will carefully scrutinize this and other recent research on mergers in devising their merger enforcement policy.  Additional research on the effects of mergers, including an evaluation of their static and dynamic efficiencies, is highly warranted.  Enforcers should not lose sight of the fact that disincentivizing efficient mergers could undermine a vibrant market for corporate control in general, as well as precluding the net creation of economic surplus in specific cases.

During a presidential transition, it is an old Washington parlor game to discuss public policy tweaks and personnel changes, with speculation often focusing on former political appointees who are linked to the new President.  But with the election of Donald Trump, who has not previously served in government, many pundits’ crystal balls may be a bit cloudier than normal.  Well, help is on the way – at least for antitrust policy mavens.

On January 24, the Heritage Foundation will bring together an all-star cast of current and former top government officials to try and burn away the mists of uncertainty as it hosts its third annual antitrust policy conference (moderated by me).  The all-star cast, which includes former antitrust chiefs at the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission and a current FTC Commissioner, will turn its attention to both domestic and international antitrust matters.  Antitrust is now a matter of global economic policy concern, and the Trump Administration’s reaction to antitrust developments around the world (including concerns about due process and industrial policy abuses overseas) may prove particularly important for American firms and the U.S. economy.

All antitrust fans are urged to attend the conference, which will be held at Heritage’s Lehrman Auditorium from 10 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on the 24th.  You can register online to attend in person, or follow the conference’s webcast at Heritage.org.

I hope to see you there!

On December 6 the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its much anticipated decision in Samsung Electronic Co. v. Apple Inc.  The opinion deferred for another day clarification of key policy questions raised by the design patent system.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sonia Sotomayor reversed and remanded a Federal Circuit decision upholding a $399 million damages award to Apple for infringement of its design patents by smartphone manufacturers.  Section 289 of the Patent Act  makes it unlawful to manufacture or sell an “article of manufacture” to which a patented design or a colorable imitation thereof has been applied and makes an infringer liable to the patent holder “to the extent of his total profit.”  A jury found that various smartphones manufactured by Samsung and other companies infringed design patents owned by Apple that covered a rectangular front face with rounded edges and a grid of colorful icons on a black screen.  Apple was awarded $399 million in damages—Samsung’s entire profit from the sale of its infringing smartphones. The Federal Circuit affirmed the damages award, rejecting Samsung’s argument that damages should be limited because the relevant articles of manufacture were the front face or screen rather than the entire smartphone.  The court reasoned that such a limit was not required because the components of Samsung’s smartphones were not sold separately to ordinary consumers and thus were not distinct articles of manufacture.  The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s statutory interpretation, holding that an “article of manufacture,” which is simply a thing made by hand or machine, encompasses both a product sold to a consumer and a component of that product.  Because the term “article of manufacture” is broad enough to embrace both a product sold to a consumer and a component of that product, whether sold separately or not, the Court opined that the Federal Circuit’s narrower reading could not be squared with Section 289’s text.

The Court, however, declined to resolve the “big question” in this case, which had been discussed during oral argument – namely, whether the relevant article of manufacture for each design patent at issue here was the smartphone or a particular smartphone component.  In leaving resolution of this “and any other issues” to the Federal Circuit on remand, the Court in effect “punted.”  (The Justice Department suggested an inherently malleable and vague “four consideration test” to this question in its Samsung v. Apple amicus brief.)  Expert commentators have highlighted this issue (see, for example, here), which, because of the plain language of Section 289 (“extent of the total profit”), bears directly on the quantum of damages for which a design patent infringer may be held liable.  How the Federal Circuit deals with the “article of manufacture” question may have significant implications for incentives to obtain and protect design patents.

An even bigger unanswered question is the appropriateness of the federal legal structure for the protection of designs.  Design patents are fairly readily obtained – they do not have to satisfy the multiple requirements for patentability (centered on inventiveness, novelty, and advance over prior art) that must be met by utility patents (hurdles that have become even harder to surmount over the last decade due to a host of Supreme Court decisions that have made it harder to obtain and defend utility patents).  Moreover, unlike utility patents, other federal intellectual property laws, covering trade dress and copyright, offer protections similar in kind (albeit not exact substitutes) to that offered by the design patent system.  Accordingly, whether existing federal legal measures covering designs are suboptimal and merit being “redesigned” merits further study.  Stay tuned.

The Senate should not reconfirm Jessica Rosenworcel to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in order to allow the Trump Administration to usher in needed reforms in the critical area of communications policy.

As documented by the Free State Foundation (FSF) and other supporters of free markets, the Obama Administration’s FCC has done a dismal job in overseeing communications regulation, both as a matter of law and economics (see, for example, the abuses documented in FSF publications).  The FCC’s proposal to impose common carrier-like regulations on the Internet is just one example of what constitutes not merely flawed policy, but a failure to adhere to the rule of law, as I explain in an October 2016 Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum (citations omitted):

[T]he rule of law involves “a system of binding rules” that have been adopted and applied by a valid government authority and that embody “clarity, predictability, and equal applicability.”

 Practices employed by government agencies that undermine the rule of law ignore a fundamental duty that the government owes its citizens and thereby undermine America’s constitutional system. Federal courts, however, will not review a federal administrative action unless an actual litigated “case or controversy” is presented to them, and they generally are reluctant to invoke constitutional “first principles” to strike down federal agency initiatives. Judicial intervention is thus a poor check on an agency’s tendency to flout the rule of law—or merely give it lip service—by acting in an unpredictable and inequitable manner.

It follows, therefore, that close scrutiny of federal administrative agencies’ activities is particularly important in helping to achieve public accountability for an agency’s failure to honor the rule of law standard. Applying such scrutiny to the FCC reveals that it does a poor job of adhering to rule of law principles. Accordingly, specific legislative reforms to rectify that shortcoming warrant serious consideration by Congress. . . .

The FCC has fallen short in meeting rule of law standards, both in its procedural practices and in various substantive actions that it has taken. . . .

[FCC Procedural failures include] delays, lack of transparency, and inefficiencies in agency proceedings (including “voting on secret texts and delaying the publication of orders”; excessive cost burdens on regulated parties; outdated rules; and problems in agency interactions with the public. . . .

Substantive agency actions also undermine the rule of law if they fall outside the scope of the agency’s constitutional, statutory, or regulatory authority.  By their nature, such actions indicate that an agency does not view itself as bound by the law and is unwilling to clarify how the government’s coercive powers will be applied.  Significant FCC initiatives in recent years have involved such derogations from rule of law principles and have proved to be far more serious than mere procedural imperfections. 

Specific FCC abuses of the rule of law, documented in my Heritage Legal Memorandum, include the imposition of arbitrary conditions on merging parties having nothing to do with the actual effects of a merger.  They also involve regulatory initiatives that exceed the FCC’s statutory authority, such as (1) an attempt to repeal state municipal broadband regulation (struck down in court), (2) the “Open Internet Order” which seeks to regulate the Internet under the guise of “net neutrality,” (3) the unauthorized extension of FCC rules covering joint sales agreements by broadcast stations (struck down in court), and (4) the unauthorized regulation of video “set top box” equipment.

The FCC has also brought a variety of public enforcement actions against private parties that could not reasonably have known that they were violating a legal norm as defined by the FCC, thereby violating principles of clarity, predictability, and equal treatment in law enforcement.

Key FCC actions that flout the rule of law have been enacted by partisan three-to-two FCC votes, with the three Democratic Commissioners (Chairman Tom Wheeler, Mignon Clyburn, and Jessica Rosenworcel) voting in favor of such measures and the two Republican Commissioners (Ajit Pai and Michael O’Rielly) voting in opposition.  Without Commissioner Rosenworcel’s votes, the FCC’s ability to undermine the rule of law in those instances would have been thwarted.

Commissioner Rosenworcel’s term expired in June 2015, but she remained on the Commission.  In 2015 President Obama nominated her for a new five-year term as FCC Commissioner, and, as explained by the Senate Commerce Committee, “[s]he may remain in her current role as commissioner until December 31, 2016 while awaiting Senate confirmation for a second term.”

Rosenworcel’s remomination has not yet been taken up by the Senate, giving President-Elect Trump the opportunity to select a new Commissioner (and Chairman) who can steer the FCC in a market-oriented direction that respects the rule of law.  On December 2nd, however, it was reported that “[Senate Minority Leader] Harry Reid and President Obama are circulating a petition to remove the hold on FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel so that she can be reconfirmed before Congress recesses next week.”

This is troublesome news.  Confirmation of Rosenworcel would deny the new President the ability to reshape communications policy, with serious negative effects on Internet freedom and innovation in the economically vital communications sector.  Senate Republicans should stand firm and deny confirmation to Ms. Rosenworcel, in order to ensure that the new President has the opportunity to reform the FCC.

On November 9, pharmaceutical stocks soared as Donald Trump’s election victory eased concerns about government intervention in drug pricing. Shares of Pfizer rose 8.5%, Allergan PLC was up 8%, and biotech Celgene jumped 10.4%. Drug distributors also gained, with McKesson up 6.4% and Express Scripts climbing 3.4%. Throughout the campaign, Clinton had vowed to take on the pharmaceutical industry and proposed various reforms to reign in drug prices, from levying fines on drug companies that imposed unjustified price increases to capping patients’ annual expenditures on drugs. Pharmaceutical stocks had generally underperformed this year as the market, like much of America, awaited a Clinton victory.

In contrast, Trump generally had less to say on the subject of drug pricing, hence the market’s favorable response to his unexpected victory. Yet, as the end of the first post-election month draws near, we are still uncertain whether Trump is friend or foe to the pharmaceutical industry. Trump’s only proposal that directly impacts the industry would allow the government to negotiate the prices of Medicare Part D drugs with drug makers. Although this proposal would likely have little impact on prices because existing Part D plans already negotiate prices with drug makers, there is a risk that this “negotiation” could ultimately lead to price controls imposed on the industry. And as I have previously discussed, price controls—whether direct or indirect—are a bad idea for prescription drugs: they lead to higher initial launch prices for drugs, increased drug prices for consumers with private insurance coverage, drug shortages in certain markets, and reduced incentives for innovation.

Several of Trump’s other health proposals have mixed implications for the industry. For example, a repeal or overhaul of the Affordable Care Act could eliminate the current tax on drug makers and loosen requirements for Medicaid drug rebates and Medicare part D discounts. On the other hand, if repealing the ACA reduces the number of people insured, spending on pharmaceuticals would fall. Similarly, if Trump renegotiates international trade deals, pharmaceutical firms could benefit from stronger markets or longer patent exclusivity rights, or they could suffer if foreign countries abandon trade agreements altogether or retaliate with disadvantageous terms.

Yet, with drug spending up 8.5 percent last year and recent pricing scandals launched by 500+ percentage increases in individual drugs (i.e., Martin Shkreli, Valeant Pharmaceuticals, Mylan), the current debate over drug pricing is unlikely to fade. Even a Republican-led Congress and White House is likely to heed the public outcry and do something about drug prices.

Drug makers would be wise to stave off any government-imposed price restrictions by voluntarily limiting price increases on important drugs. Major pharmaceutical company Allergan has recently done just this by issuing a “social contract with patients” that made several drug pricing commitments to its customers. Among other assurances, Allergan has promised to limit price increases to single-digit percentage increases and no longer engage in the common industry tactic of dramatically increasing prices for branded drugs nearing patent expiry. Last year throughout the pharmaceutical industry, the prices of the most commonly-used brand drugs increased by over 16 percent and, in the last two years before patent expiry, drug makers increased the list prices of drugs by an average of 35 percent. Thus, Allergan’s commitment will produce significant savings over the life of a product, creating hundreds of millions of dollars in savings to health plans, patients, and the health care system.

If Allergan can make this commitment for its entire drug inventory—over 80+ drugs—why haven’t other companies done the same? Similar commitments by other drug makers might be enough to prevent lawmakers from turning to market-distorting reforms, such as price controls, that could end up doing more harm than good for consumers, the pharmaceutical industry, and long-term innovation.

In recent years, aggressive antitrust enforcement overseas has increasingly targeted some of America’s most successful and innovative companies, such as Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Qualcomm.  Inadequate foreign due process and insufficient protection for American intellectual property rights are a feature of many foreign antitrust actions, which threaten to undermine key American producers – harming U.S. workers and the U.S. economy.

On December 6, the Heritage Foundation will convene a lunch-time panel of experts (12-1:00 pm), including current and former top government officials, who will explore the nature of this new challenge to American competitiveness and discuss what the Trump Administration should do to confront this growing problem.  Please feel free to attend this program in person, or watch it streamed live at Heritage.org.  A link providing information about this high profile event is here.

As Truth on the Market readers prepare to enjoy their Thanksgiving dinners, let me offer some (hopefully palatable) “food for thought” on a competition policy for the new Trump Administration.  In referring to competition policy, I refer not just to lawsuits directed against private anticompetitive conduct, but more broadly to efforts aimed at curbing government regulatory barriers that undermine the competitive process.

Public regulatory barriers are a huge problem.  Their costs have been highlighted by prestigious international research bodies such as the OECD and World Bank, and considered by the International Competition Network’s Advocacy Working Group.  Government-imposed restrictions on competition benefit powerful incumbents and stymie entry by innovative new competitors.  (One manifestation of this that is particularly harmful for American workers and denies job opportunities to millions of lower-income Americans is occupational licensing, whose increasing burdens are delineated in a substantial body of research – see, for example, a 2015 Obama Administration White House Report and a 2016 Heritage Foundation Commentary that explore the topic.)  Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Justice Department (DOJ) antitrust officials should consider emphasizing “state action” lawsuits aimed at displacing entry barriers and other unwarranted competitive burdens imposed by self-interested state regulatory boards.  When the legal prerequisites for such enforcement actions are not met, the FTC and the DOJ should ramp up their “competition advocacy” efforts, with the aim of convincing state regulators to avoid adopting new restraints on competition – and, where feasible, eliminating or curbing existing restraints.

The FTC and DOJ also should be authorized by the White House to pursue advocacy initiatives whose goal is to dismantle or lessen the burden of excessive federal regulations (such advocacy played a role in furthering federal regulatory reform during the Ford and Carter Administrations).  To bolster those initiatives, the Trump Administration should consider establishing a high-level federal task force on procompetitive regulatory reform, in the spirit of previous reform initiatives.  The task force would report to the president and include senior level representatives from all federal agencies with regulatory responsibilities.  The task force could examine all major regulatory and statutory schemes overseen by Executive Branch and independent agencies, and develop a list of specific reforms designed to reduce federal regulatory impediments to robust competition.  Those reforms could be implemented through specific regulatory changes or legislative proposals, as the case might require.  The task force would have ample material to work with – for example, anticompetitive cartel-like output restrictions, such as those allowed under federal agricultural orders, are especially pernicious.  In addition to specific cartel-like programs, scores of regulatory regimes administered by individual federal agencies impose huge costs and merit particular attention, as documented in the Heritage Foundation’s annual “Red Tape Rising” reports that document the growing burden of federal regulation (see, for example, the 2016 edition of Red Tape Rising).

With respect to traditional antitrust enforcement, the Trump Administration should emphasize sound, empirically-based economic analysis in merger and non-merger enforcement.  They should also adopt a “decision-theoretic” approach to enforcement, to the greatest extent feasible.  Specifically, in developing their enforcement priorities, in considering case selection criteria, and in assessing possible new (or amended) antitrust guidelines, DOJ and FTC antitrust enforcers should recall that antitrust is, like all administrative systems, inevitably subject to error costs.  Accordingly, Trump Administration enforcers should be mindful of the outstanding insights provide by Judge (and Professor) Frank Easterbrook on the harm from false positives in enforcement (which are more easily corrected by market forces than false negatives), and by Justice (and Professor) Stephen Breyer on the value of bright line rules and safe harbors, supported by sound economic analysis.  As to specifics, the DOJ and FTC should issue clear statements of policy on the great respect that should be accorded the exercise of intellectual property rights, to correct Obama antitrust enforcers’ poor record on intellectual property protection (see, for example, here).  The DOJ and the FTC should also accord greater respect to the efficiencies associated with unilateral conduct by firms possessing market power, and should consider reissuing an updated and revised version of the 2008 DOJ Report on Single Firm Conduct).

With regard to international competition policy, procedural issues should be accorded high priority.  Full and fair consideration by enforcers of all relevant evidence (especially economic evidence) and the views of all concerned parties ensures that sound analysis is brought to bear in enforcement proceedings and, thus, that errors in antitrust enforcement are minimized.  Regrettably, a lack of due process in foreign antitrust enforcement has become a matter of growing concern to the United States, as foreign competition agencies proliferate and increasingly bring actions against American companies.  Thus, the Trump Administration should make due process problems in antitrust a major enforcement priority.  White House-level support (ensuring the backing of other key Executive Branch departments engaged in foreign economic policy) for this priority may be essential, in order to strengthen the U.S. Government’s hand in negotiations and consultations with foreign governments on process-related concerns.

Finally, other international competition policy matters also merit close scrutiny by the new Administration.  These include such issues as the inappropriate imposition of extraterritorial remedies on American companies by foreign competition agencies; the harmful impact of anticompetitive foreign regulations on American businesses; and inappropriate attacks on the legitimate exercise of intellectual property by American firms (in particular, American patent holders).  As in the case of process-related concerns, White House attention and broad U.S. Government involvement in dealing with these problems may be essential.

That’s all for now, folks.  May you all enjoy your turkey and have a blessed Thanksgiving with friends and family.

Neil TurkewitzTruth on the Market is delighted to welcome our newest blogger, Neil Turkewitz. Neil is the newly minted Senior Policy Counsel at the International Center for Law & Economics (so we welcome him to ICLE, as well!).

Prior to joining ICLE, Neil spent 30 years at the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), most recently as Executive Vice President, International.

Neil has spent most of his career working to expand economic opportunities for the music industry through modernization of copyright legislation and effective enforcement in global markets. He has worked closely with creative communities around the globe, with the US and foreign governments, and with international organizations (including WIPO and the WTO), to promote legal and enforcement reforms to respond to evolving technology, and to promote a balanced approach to digital trade and Internet governance premised upon the importance of regulatory coherence, elimination of inefficient barriers to global communications, and respect for Internet freedom and the rule of law.

Among other things, Neil was instrumental in the negotiation of the WTO TRIPS Agreement, worked closely with the US and foreign governments in the negotiation of free trade agreements, helped to develop the OECD’s Communique on Principles for Internet Policy Making, coordinated a global effort culminating in the production of the WIPO Internet Treaties, served as a formal advisor to the Secretary of Commerce and the USTR as Vice-Chairman of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights, and served as a member of the Board of the Chamber of Commerce’s Global Intellectual Property Center.

You can read some of his thoughts on Internet governance, IP, and international trade here and here.

Welcome Neil!

In an October 25 blog commentary posted at this site, Geoffrey Manne and Kristian Stout argued against a proposed Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ban on the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in internet service providers’ consumer service agreements.  This proposed ban is just one among many unfortunate features in the latest misguided effort by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate the privacy of data transmitted over the Internet (FCC Privacy NPRM), discussed by me in an October 27, 2016 Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum:

The growth of the Internet economy has highlighted the costs associated with the unauthorized use of personal information transmitted online. The federal government’s consumer protection agency, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), has taken enforcement actions for online privacy violations based on its authority to proscribe “unfair or deceptive” practices affecting commerce. The FTC’s economically influenced case-by-case approach to privacy violations focuses on practices that harm consumers. The FCC has proposed a rule that that would impose intrusive privacy regulation on broadband Internet service providers (but not other Internet companies), without regard to consumer harm.  If implemented, the FCC’s rule would impose major economic costs and would interfere with neutral implementation of the FTC’s less intrusive approach, as well as the FTC’s lead role in federal regulatory privacy coordination with foreign governments.

My analysis concludes with the following recommendations:

The FCC’s Privacy NPRM is at odds with the pro-competitive, economic welfare enhancing goals of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. It ignores the limitations imposed by that act and, if implemented, would harm consumers and producers and slow innovation. This prompts four recommendations.

The FCC should withdraw the NPRM and leave it to the FTC to oversee all online privacy practices under its Section 5 unfairness and deception authority. The adoption of the Privacy Shield, which designates the FTC as the responsible American privacy oversight agency, further strengthens the case against FCC regulation in this area.

In overseeing online privacy practices, the FTC should employ a very light touch that stresses economic analysis and cost-benefit considerations. Moreover, it should avoid requiring that rigid privacy policy conditions be kept in place for long periods of time through consent decree conditions, in order to allow changing market conditions to shape and improve business privacy policies.

Moreover, the FTC should borrow a page from former FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright by implementing an “economic approach” to privacy.  Under such an approach, FTC economists would help make the commission a privacy “thought leader” by developing a rigorous academic research agenda on the economics of privacy, featuring the economic evaluation of industry sectors and practices;

The FTC would bear the burden of proof in showing that violations of a company’s privacy policy are material to consumer decision-making;

FTC economists would report independently to the FTC about proposed privacy-related enforcement initiatives; and

The FTC would publish the views of its Bureau of Economics in all privacy-related consent decrees that are placed on the public record.

The FTC should encourage the European Commission and other foreign regulators to take into account the economics of privacy in developing their privacy regulatory policies. In so doing, it should emphasize that innovation is harmed, the beneficial development of the Internet is slowed, and consumer welfare and rights are undermined through highly prescriptive regulation in this area (well-intentioned though it may be). Relatedly, the FTC and other U.S. government negotiators should argue against adoption of a “one-size-fits-all” global privacy regulation framework.  Such a global framework could harmfully freeze into place over-regulatory policies and preclude beneficial experimentation in alternative forms of “lighter-touch” regulation and enforcement.

Although not a panacea, these recommendations would help deter (or, at least, constrain) the economically harmful government micromanagement of businesses’ privacy practices in the United States and abroad.  The Internet economy would in turn benefit from such a restraint on the grasping hand of big government.

Stay tuned.