Showing archive for: “Market for Corporate Control”
How a Bad Presumption Became Too Useful to Kill
The Philadelphia National Bank (PNB) presumption refuses to die. Long criticized and widely viewed as bad policy, it survives today in slightly attenuated form, and there is no sign that Trump-appointed antitrust enforcers plan to bury it. If anything, the 2023 Merger Guidelines, still in force, double down on the presumption more than their predecessors. ... How a Bad Presumption Became Too Useful to Kill
Broadband Deployment, Pole Attachments, & the Competition Economics of Rural-Electric Co-ops
In our recent issue brief, Geoffrey Manne, Kristian Stout, and I considered the antitrust economics of state-owned enterprises—specifically the local power companies (LPCs) that are government-owned under the authority of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). While we noted that electricity cooperatives (co-ops) do not receive antitrust immunities and could therefore be subject to antitrust enforcement, we ... Broadband Deployment, Pole Attachments, & the Competition Economics of Rural-Electric Co-ops
The Internationalization of Due Process, Federal Antitrust Enforcement, and the Rule of Law
The acceptance and implementation of due-process standards confer a variety of welfare benefits on society. As Christopher Yoo, Thomas Fetzer, Shan Jiang, and Yong Huang explain, strong procedural due-process protections promote: (1) compliance with basic norms of impartiality; (2) greater accuracy of decisions; (3) stronger economic growth; (4) increased respect for government; (5) better compliance ... The Internationalization of Due Process, Federal Antitrust Enforcement, and the Rule of Law
FTC-DOJ RFI on Merger Guidelines: The Agencies Should Proceed with Caution
The Jan. 18 Request for Information on Merger Enforcement (RFI)—issued jointly by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ)—sets forth 91 sets of questions (subsumed under 15 headings) that provide ample opportunity for public comment on a large range of topics. Before chasing down individual analytic rabbit holes related to specific ... FTC-DOJ RFI on Merger Guidelines: The Agencies Should Proceed with Caution
10 Things the American Innovation and Choice Online Act Gets Wrong
The Senate Judiciary Committee is set to debate S. 2992, the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (or AICOA) during a markup session Thursday. If passed into law, the bill would force online platforms to treat rivals’ services as they would their own, while ensuring their platforms interoperate seamlessly. The bill marks the culmination of ... 10 Things the American Innovation and Choice Online Act Gets Wrong
FTC Moves Closer Toward Ex Ante Merger Regulation
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has taken another step away from case-specific evaluation of proposed mergers and toward an ex ante regulatory approach in its Oct. 25 “Statement of the Commission on Use of Prior Approval Provisions in Merger Orders.” Though not unexpected, this unfortunate initiative once again manifests the current FTC leadership’s disdain for ... FTC Moves Closer Toward Ex Ante Merger Regulation
Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
In recent years, a growing chorus of voices has argued that existing merger rules fail to apprehend competitively significant mergers, either because they fall below existing merger-filing thresholds or because they affect innovation in ways that are purportedly ignored. These fears are particularly acute in the pharmaceutical and tech industries, where several high-profile academic articles ... Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
Let’s (NOT) Stop All the Mergers: The Case for Letting the Agencies Do Their Jobs
Never let a crisis go to waste, or so they say. In the past two weeks, some of the same people who sought to stop mergers and acquisitions during the bull market took the opportunity of the COVID-19 pandemic and the new bear market to call to ban M&A. On Friday, April 24th, Rep. David ... Let’s (NOT) Stop All the Mergers: The Case for Letting the Agencies Do Their Jobs
The Covidien/Newport Merger: Killer Acquisition or Just a Killer Story?
[TOTM: The following is part of a blog series by TOTM guests and authors on the law, economics, and policy of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Geoffrey A. Manne, (President, ICLE; Distinguished Fellow, Northwestern University Center on Law, Business, and Economics); and Dirk Auer, (Senior Fellow ... The Covidien/Newport Merger: Killer Acquisition or Just a Killer Story?
Correcting the Federalist Society Review’s Mischaracterization of How to Regulate
Ours is not an age of nuance. It’s an age of tribalism, of teams—“Yer either fer us or agin’ us!” Perhaps I should have been less surprised, then, when I read the unfavorable review of my book How to Regulate in, of all places, the Federalist Society Review. I had expected some positive feedback from ... Correcting the Federalist Society Review’s Mischaracterization of How to Regulate
What’s hip (in antitrust) today should stay passé: Henry G. Manne on “hipster antitrust”
Today would have been Henry Manne’s 90th birthday. When he passed away in 2015 he left behind an immense and impressive legacy. In 1991, at the inaugural meeting of the American Law & Economics Association (ALEA), Manne was named a Life Member of ALEA and, along with Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase, and federal appeals court ... What’s hip (in antitrust) today should stay passé: Henry G. Manne on “hipster antitrust”
FTC Economists’ Paper Discredits Claims of Inappropriately “Weak” Merger Enforcement
During 2016 it became fashionable in certain circles to decry “lax” merger enforcement and to call for a more aggressive merger enforcement policy (see, for example, the American Antitrust Institute’s September 2016 paper on competition policy, critiqued by me in this blog post). Interventionists promoting “tougher” merger enforcement have cited Professor John Kwoka’s 2015 book, ... FTC Economists’ Paper Discredits Claims of Inappropriately “Weak” Merger Enforcement
