Showing archive for: “EU”
Privacy and Security Risks of Interoperability and Sideloading Mandates
There has been a wave of legislative proposals on both sides of the Atlantic that purport to improve consumer choice and the competitiveness of digital markets. In a new working paper published by the Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum, I analyzed five such bills: the EU Digital Services Act, the EU Digital Markets Act, and ... Privacy and Security Risks of Interoperability and Sideloading Mandates
App Stores as Public Utilities?
In a new paper, Giuseppe Colangelo and Oscar Borgogno investigate whether antitrust policy is sufficiently flexible to keep up with the dynamics of digital app stores, and whether regulatory interventions are required in order to address their unique features. The authors summarize their findings in this blog post. App stores are at the forefront of ... App Stores as Public Utilities?
Amazon Italy’s Efficiency Offense
Early last month, the Italian competition authority issued a record 1.128 billion euro fine against Amazon for abuse of dominance under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In its order, the Agenzia Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM) essentially argues that Amazon has combined its Amazon.it marketplace ... Amazon Italy’s Efficiency Offense
Merger Control’s Misaligned Incentives
Antitrust policymakers around the world have taken a page out of the Silicon Valley playbook and decided to “move fast and break things.” While the slogan is certainly catchy, applying it to the policymaking world is unfortunate and, ultimately, threatens to harm consumers. Several antitrust authorities in recent months have announced their intention to block ... Merger Control’s Misaligned Incentives
Italy’s Google and Apple Decisions: Regulatory Paternalism and Overenforcement
The Autorità Garante della Concorenza e del Mercato (AGCM), Italy’s competition and consumer-protection watchdog, on Nov. 25 handed down fines against Google and Apple of €10 million each—the maximum penalty contemplated by the law—for alleged unfair commercial practices. Ultimately, the two decisions stand as textbook examples of why regulators should, wherever possible, strongly defer to ... Italy’s Google and Apple Decisions: Regulatory Paternalism and Overenforcement
Oldie-but-Baddie: The Revival of an Antitrust ‘Efficiencies Offense’?
Recent antitrust forays on both sides of the Atlantic have unfortunate echoes of the oldie-but-baddie “efficiencies offense” that once plagued American and European merger analysis (and, more broadly, reflected a “big is bad” theory of antitrust). After a very short overview of the history of merger efficiencies analysis under American and European competition law, we ... Oldie-but-Baddie: The Revival of an Antitrust ‘Efficiencies Offense’?
Mandatory Interoperability Is Not a ‘Super Tool’ for Platform Competition
On both sides of the Atlantic, 2021 has seen legislative and regulatory proposals to mandate that various digital services be made interoperable with others. Several bills to do so have been proposed in Congress; the EU’s proposed Digital Markets Act would mandate interoperability in certain contexts for “gatekeeper” platforms; and the UK’s competition regulator will ... Mandatory Interoperability Is Not a ‘Super Tool’ for Platform Competition
Case closed: Google wins (for now)
The European Commission and its supporters were quick to claim victory following last week’s long-awaited General Court of the European Union ruling in the Google Shopping case. It’s hard to fault them. The judgment is ostensibly an unmitigated win for the Commission, with the court upholding nearly every aspect of its decision. However, the broader ... Case closed: Google wins (for now)
Judge Ginsburg: On the Proposed Digital Markets Unit and the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority
Thank you, Victoria, for the invitation to respond to Mr. Coscelli and his proposal for a legislatively founded Digital Markets Unit. Mr. Coscelli is one of the most talented, successful, and creative heads a competition agency has ever had. In the case of the DMU [ed., Digital Markets Unit], however, I think he has let ... Judge Ginsburg: On the Proposed Digital Markets Unit and the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority
Consumer Welfare-Based Antitrust Enforcement is the Superior Means to Deal with Large Digital-Platform Competition Issues
There has been a rapid proliferation of proposals in recent years to closely regulate competition among large digital platforms. The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA, which will become effective in 2023) imposes a variety of data-use, interoperability, and non-self-preferencing obligations on digital “gatekeeper” firms. A host of other regulatory schemes are being considered in ... Consumer Welfare-Based Antitrust Enforcement is the Superior Means to Deal with Large Digital-Platform Competition Issues
The Contestable Platform Paradox
Why do digital industries routinely lead to one company having a very large share of the market (at least if one defines markets narrowly)? To anyone familiar with competition policy discussions, the answer might seem obvious: network effects, scale-related economies, and other barriers to entry lead to winner-take-all dynamics in platform industries. Accordingly, it is ... The Contestable Platform Paradox
5 Thoughts on the Senate’s Proposed Platform Self-Preferencing Ban
A bipartisan group of senators unveiled legislation today that would dramatically curtail the ability of online platforms to “self-preference” their own services—for example, when Apple pre-installs its own Weather or Podcasts apps on the iPhone, giving it an advantage that independent apps don’t have. The measure accompanies a House bill that included similar provisions, with ... 5 Thoughts on the Senate’s Proposed Platform Self-Preferencing Ban
