Site icon Truth on the Market

Brazil Is Counting Votes Before Counting the Costs of Digital Regulation

Even as Brazil’s government is racing to find the votes for a sweeping digital-markets law, it’s still struggling to explain why the country needs it.

The Chamber of Deputies, Brazil’s lower house, is expected to vote tomorrow, Nov. 17, on Bill 4,675/2025. The bill would let the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), Brazil’s antitrust authority, designate digital platforms as “systemically relevant” and impose special obligations without first establishing an antitrust violation. For a closer look at the proposal (in Portuguese), I recommend my colleague Dario Oliveira Neto’s analysis on LinkedIn.

As Valor Econômico reported Nov. 13, the bill’s rapporteur, Aliel Machado—the lawmaker tasked with reviewing the proposal and recommending a text for the chamber to consider—has been courting centrist parties to secure passage. The government appears close enough to a majority to consider a vote, but whether it has one remains unclear. Negotiations today and tomorrow will determine whether the vote goes ahead.

The government has a clear political reason to move quickly, but hasn’t shown an economic reason to do the same. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration wants to advance its legislative priorities before a more right-leaning Congress takes office in February. Chamber Speaker Hugo Motta decides which bills reach the floor, giving him considerable leverage as he seeks another term as speaker.

Scheduling a vote and winning it are separate questions, though bringing the bill to the floor would likely signal that its sponsors believe they have the votes. Even if it passes the chamber, it would face another round of debate in the Senate, where approval is far from assured.

Those calculations explain the rush, but don’t make the case for the policy. In July, the Brazilian Chamber of the Digital Economy warned that the proposal lacked published impact analyses measuring its costs and consequences. Supporters invoke foreign precedents, consumer protection, opportunities for smaller businesses, and platforms’ political influence. Each claim merits scrutiny, and none answers the central questions on its own: What competition problem requires these new powers, and why should Brazilians expect the benefits to exceed the costs?

A Thriving Market Is Not a Regulatory Emergency

The growth of Brazil’s digital economy makes the need for urgent intervention harder to explain. According to the São Paulo State Federation of Trade in Goods, Services, and Tourism (FecomercioSP), e-commerce sales grew from R55.9 billion in 2016 to R295.6 billion in 2025, rising 20% in the last year alone. Marketplaces, app stores, search engines, and social-media advertising help sellers reach customers across Brazil. A business in the northeastern state of Paraíba can now sell to a customer thousands of miles away in Porto Alegre, a southern city, at a fraction of what reaching that customer would have cost in 2010.

Growth alone doesn’t prove that every market is competitive or that every platform treats businesses and consumers fairly. But lawmakers need to weigh the bill’s promised benefits against the risk of disrupting services Brazilians already use. Would the proposed rules improve on today’s digital economy once higher costs, fewer features, or delays in launching new services enter the calculation?

The bill’s supporters promise entry, innovation, and consumer choice. Paulo Henrique de Oliveira, chief of staff to CADE’s president, argues that the proposal would promote all three. As he put it, translated from Portuguese:

Delaying the opening of markets also costs opportunities for investment and innovation.

Felipe Roquete, CADE’s acting superintendent-general, who oversees its investigative arm, shared Oliveira’s argument approvingly.

Those are goals, not evidence that this bill would achieve them. Before imposing these obligations, lawmakers need to show how they would open markets, encourage investment, or give consumers better choices.

Keeping Up With the Regulators

Supporters also argue that Brazil needs to catch up with the rest of the world. But the jurisdictions cited as models—the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan—have taken different approaches to deciding which businesses to regulate and what obligations to impose. Japan’s smartphone law, for example, targets specific mobile-software activities of Apple and Google, including Apple’s Japanese subsidiary. It doesn’t give regulators a general mandate to redesign the digital economy.

Other governments have sought more evidence before settling on an approach. India commissioned a market study before finalizing its proposed digital-competition framework, including the thresholds that determine which companies and services would fall under its rules. Brazil could follow that example: establish the basis for intervention before committing to it.

Brazil can learn from other countries’ approaches, but it still needs evidence that the proposed rules would address problems in its own markets. The fact that another government has adopted similar rules doesn’t show that those rules have delivered benefits there—or would do so in Brazil.

Please Read the Consumer-Protection Fine Print

Supporters also argue that the bill would protect consumers. To assess that claim, lawmakers need to show how its rules would improve on the prices, features, and services Brazilians already enjoy. Many digital services are free; others offer products and features people willingly pay for. Offering free services or products people willingly buy doesn’t exempt a company from competition law. But lawmakers must account for the value those services provide when weighing the benefits and risks of intervention.

It’s easy to imagine how existing services could improve. Sound policymaking also asks how regulation could make them worse.

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) offers reasons for caution. An Apple-funded study examined products from developers that adopted Apple’s alternative business terms in the European Union, which reduced the commissions they paid. Prices stayed the same or rose for more than 90% of the products studied. That finding doesn’t settle the DMA’s overall effects, but it challenges the assumption that lower platform fees automatically translate into lower consumer prices.

Rules intended to stop platforms from favoring their own services can also make those services harder to use. Restrictions on connecting services affect how consumers move between search results, maps, shopping, and bookings. Giving a competing intermediary—a separate service that connects buyers and sellers—greater visibility may mean making customers take extra steps.

The stakes extend beyond convenience. Uncertainty about regulatory requirements can affect when companies launch products and features. The DMA doesn’t explain every delayed European launch; privacy rules, other regulations, and commercial decisions also matter. But Brazil should assess whether new obligations could delay access to useful technology, especially artificial intelligence.

For workers and businesses, a six-month delay can mean six months of lost productivity gains. A policy sold as promoting innovation should also account for how it affects people’s ability to put innovation to work.

Redistribution Is Not the Same as Competition

Supporters also argue that regulation will shift revenue from large platforms to smaller businesses. Europe’s experience suggests that other large companies may instead capture the gains intended for smaller businesses.

When Google changed its search results to comply with the DMA, hotels warned that the redesign could make them more dependent on booking intermediaries. Hotel-technology company Mirai compared Google Hotel Ads performance across markets covered by the DMA and those outside it, using a sample of 3,450 hotels. It reported a 30% decline in clicks and a drop of as much as 36% in direct bookings associated with the changes. Those findings cover a specific advertising channel and sample of hotels, but they illustrate a concrete tradeoff: rules that constrain one intermediary can strengthen others.

Platforms are private businesses seeking profits. If regulation restricts one source of revenue, they have incentives to recover it elsewhere by charging different fees, cutting investment, or changing their services. Who ultimately bears those costs depends on market conditions. Lawmakers can’t assume that every dollar a platform loses becomes a dollar gained by consumers or local startups.

The businesses best positioned to benefit may not be small or Brazilian, either. Large international app developers and intermediaries have ample resources, their own regulatory strategies, and commercial interests to pursue. Giving them more bargaining power may shift profits among well-funded companies without creating more value.

Competition policy needs a credible explanation of how consumers would benefit. A list of companies that would like to pay their suppliers less won’t do.

Political Grievances Seek an Antitrust Remedy

Supporters also point to platforms’ political influence. Lula has linked his calls for regulation to complaints about outside interference through digital platforms. Yet the bill’s rapporteur insists that the proposal concerns economic regulation, not online content. The government has mounted a public campaign to stress that distinction.

Bill 4,675 would regulate platforms’ business practices, not decide what political content they can carry. If supporters cite platforms’ handling of political speech as a reason to pass it, they need to explain how the bill’s competition powers would address those concerns.

If the concern is election advertising, transparency, or the treatment of political candidates, lawmakers should identify the problem and address it through the appropriate legal framework. Politicians’ distrust of platforms doesn’t establish a case for rules governing app stores, how services connect and work together, or how platforms rank commercial offerings.

Supporters also cite procedural safeguards. Oliveira argues that the bill would preserve CADE’s duty to assess evidence, explain its decisions, and dismiss proceedings when warranted. He notes that existing law already lets certain public bodies trigger investigations and describes the proposal as an adaptation of that mechanism.

Those safeguards deserve consideration, but they don’t establish the economic case for the powers themselves. CADE could follow every procedural requirement and still impose obligations whose benefits remain uncertain. Requiring the agency to explain a decision doesn’t show that the intervention will improve competition.

Count the Costs Before Counting the Votes

Brazil’s digital markets deserve scrutiny. But supporters still need to identify the competition problems that require new powers and explain why CADE’s existing tools can’t adequately address them.

The bill would let CADE impose special obligations on designated platforms without first finding that they violated competition law. Supporters argue that this would let CADE prevent harm before it occurs. But lawmakers also need to weigh the risk of imposing costly restrictions on business practices without evidence that those practices harm competition or that the restrictions would benefit consumers.

Negotiations today and tomorrow may settle whether the government has enough votes to pass the bill in the Chamber. They won’t answer those economic questions. And even a successful Chamber vote would begin, rather than end, the Senate’s responsibility to examine them.

The government may be close to assembling a majority. It still needs to assemble a case.

Exit mobile version