I received word today that Douglass North passed away yesterday at the age of 95 (obit here). Professor North shared the Nobel Prize in Economic with Robert Fogel in 1993 for his work in economic history on the role of institutions in shaping economic development and performance.

Doug was one of my first professors in graduate school at Washington University. Many of us in our first year crammed into Doug’s economic history class for fear that he might retire and we not get the chance to study under him. Little did we expect that he would continue teaching into his DoughNorth_color_300-doc80s. The text for our class was the pre-publication manuscript of his book, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Doug’s course offered an interesting juxtaposition to the traditional neoclassical microeconomics course for first-year PhD students. His work challenged the simplifying assumptions of the neoclassical system and shed a whole new light on understanding economic history, development and performance. I still remember that day in October 1993 when the department was abuzz with the announcement that Doug had received the Nobel Prize. It was affirming and inspiring.

As I started work on my dissertation, I had hoped to incorporate a historical component on the early development of crude oil futures trading in the 1930s so I could get Doug involved on my committee. Unfortunately, there was not enough information still available to provide any analysis (there was one news reference to a new crude futures exchange, but nothing more–and the historical records of the NY Mercantile Exchange had been lost in a fire).and I had to focus solely on the deregulatory period of the late 1970s and early 1980s. I remember joking at one of our economic history workshops that I wasn’t sure if it counted as economic history since it happened during Doug’s lifetime.

Doug was one of the founding conspirators for the International Society for New Institutional Economics (now the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics) in 1997, along with Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. Although the three had strong differences of opinions concerning certain aspects of their respective theoretical approaches, they understood the generally complementary nature of their work and its importance not just for the economic profession, but for understanding how societies and organizations perform and evolve and the role institutions play in that process.

The opportunity to work around these individuals, particularly with North and Coase, strongly shaped and influenced my understanding not only of economics, but of why a broader perspective of economics is so important for understanding the world around us. That experience profoundly affected my own research interests and my teaching of economics. Some of Doug’s papers continue to play an important role in courses I teach on economic policy. Students, especially international students, continue to be inspired by his explanation of the roles of institutions, how they affect markets and societies, and the forces that lead to institutional change.

As we prepare to celebrate Thanksgiving in the States, Doug’s passing is a reminder of how much I have to be thankful for over my career. I’m grateful for having had the opportunity to know and to work with Doug. I’m grateful that we had an opportunity to bring him to Mizzou in 2003 for our CORI Seminar series, at which he spoke on Understanding the Process of Economic Change (the title of his next book at the time). And I’m especially thankful for the influence he had on my understanding of economics and that his ideas will continue to shape economic thinking and economic policy for years to come.

In Collins Inkjet Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (2015) (subsequently settled, leading to a withdrawal of Kodak’s petition for certiorari), the Sixth Circuit elected to apply the Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth “bundled discount attribution price-cost” methodology in upholding a preliminary injunction against Kodak’s policy of discounting the price of refurbished Kodak printheads to customers who purchased ink from Kodak, rather than from Collins.  This case illustrates the incoherence and economic irrationality of current tying doctrine, and the need for Supreme Court guidance – hopefully sooner rather than later.

The key factual and legal findings in this case, set forth by the Sixth Circuit, were as follows:

Collins is Kodak’s competitor for selling ink for Versamark printers manufactured by Kodak. Users of Versamark printers must periodically replace a printer component called a printhead; Kodak is the only provider of replacement “refurbished printheads” for such printers. In July 2013, Kodak adopted a pricing policy that raised the cost of replacing Versamark printheads, but only for customers not purchasing Kodak ink. Collins filed suit, arguing that this amounts to a tying arrangement prohibited under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, because it is designed to monopolize the Versamark ink market. Collins sought a preliminary injunction barring Kodak from charging Collins’ customers a higher price for refurbished printheads. The district court issued the preliminary injunction, finding a strong likelihood that Kodak’s pricing policy was a non-explicit tie that coerced Versamark owners into buying Kodak ink and that Kodak possessed sufficient market power in the market for refurbished printheads to make the tie effective.

On appeal, Kodak challenges both the legal standard the district court applied to find whether customers were coerced into using Kodak ink and the district court’s preliminary factual findings. In evaluating the likelihood of success on the merits, the district court applied a standard that unduly favored Collins to determine whether customers were coerced into buying Kodak ink. The court examined whether the policy made it likely that all or almost all customers would switch to Kodak ink, but did not examine whether this would be the result of unreasonable conduct on Kodak’s part. A tying arrangement enforced entirely through differential pricing of the tying product contravenes the Sherman Act only if the pricing policy is economically equivalent to selling the tied product below cost. The record makes it difficult to determine conclusively Kodak’s ink production costs, but the available evidence suggests that Kodak was worse off when customers bought both products, meaning that it was in effect selling ink at a loss. Thus, Collins was likely to succeed on the merits even under the correct standard.  Furthermore, the district court was correct in its consideration of the other factors for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction was not an abuse of discretion.

The Sixth Circuit’s Collins Inkjet opinion nicely illustrates the current unsatisfactory state of tying law from an economic perspective.  Unlike in various other areas of antitrust law, such as vertical restraints, exclusionary conduct, and enforcement, the Supreme Court has failed to apply a law and economics standard to tying.  It came close on two occasions, with four Justices supporting a rule of reason standard for tying in Jefferson Parish, and with a Supreme Court majority acknowledging that “[m]any tying arrangements . . . are fully consistent with a free, competitive market” in Independent Ink (which held that it should not be presumed that a patented tying product conveyed market power).  Nevertheless, despite the broad scholarly recognition that tying may generate major economic efficiencies (even when the tying product conveys substantial market power), tying still remains subject to a peculiar rule of limited per se illegality, which is triggered when:  (1) two separate products or services are involved; (2) the sale or agreement to sell one is conditioned on the purchase of the other; (3) the seller has sufficient economic power in the market for the tying product to enable it to restrain trade in the market for the tied product; and (4) a “not insubstantial amount” of interstate commerce in the tied product is affected.  Unfortunately, it is quite possible for plaintiffs to shoehorn much welfare-enhancing conduct into this multipart test, creating a welfare-inimical disincentive for efficiency-seeking businesses to engage in such conduct.  (The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit refused to apply the per se rule to platform software in United States v. Microsoft, but other appellate courts have not been similarly inclined to flout Supreme Court precedent.)

Courts that are concerned with the efficient application of antitrust may nonetheless evade the confines of the per se rule in appropriate instances, by applying economic reasoning to the factual context presented and finding particular test conditions not met.  The Sixth Circuit’s Collins Inkjet opinion, unfortunately, failed to do so.  It is seriously problematic, in at least four respects.

First, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion agreed with the district court that “coercive” behavior created an “implicit tie,” despite the absence of formal contractual provisions that explicitly tied Kodak’s ink to sale of its refurbished printheads.

Second, it ignored potential vigorous and beneficial ex ante competition among competing producers of printers to acquire customers, which would have negated a finding of significant economic power in the printer market and thereby precluded per se condemnation.

Third, it incorrectly applied the PeaceHealth standard to the facts at hand due to faulty economic reasoning.  For a finding of anticompetitive (“exclusionary”) bundled discounting, PeaceHealth requires that, after all discounts are applied to the “competitive” product, “the resulting price of the competitive product or products is below the defendant’s incremental cost to produce them”.  In Collins Inkjet, all that was known was that Kodak “stood to make more money if customers bought ink from Collins and paid Kodak’s unmatched printhead refurbishment price than if they bought Kodak ink and paid the matched printhead refurbishment price.”  Absent additional information, however, this merely supported a finding that Kodak’s tied ink was priced below its average total cost, not below its (far lower) incremental cost.  (Applying PeaceHealth, the Collins Inkjet court attributed the printhead discount entirely to Kodak’s ink, the tied product.)  In short, absent this error in reasoning (ironically, the court justified its flawed cost analysis “as a matter of formal logic”), the Sixth Circuit could not have based a finding of anticompetitive conduct on the PeaceHealth precedent.

Fourth, and more generally, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, in its blinkered search for a “modern” (PeaceHealth) finely-calibrated test to apply in this instance, lost sight of the Supreme Court’s broad teaching in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. that antitrust law was designed to be “a consumer welfare prescription.”  Kodak’s pricing policy that offered discounts to buyers of its printheads and ink yielded lower prices to consumers.  There was no showing that Collins Inkjet would likely be driven out of business, or, even if it were, that consumers would eventually be harmed.  Absent any showing of likely anticompetitive effects, vertical contractual provisions, including tying, should not be subject to antitrust challenge.  Indeed, as Professor (and former Federal Trade Commissioner) Joshua Wright and I have pointed out:

[T]he potential efficiencies associated with . . . tying . . . and the fact that [tying is] prevalent in markets without significant antitrust market power, lead most commentators to believe that [it is] . . . generally procompetitive and should be analyzed under some form of rule of reason analysis. . . .  [T]he adoption of a rule of reason for tying and presumptions of legality for [tying] . . . under certain circumstances may be long overdue.  

In sum, it is high time for the Supreme Court to take an appropriate case and clarify that tying arrangements (whether explicit or “coerced”) are subject to the rule of reason, with full recognition of tying’s efficiencies.  Such a holding would enable businesses to engage in a wider variety of efficient contracts, thereby promoting consumer welfare.

Finally, while it is at it, the Court should also consider taking a loyalty discount case, to reduce harmful uncertainty in this important area (caused by such economically irrational precedents as LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M) and establish a clear standard to guide the business community.  If it takes a loyalty discount case, the Court could beneficially draw upon Wright’s observation that “economic theory and evidence suggest[s] that instances of anticompetitive loyalty discounts will be relatively rare,” and his recommendation that “an exclusive dealing framework . . . be applied in such cases.”

My Office Door

Thom Lambert —  12 November 2015 — 5 Comments

University professors often post things on their office doors—photos, news clippings, conference posters, political cartoons.   I’ve never been much for that.  The objective, I assume, is to express something about yourself: who you are, what interests you, what values you hold.  I’ve never participated in this custom because I haven’t wanted to alienate students who might not share my views.  That’s not to suggest that I’m shy about those views.  I will—and regularly do—share them with students, even those who I know disagree with me.  But if posting my views on the door were to dissuade students from coming to me to discuss those views (and contrary ones), I would be losing the opportunity to have a meaningful dialogue.  Plus, my tastes veer toward minimalism, and doors covered with postings are ugly. Thus, no postings.

Until today.  My institution, the University of Missouri, is at a crossroads.  We can be a place where ideas—even unpopular ones—are  freely expressed, exchanged, and scrutinized.  Or we can be a place where everyone’s feelings are protected at all times.   It’s one or the other.

Tuesday morning, I opened an email and thought, “What a great prank. It looks so official!”  The email, which was from the MU Police, read as follows:

To continue to ensure that the University of Missouri campus remains safe, the MU Police Department (MUPD) is asking individuals who witness incidents of hateful and/or hurtful speech or actions to:

  • Call the police immediately at 573-882-7201. (If you are in an emergency situation, dial 911.)
  • Give the communications operator a summary of the incident, including location.
  • Provide a detailed description of the individual(s) involved.
  • Provide a license plate and vehicle descriptions (if appropriate).
  • If possible and if it can be done safely, take a photo of the individual(s) with your cell phone.

Delays, including posting information to social media, can often reduce the chances of identifying the responsible parties. While cases of hateful and hurtful speech are not crimes, if the individual(s) identified are students, MU’s Office of Student Conduct can take disciplinary action.

As it turns out, it was no joke.  Anyone on my campus who witnesses “hurtful speech” is directed to call campus police—individuals who carry guns, drive squad cars, and regularly arrest people. Now rest assured, “cases of hateful and hurtful speech are not crimes.”  They can give rise to, at most, “disciplinary action” by the MU Office of Student Conduct.  But still, isn’t it a bit unsettling—chilling, even—to think that if you say something “hurtful” at Mizzou (e.g., gay marriage is an abomination, affirmative action is unfair and hurts those it is ostensibly designed to help, Christians who oppose gay marriage are bigots, Islam is not a religion of peace, white men are privileged in a way that leads to undeserved rewards, culture matters in cultivating success, Republicans are dumb), the police may track you down and you may be required to defend yourself before the student conduct committee?  Perhaps the MU Police, or whoever crafted that email (let’s get real…it wasn’t the police), didn’t really mean that all hurtful speech is potentially problematic.  But if that’s the case, then why did they word the email as they did?  Pandering to an unreasonable element, maybe?

Contrast Mizzou’s approach to that taken by Purdue University.  The day after the Mizzou email, Purdue president Mitch Daniels reminded members of the Purdue community that their school actually stands for both tolerance AND free speech.  Here’s his letter:

Purdue Letter


The contrast between Mizzou and Purdue couldn’t be starker.  And it really, really matters.  I hope that posting these two documents on my door (along with this spot-on Wall Street Journal editorial) will not dissuade students from engaging in dialogue with me.  But I can’t be demure on this one.  So I now have—much to my aesthetic chagrin—a decorated office door.  Please come in and talk, even if you think I’m wrong.


Today, thirty-nine different companies and policy experts from a wide swath of the political spectrum signed a letter urging lawmakers to create a “portable benefits” platform that will enable sharing economy companies to continue innovating while simultaneously providing desirable social safety net benefits to workers. This is well timed, as there is a growing consensus among lawmakers (such as Senator Warner) that “something must be done” to provide benefits to workers in the so-called “gig economy.”

In total, the thirty-nine signatories to the letter are pushing for changes to existing law based on a set of principles holding that benefits should be:

  1. Independent;
  2. Flexible and pro-rated;
  3. Portable;
  4. Universal; and
  5. Supportive of innovation

In a nutshell, this would effectively mean that there is some form of benefits available to gig economy workers that follows them around and is accessible regardless of who employs them (or, ostensibly, whether they are employed at all).

Looking past the text of the letter, this would likely entail a package of changes to existing law that would allow individual workers to utilize some form of privately created platform for managing the benefits that are normally obtained in a traditional employee-employer relationship. Such benefits would include, for instance, workers’ compensation, unemployment, disability, professional development, and retirement. A chief advantage of a portable benefits platform is that–much as in an underlying justification of the ACA–workers would no longer be tied to particular companies in order to enjoy these traditionally employer-based benefits.

Although platform-based work facilitated by smartphone apps is cutting edge, there is historical precedent for this approach to the provision of benefits. Unions have long relied upon multi-employer plans for providing benefits, and the healthcare industry developed portable health savings accounts as a means to free individuals from employer-bound health insurance plans. And the industry has been seeking fully private solutions to these sorts of problems for some time. For instance, Uber recently partnered with Stride Health to provide health insurance benefits to verified drivers.

There will, of course, be some necessary legislative changes in order to make these portable benefits platforms a reality. First, there probably needs to be a provision in the tax code that allows for workers’ contributions to their own plans to receive the same tax-favored treatment that traditional employer-based benefits receive (or, even better, the political give-away would need to be removed from employer-based benefits). Additionally, companies would need to be able to make optional matching contributions with a similar tax treatment. And lurking in the background of all of this is the specter of a large number of employer obligations. Thus, a necessary quid pro quo to get sharing economy companies to pay into these platforms will be some form of safe harbor shielding them from further obligations.

This is a win for both companies and workers. The truth is that our labor market is very fractured–labor force participation rates are at a low, and those who are working remain chronically underemployed. Coupled with this reality, the technology that enables work is becoming ever more flexible and, as shown by their expressed preferences, individuals are clearly interested in the gig economy as a means of easily obtaining work as needed. A portable benefits platform could provide the sort of support to make flexible work a viable alternative to employee status.

And for many employers–sharing economy and non-sharing economy alike–removing antiquated legal strictures from the employment relationship promises a number of increased efficiencies. Particularly in the context of sharing economy companies, this will include the ability to exert some form of control over platform workers without being sucked into an onerous employer-employee relationship.

For instance, Instacart recently moved a number of its platform workers to part-time employee status. Although the decision was very likely multi-faceted, a big part of it had to be Instacart’s desire to give training and guidance to the shoppers who provided services to the platform’s consumers (for instance, instructing them on the best sequence in which to pick groceries in order to ensure maximum freshness). However, to provide any modest degree of oversight would likely mean that Instacart would move from empowering contractors to directing employees, and thereby run into a thicket of labor laws.

Yet why should this particular employee classification be necessary? Platform-based work is a revolutionary way to defeat the traditional transaction costs that justified large, centrally-organized firms. Companies like Uber and Instacart enable what otherwise would have been fallow resources–spare labor, unused cars, and the like–to be fitted to consumer demand.

Moreover, forcing rigid employee classifications upon sharing economy workers will only reintroduce inefficiency into the worker-company relationship. Instead of allowing workers to sign on just for the amount of work they are willing to do, and allowing consumers just to purchase the amount of work they desire, an employee classification essentially requires companies to purchase labor in blocks of hours. At scale, this necessarily introduces allocation and pricing errors into the system. If a smart safe harbor is included in any legislative push for a portable benefits platform, companies could have much more flexibility in directing platform workers.

I am excited to see this development emerging from the industry and from policy makers, and I look forward to the response of our lawmakers (although, this being election season, I don’t expect too much from that response — at least not yet). There is understably a lot of concern about the welfare of workers in the new economy. But it’s important not to lose the innovative new ways of working, producing, and consuming that the modern digital economy affords by resorting to ill-fitted legal regimes from the past.

Today, in ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that electronic transmissions of digital data from abroad do not involve the importation of “articles” for purposes of Section 337 of the Tariff Act (“Section 337,” 19 U.S.C. § 1337), thereby stripping the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) of jurisdiction over infringement of intellectual property (IP) facilitated through such transmissions.  If allowed to stand, this unfortunate and ill-reasoned 2-1 panel decision will incentivize IP infringement schemes involving data imports, thereby harming U.S. IP holders (including holders of federally-protected patents, copyrights, trademarks, and designs) and rewarding unfair methods of import competition, contrary to the broad statutory purpose of Section 337.

Align Technology, Inc. held various patents covering the production of orthodontic tooth-straightening appliances, known as aligners.  ClearCorrect Operating, LLC (“ClearCorrect US”) used patented Align Technology without authorization to create digital models of patients’ teeth, and electronically transmitted those models to its Pakistani affiliate, Clear Correct Pakistan.  The Pakistani affiliate manipulated those models and then transmitted final digital models back to the United States, which ClearCorrect US utilized to make orthodontic aligners.  Align Technology complained to the ITC, which found that Clear Correct Pakistan engaged in infringing activity in Pakistan and that data transmission of its digital models to the U.S. violated Section 337(a)(1)(B)(ii), in that it involved the importation of articles covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent.  ClearCorrect appealed the ITC’s determination to the Federal Circuit.

Judge Sharon Prost’s majority opinion, while conceding that the term “articles” is not defined in the Tariff Act, nevertheless found that because “dictionaries point to the fact that ‘articles’ means ‘material things’”, the term “’articles’ does not cover electronically transmitted digital data.”  Thus, finding the term “articles” to be clear (“commonsense dictates that there is a fundamental difference between electronic transmissions and ‘material things[.]’”), Judge Prost rejected the ITC’s findings under step one (is there statutory ambiguity) of Chevron deference analysis.  Even assuming that “articles” is ambiguous, however, Judge Prost held that the ITC’s interpretation of that term was “unreasonable,” and thus failed step two (was the agency’s interpretation permissible) of Chevron analysis.  Specifically, Judge Prost deemed the ITC’s definition as inconsistent with dictionary definitions and with the Tariff Act’s legislative history.

In her short concurring opinion, Judge Kathleen O’Malley reasoned that the ITC’s definition of “articles” would give it jurisdiction over all incoming international Internet data transmissions, something Congress had not foreseen – “[b]ecause Congress did not intend to delegate such authority to the Commission, I would find the two step Chevron inquiry inapplicable in this case”.  Judge O’Malley added, however, that assuming Chevron applies, “I agree with the majority’s ruling that the Commission erred when it determined that it had jurisdiction over the disputed digital data.”  (Judge O’Malley’s apparent concern that upholding the ITC’s determination would have given that agency excessive regulatory control over the Internet appears to wrongly conflate the protection of property rights through a targeted and carefully-tailored provision (Section 337) with far-reaching command and control regulation – something that is clearly beyond the scope of the ITC’s authority.)

In her dissent, Judge Pauline Newman pointed out that Section 337 was written in broad terms that are adaptable to changes in technology.  She noted compellingly that contrary to the majority’s crabbed reading of “articles,” the term “was intended to be all-encompassing”, and “[t]he Supreme Court [itself] defined ‘articles of commerce’ to include pure information”.  Accordingly, limiting Section 337’s application to the non-digital technology that existed in the 1920s and 1930s (when the statutory core of the Tariff Act was enacted) makes no sense.  Summing it up, Judge Newman trenchantly concluded that “[o]n any standard, the Commission’s determination is reasonable, and warrants respect.  The panel majority’s contrary ruling is not reasonable, on any standard.”

U.S. patentees are not the only IP holders that face serious harm from the Federal Circuit’s regrettable holding.  For example, the Motion Picture Association of America stated that “[t]his ruling, if it stands, would appear to reduce the authority of the ITC to address the scourge of overseas web sites that engage in blatant piracy of movies, television programs, music, books, and other copyrighted works”.

An en banc Federal Circuit (or, better yet Supreme Court) reversal of this decision would prove helpful, but judicial processes move slowly.  Given the potential for serious harm to U.S. IP-dependent industries stemming from this holding, Congress may wish to seriously consider clarifying that the term “articles” in Section 337 is applicable to all forms of commerce, including digital transmissions.

Unless you live under a rock, you know that the president and chancellor of the University of Missouri, where I teach law, have resigned in response to protests over their failure to respond to several (three identified) racist incidents on campus. A group called Concerned Student 1950 staged a series of protests and demanded, among other things, that our president resign, that he publicly denounce his white privilege, that the university mandate a “comprehensive racial awareness and inclusion curriculum,” and that the percentage of black faculty and staff be increased to 10% by the 2017-18 school year. Last week, a student embarked on a hunger strike until Concerned Student 1950’s demands were met, and students in solidarity moved into a tent village on one of our quads.  Over the weekend, the black members of our football team threatened to boycott play until the president resigned, and our coach, facing four straight losses and little prospect of another victory this season, agreed to support and publicize the boycott.  Yesterday morning, Mizzou faculty supporting the Concerned Student group walked out of their classes and headed to the quad, where faculty and administrators joined protesting students in blocking media access to the tent village in the middle of our public quad. Around 10:00 AM, the president resigned, and protesting students danced on the quad.  Toward the end of the day, the chancellor announced that he will move from his position at the end of the year.

The Mizzou Faculty Council and the administration of the law school have expressed to Mizzou students that the faculty fully supports them.  We faculty members have been encouraged to express that support ourselves.  I want to do that now.

I want to express my support for the students for a couple of reasons.  First, I really love Mizzou.  It’s a special place full of wonderful students.  I visited at the University of Minnesota a  few years back, and I couldn’t wait to get back to Mizzou.  Our students reflect the amazing diversity of our state: inner city kids from St. Louis and Kansas City, kids from the suburbs, kids with southern accents from the bootheel, kids with near-Minnesota accents from the northern part of the state, rich kids from fancy prep schools, poor kids who went to public school in the inner city or farm towns.  Unlike so many public law schools, Mizzou has kept its operating costs and its tuition at reasonable levels, so an education here is really open to just about all qualified students from the state.  (Minnesota’s in-state law school tuition is $41,222; Missouri’s is $19,545.)  We mix everyone together and end up with a wonderful student body.  I simply adore my students.

Second, I want to support students who have been the subject of racist remarks because I, too, have experienced the pain of being mocked, criticized, ridiculed, etc. for who I am.  I was a not-very-athletic gay kid who attended the very traditional and somewhat jockish Fairview Christian Academy.  I followed that up with Wheaton College, Billy Graham’s alma mater.  For most of my formative years, I was continually reminded that I was deficient, flawed, damned.  Express slurs were few and far between (though they occurred), but I was not accepted for who I am.  I know the pain of exclusion, and I want both to provide an empathetic ear to my students who feel excluded and to sound a prophetic voice against those who discriminate.

But I could not really support my Mizzou students in this difficult time if I did not point out a few things.

First–The top administrators of a school of 35,000 people cannot prevent all instances of racism.  Ignorant, mean people are sometimes going to yell slurs from their pick-up trucks when they drive through campus.  Drunken frat boys are occasionally going to say ugly things.  When you ambush the homecoming parade, to which parents have brought their small children for a rah-rah college experience, some people are not going to be nice to you.  Those ambushed may be taken aback and may not say all the right things.  People who draw things with poop are especially hard to control. Be prepared: The people who replace the deposed president and chancellor at Mizzou are unlikely to prevent every racist incident on our campus.

Second–The U.S. Constitution forbids state institutions from employing racial quotas.  Having been involved in hiring at Mizzou for a number of years, I can assure that we bend over backward to fill open positions with qualified minority applicants. It is highly unlikely that Concerned Student 1950’s demand that the percentage of black faculty and staff at Mizzou be raised to 10% by 2017-18 can be implemented in a manner consistent with constitutional obligations.  You should know that.

Third–Free speech means more than the freedom to express views with which you agree.  I honestly think most Mizzou students understand this point, but I’m afraid that the administrator and communications professor in this video don’t grasp it.  Lest you be misled by their ill-advised bullying, you should know that the First Amendment is for everyone.

Fourth–Unreasonable demands have consequences.  We will survive this, but Mizzou has been badly weakened.  I can’t imagine that the press accounts from the last week will help with minority student and faculty recruitment next year.  That’s a shame, because based on my encounters with a great many minority students and professors at Mizzou over the past twelve years, I believe most have had good experiences.  Perhaps they haven’t been honest with me.  Or perhaps the situation has changed in the last couple of years.  If so, I’m terribly sorry to hear that. But, following the events of the last week, I can’t imagine that next year will be better.

Fifth–Regardless of your take on the events of the last week, I hope you will not let bitterness reign in your hearts.  Unlike many of my gay friends from conservative religious backgrounds, I chose years ago not to write off those people who were once unkind to me.  I’m glad I made that choice.  I hope any Mizzou student who is currently feeling marginalized for any reason will keep calm, carry on, give others the benefit of the doubt, and be open to reconciliation.

So, Mizzou students, I support you.  But I will not coddle you.  You’re adults and should be treated as such.


Last July, the Eastern District of Virginia upheld the cancellation of various trademarks of the Washington Redskins on the grounds that the marks were disparaging to Native Americans. I am neither a fan of football, nor of offensive names for sports teams–what I am is a fan of free speech. Although the Redskins may be well advised to change their team name, interfering with both the team’s right to free speech as well as its property right in the registered mark is the wrong way–both legally and in principle–to achieve socially desirable ends.

Various theories have been advanced, but the really interesting part of the dispute–a topic upon which I published a paper this year–is the likelihood that the Lanham Act’s prohibition of immoral, scandalous, or disparaging marks runs afoul of the First Amendment. I was cheered to see this week that the First Amendment Lawyers Association filed an amicus brief largely along the lines of my paper. However, there were a couple of points that I still feel deserve more attention when thinking about the § 2(a) (the Lanham Act’s so-called “morality clauses”).

Trademarks Are Not License Plates

The district court tried to sidestep the First Amendment issue by declaring that the trademarks themselves are not at issue, but merely the right to register the trademarks. To reach its result, the court relied on the recent Walker case wherein the Supreme Court declared that Texas was at liberty to prevent Confederate flags from appearing on its license plates, since license plates could be considered the speech of the government.

However, there is an important distinction between license plates and trademarks. License plates are a good totally of government manufacture. One cannot drive a car on a public road without applying to the government for permission and affixing a government registration tag on the vehicle. The plate is not a blank slate upon which one may express one’s self, but is a state-issued information placard used for law enforcement purposes.

Trademarks, arising as they do from actual use, preexist federal recognition. The Lanham Act merely provides a mechanism for registering trademarks that happen to be used in interstate commerce. The federal government then chooses to recognize that trademark when contested or offered for registration.

This is a major distinction: the social field of trademarks already exists – the federal government has chosen to regulate and provide an enforcement mechanism for these property rights and speech acts when used in interstate commerce. Thus it is the market for trademarks that constitutes the forum, and not the physically recorded government register. Given that the government has interfered in a preexisting market in a way in which it protects some state-created trademark property rights, but not others, is it proper to regulate speech by virtue of its content? I think not.

Further, license plates are obviously government property to anyone who looks at them. Plates bear the very name of the state directly on their face. The system of trademark registration is a largely invisible process that only becomes relevant during legal proceedings. When the public looks at a given trademark I would argue that the state’s imprimatur is certainly one of the last things of which they would think.

Thus, a restriction on “immoral” or “disparaging” trademarks constitutes viewpoint discrimination. Eugene Volokh echoed this sentiment when he wrote on the refusal to register “Stop the Islamisation of America”:

Trademark registration … is a government benefit program open to a wide array of speakers with little quality judgment. Like other such programs … it should be seen as a form of “limited public forum,” in which the government may impose content-based limits but not viewpoint-based ones. An exclusion of marks that disparage groups while allowing marks that praise those groups strikes me as viewpoint discrimination.

The Lanham Act endows registrants with government-guaranteed legal rights in connection with the words and symbols by which they are recognized in society. Particularly in a globalized, interconnected society, the brand of an entity is a significant component of how it speaks to society. Discriminating against marks as “immoral” or “disparaging” can be nothing short of viewpoint discrimination.

Commercial Speech Is Protected Speech

As everyone is well aware, the First Amendment provides broad protection for a wide spectrum of speech. The definition of speech itself is likewise broad, including not only words, but also non-verbal gestures and symbols. Any governmental curtailing of such speech will be “presumptively invalid,” with the burden of rebutting that presumption on the government.

When speech is undertaken as part of commerce it does not magically lose any political, social or religious dimension it had when in a noncommercial context. Cartoons issued bearing the image of the Prophet as part of a commercial magazine are surely a political statement deserving of protection. The situation is the same if an organization adopts a logo that is derisive to a particular political or religious ideology – that publication is making a protected, expressive statement through its branding.

At first glance, one might think that defenders of § 2(a) would attempt to qualify scandalous and immoral trademarks as “obscene” and thereby render them subject to censorship. But, in McGinley the Federal Circuit explicitly refused to apply the obscenity standards from the Supreme Court to §2(a) on the grounds that the Lanham Act does not itself use the word “obscenity.” Instead, the Federal Circuit, following the TTAB, was of the opinion that “[w]hat is denied are the benefits provided by the Lanham Act which enhance the value of a mark” and that the appellant still had legal recourse under state common law. Therefore, so the court in McGinley reasoned, since the right to use the mark is not actually abridged, no expression is abridged. And this is the primary basis upon which the district court in Pro-Football built its argument that no First Amendment concerns were implicated in canceling the Redskins trademark.

This of course willfully ignores once again the notion that in intervening in the field of trademarks, and in favoring certain speakers over others, courts effectively allows the Lanham Act to amplify preferred speech and burden disfavored speech. This is true whether or not we classify the trademark right as a bundle of procedural rights (which in turn make speech competitively possible) or as pure speech directly.

That said, it’s much more in keeping with the tradition of the First Amendment to understand trademarks as a protected category of commercial speech. The Supreme Court has noted that otherwise commercial information may at times be more urgent than even political dialog, and that information relating to a financial incentive was not necessarily commercial for First Amendment purposes. “[S]ignificant societal interests are served by such speech.” This is so because even entirely commercial speech “may often carry information of import to significant issues of the day.”

Even were commercial speech not fully protected–as I believe it to be–the Supreme Court has also recognized that commercial speech may be so intertwined with noncommercial speech so as to make them inseparable for First Amendment purposes. In particular, commercial messages do more than merely provide information about the characteristics of goods and services:

[S]olicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.

The analogy to trademarks is rather clear in this context. Although trademarks may refer to a particular product or service, that product or service is not of necessity a purely commercial object. Further, even if the product or service is a commercial object, the trademark itself can be, or can become, a symbolic referent and not a mere sales pitch. Consider, for instance, Mickey Mouse. The iconic mouse ears certainly represent a vast commercial empire generally, and specifically operate as a functional trademark for Mickey Mouse cartoons and merchandise. However, is there not much more of cultural significance to the mark than mere commercial value? The mouse ears represent something culturally – about childhood, about America, and about art – that is much more than merely a piece of pricing or quality information.

The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Prevents Trading Rights for Privileges

The district court (and Federal Circuit, for that matter) have missed a very important dimension in summarily dismissing First Amendment concerns of trademark holders. These courts dismiss owners of “immoral” or “disparaging” trademarks on the belief that no actual harm is done – the mark holders still own the mark, and, as far as the court is concerned, no speech has been suppressed. However, trademark registration, in addition to providing a forum in which to speak, also provides real procedural benefits for the mark holder. For instance, businesses and individuals enjoy a nationwide recognition of their presence and can vindicate their interests in federal courts. Without the federal registration that is presumptively supplied to marks that are not “immoral” or “scandalous,” an individual can find himself attempting to protect his interests in a mark in the courts of every state in which he does business.

However, under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine even though the benefits of trademark registration are not constitutionally guaranteed rights, those benefits cannot be offered in exchange for a trademark owner’s loss of actually guaranteed rights. Thus, the tight link between trademark registration and First Amendment protections that the courts just keep ignoring.

Its also worth noting that this doctrine did not emerge in constitutional jurisprudence until after the period in which the Lanham Act was drafted. Instead, the Lanham Act era was characterized by the rights-privileges distinction–made famous by then Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Oliver Wendell Holmes. In McAuliffe, a police officer sued for reinstatement after he was dismissed for his participation in a political organization. In dismissing the case, Chief Justice Holmes held that “[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” This quote from Holmes captures precisely the sense in which the Federal Circuit dismisses the First Amendment concerns of mark holders. 

In contrast to this rather antiquated view, the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the proposition that “the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.” Although this principle contains exceptions, it has been applied to a wide variety of situations including refusal to renew teaching contracts over First Amendment-protected speech acts, and infringement of the right to travel by refusing to adequately extend healthcare benefits to sick persons who had not been residents of a county for at least a year.

Basically, the best defense one can offer for § 2(a) is rooted in an outmoded view of the First Amendment that is, to put it mildly, unconstitutional. We don’t shut down speakers who offend us (at least for the time being), and we should stop attacking trademarks that we find to be immoral.

Thanks to the Truth on the Market bloggers for having me. I’m a long-time fan of the blog, and excited to be contributing.

The Third Circuit will soon review the appeal of generic drug manufacturer, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, in the latest case involving “product hopping” in the pharmaceutical industry — Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Warner Chilcott.

Product hopping occurs when brand pharmaceutical companies shift their marketing efforts from an older version of a drug to a new, substitute drug in order to stave off competition from cheaper generics. This business strategy is the predictable business response to the incentives created by the arduous FDA approval process, patent law, and state automatic substitution laws. It costs brand companies an average of $2.6 billion to bring a new drug to market, but only 20 percent of marketed brand drugs ever earn enough to recoup these costs. Moreover, once their patent exclusivity period is over, brand companies face the likely loss of 80-90 percent of their sales to generic versions of the drug under state substitution laws that allow or require pharmacists to automatically substitute a generic-equivalent drug when a patient presents a prescription for a brand drug. Because generics are automatically substituted for brand prescriptions, generic companies typically spend very little on advertising, instead choosing to free ride on the marketing efforts of brand companies. Rather than hand over a large chunk of their sales to generic competitors, brand companies often decide to shift their marketing efforts from an existing drug to a new drug with no generic substitutes.

Generic company Mylan is appealing U.S. District Judge Paul S. Diamond’s April decision to grant defendant and brand company Warner Chilcott’s summary judgment motion. Mylan and other generic manufacturers contend that Defendants engaged in a strategy to impede generic competition for branded Doryx (an acne medication) by executing several product redesigns and ceasing promotion of prior formulations. Although the plaintiffs generally changed their products to keep up with the brand-drug redesigns, they contend that these redesigns were intended to circumvent automatic substitution laws, at least for the periods of time before the generic companies could introduce a substitute to new brand drug formulations. The plaintiffs argue that product redesigns that prevent generic manufacturers from benefitting from automatic substitution laws violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Product redesign is not per se anticompetitive. Retiring an older branded version of a drug does not block generics from competing; they are still able to launch and market their own products. Product redesign only makes competition tougher because generics can no longer free ride on automatic substitution laws; instead they must either engage in their own marketing efforts or redesign their product to match the brand drug’s changes. Moreover, product redesign does not affect a primary source of generics’ customers—beneficiaries that are channeled to cheaper generic drugs by drug plans and pharmacy benefit managers.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that “the antitrust laws…were enacted for the protection of competition not competitors” and that even monopolists have no duty to help a competitor. The district court in Mylan generally agreed with this reasoning, concluding that the brand company Defendants did not exclude Mylan and other generics from competition: “Throughout this period, doctors remained free to prescribe generic Doryx; pharmacists remained free to substitute generics when medically appropriate; and patients remained free to ask their doctors and pharmacists for generic versions of the drug.” Instead, the court argued that Mylan was a “victim of its own business strategy”—a strategy that relied on free-riding off brand companies’ marketing efforts rather than spending any of their own money on marketing. The court reasoned that automatic substitution laws provide a regulatory “bonus” and denying Mylan the opportunity to take advantage of that bonus is not anticompetitive.

Product redesign should only give rise to anticompetitive claims if combined with some other wrongful conduct, or if the new product is clearly a “sham” innovation. Indeed, Senior Judge Douglas Ginsburg and then-FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright recently came out against imposing competition law sanctions on product redesigns that are not sham innovations. If lawmakers are concerned that product redesigns will reduce generic usage and the cost savings they create, they could follow the lead of several states that have broadened automatic substitution laws to allow the substitution of generics that are therapeutically-equivalent but not identical in other ways, such as dosage form or drug strength.

Mylan is now asking the Third Circuit to reexamine the case. If the Third Circuit reverses the lower courts decision, it would imply that brand drug companies have a duty to continue selling superseded drugs in order to allow generic competitors to take advantage of automatic substitution laws. If the Third Circuit upholds the district court’s ruling on summary judgment, it will likely create a circuit split between the Second and Third Circuits. In July 2015, the Second Circuit court upheld an injunction in NY v. Actavis that required a brand company to continue manufacturing and selling an obsolete drug until after generic competitors had an opportunity to launch their generic versions and capture a significant portion of the market through automatic substitution laws. I’ve previously written about the duty created in this case.

Regardless of whether the Third Circuit’s decision causes a split, the Supreme Court should take up the issue of product redesign in pharmaceuticals to provide guidance to brand manufacturers that currently operate in a world of uncertainty and under the constant threat of litigation for decisions they make when introducing new products.

shepherd-joannaTruth on the Market is delighted to welcome our newest blogger, Joanna Shepherd. Joanna is a Professor of Law at Emory School of Law and holds an adjunct position in the Emory Economics Department (where she also earned her PhD). At the law school she teaches Torts, Law and Economics, Analytical Methods for Lawyers, and Legal and Economic Issues in Health Policy. She also frequently teaches economics courses to law professors and federal and state judges.

Joanna is also a senior scholar at the International Center for Law and Economics.

Joanna’s research focuses on various law & econ topics. Her recent research has examined issues related to the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries, tort reform, litigation practice, and judicial behavior. Her works has appeared in the Michigan Law Review, Vanderbilt Law Review, Southern California Law Review, New York University Law ReviewDuke Law JournalUCLA Law Review, The Journal of Legal Studies, The Journal of Law & Economics, The American Law & Economics Review, Health Matrix, and The American Journal of Law & Medicine, among others. Joanna is also an author of the textbook, Economic Analysis for Lawyers, with Henry Butler and Christopher Drahozal. Her research has been discussed in numerous newspapers, including the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, and has been cited by several courts including the Supreme Court.

You can find links to Joanna’s scholarship on her SSRN page.

Welcome Joanna!

One baleful aspect of U.S. antitrust enforcers’ current (and misguided) focus on the unilateral exercise of patent rights is an attack on the ability of standard essential patent (SEP) holders to obtain a return that incentivizes them to participate in collective standard setting.  (This philosophy is manifested, for example, in a relatively recent U.S. Justice Department “business review letter” that lends support to the devaluation of SEPs.)  Enforcers accept the view that FRAND royalty rates should compensate licensees only for the value of the incremental difference between the first- and second-best technologies in a hypothetical ex ante competition among patent holders to have their patented technologies included in a proposed standard – a methodology that yields relatively low royalty rates (tending toward zero when the first- and second-best technologies are very close substitutes).  Tied to this perspective is enforcers’ concern with higher royalty rates as reflecting unearned “hold-up value” due to the “lock in” effects of a standard (the premium implementers are willing to pay patent holders whose technologies are needed to practice an established standard).  As a result, strategies by which SEP holders unilaterally seek to maximize returns to their SEP-germane intellectual property, such as threatening lawsuits seeking injunctions for patent infringement, are viewed askance.

The ex ante “incremental value” approach, far from being economically optimal, is inherently flawed.  It is at odds with elementary economic logic, which indicates that “ratcheting down” returns to SEPs in line with an “ex ante competition among technologies” model will lower incentives to invest in patented technologies offered up for consideration by SSOs in a standard- setting exercise.  That disincentive effect will in turn diminish the quality of patents that end up as SEPs – thereby reducing the magnitude of the welfare benefits stemming from standards.  In fact, the notion that FRAND principles should be applied in a manner that guarantees minimal returns to patent holders is inherently at odds with the justification for establishing a patent system in the first place.  That is because the patent system is designed to generously reward large-scale dynamic gains that stem from innovation, while the niggardly “incremental value” yardstick is a narrow static welfare measure that ignores incentive effects (much as the “marginal cost pricing” ideal of neoclassical price theory is inconsistent with Austrian and other dynamic perspectives on marketplace interactions).

Recently, lawyer-economist Greg Sidak outlined an approach to SEP FRAND-based pricing that is far more in line with economic reality – one based on golf tournament prizes.  In a paper to be delivered at the November 5 2015 “Patents in Telecoms” Conference at George Washington University, Sidak explains that collective standard-setting through a standard-setting organization (SSO) is analogous to establishing and running a professional golf tournament.  Like golf tournament organizers, SSOs may be expected to award a substantial prize to the winner that reflects a significant spread between the winner and the runner-up, in order to maximize the benefits flowing from their enterprise.  Relevant excerpts from Sidak’s draft paper (with footnotes omitted and hyperlink added) follow:

“If an inventor could receive only a pittance for his investment in developing his technology and in contributing it to a standard, he would cease contributing proprietary technologies to collective standards and instead pursue more profitable outside options.  That reasoning is even more compelling if the inventor is a publicly traded firm, answerable to its shareholders.  Therefore, modeling standard setting as a static Bertrand pricing game [reflected in the incremental value approach] without any differentiation among the competing technologies and without any outside option for the inventors would predict that every inventor loses—that is, no inventor could possibly recoup his investment in innovation and therefore would quickly exit the market.  Standard setting would be a sucker’s game for inventors.  . . .

[J]ust as the organizer of a golf tournament seeks to ensure that all contestants exert maximum effort to win the tournament, so as to ensure a competitive and entertaining tournament, the SSO must give each participant the incentive to offer the SSO its best technologies. . . .

The rivalrous process—the tournament—by which an SSO identifies and then adopts a particular technology for the standard incidentally produces something else of profound value, something which the economists who invoke static Bertrand competition to model a FRAND royalty manage to obscure.  The high level of inventor participation that a standard-setting tournament is able to elicit by virtue of its payoff structure reveals valuable information about both the inventors and the technologies that might make subsequent rounds of innovation far more socially productive (for example, by identifying dead ends that future inventors need not invest time and money in exploring).  In contrast, the alternative portrayal of standard setting as static Bertrand competition among technologies leads . . . to the dismal prediction that standard setting is essentially a lottery.  The alternative technologies are assumed to be unlimited in number and undifferentiated in quality.  All are equally mediocre. If the standard were instead a motion picture and the competing inventions were instead actors, there would be no movie stars—only extras from central casting, all equally suitable to play the leading role.  In short, a model of competition for adoption of a technology into the standard that, in practical effect, randomly selects its winner and therefore does not aggregate and reveal information is a model that ignores what Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek long ago argued is the quintessential virtue of a market mechanism.

The economic literature finds that a tournament is efficient when the cost of measuring the absolute output of each participant sufficiently exceeds the cost of measuring the relative output of each participant compared with the other participants.  That condition obtains in the context of SEPs and SSOs.  Measuring the actual output or value of each competing technology for a standard is notoriously difficult.  However, it is much easier to ascertain the relative value of each technology.  SEP holders and implementers routinely make these ordinal comparisons in FRAND royalty disputes. Given the similarities between tournaments and collective standard setting, and the fact that it is far easier to measure the relative value of an SEP than its absolute value, it is productive to analyze the standard-setting process as if it were a tournament. . . .

[I]n addition to guaranteeing participation, the prize structure must provide a sufficient incentive to encourage participants to exert a high level of effort.  In a standard setting context, a “high level of effort” means investing significant capital and other resources to develop new technologies that have commercial value.  The economic literature . . . suggests that the level of effort that a participant exerts depends on the spread, or difference, between the prize for winning the tournament and the next-best prize.  Furthermore, . . . ‘as the spread increases, the incentive to devote additional resources to improving one’s probability of winning increases.’  That result implies that the first-place prize must exceed the second-place prize and that, the greater the disparity between those two prizes, the greater the incentive that participants have to invest in developing new and innovative technologies.”

Sidak’s latest insights are in line with the former bipartisan U.S. antitrust consensus (expressed in the 1995 U.S. Justice Department – Federal Trade Commission IP-Antitrust Guidelines) that antitrust enforcers should focus on targeting schemes that reduce competition among patented technologies, and not challenge unilateral efforts by patentees to maximize returns to their legally-protected property right.  U.S. antitrust enforcers (and their foreign counterparts) would be well-advised to readopt that consensus and abandon efforts to limit returns to SEPs – an approach that is inimical to innovation and to welfare-enhancing dynamic competition in technology markets.