Europe is experiencing a bout of geopolitical vertigo. With Donald Trump having once again floated the purchase of Greenland and threatened tariffs against his European allies, the transatlantic relationship looks more fragile than at any point in recent memory. NATO may yet survive the strain, but hoping for a return to predictability is no longer a strategy. European leaders must plan for a world in which American politics remains volatile.
The instinctive response across Europe has largely been to turn inward. From fierce resistance to the Mercosur trade agreement to growing calls for “tech sovereignty” and “defense autonomy”, the prevailing reflex is decoupling: less reliance on the United States, fewer global supply chains, more state-backed substitutes. If Washington is unreliable, the argument runs, Europe should build its own clouds, satellites, and defense systems behind protective walls.
This instinct is understandable. It is also misguided.
Europe should pursue policies that foster innovation, resilience, and growth. But trying to insulate itself from American unpredictability by force-feeding industrial champions into existence risks repeating the familiar mistake of confusing political ambition with economic viability. Spending public money to mimic technologies that already exist, often at higher cost and lower quality, does not build strength; it is a self-imposed disadvantage.
Consider the push to replace SpaceX’s Starlink with a publicly backed European satellite constellation, or to mandate the use of a “sovereign cloud” regardless of its performance. These efforts would ask European firms and consumers to pay more for inferior services in the name of autonomy.
The economic cost is real. As Nobel laureate William Nordhaus showed, innovators capture only a small fraction of the value their technologies create. The rest flows to users. When Europe adopts American technologies, it captures that surplus for free. Blocking or penalizing those technologies in the name of sovereignty means willingly giving up productivity gains that European firms and households would otherwise enjoy.
The push toward economic autarky also rests on two deeper misunderstandings.
First, autonomy is largely illusory in 2026. Modern technology rests on global supply chains that no single bloc can replicate end to end. America’s flagship defense systems rely on components and materials sourced across continents. Europe, for its part, dominates key choke points such as advanced semiconductor lithography. There is no purely European tech or defense stack, just as there is no purely American one. Attempts to pretend otherwise will increase costs without eliminating dependencies.
Second, European policymakers misread where power actually lies. Too often, leverage is treated as a function of corporate headquarters. If Google, Apple, or NVIDIA are American, the thinking goes, Europe must create its own champions to regain control.
But headquarters can move. Market gravity cannot.
The United States exerts influence because it remains the world’s consumer of first resort. Access to American demand underwrites global innovation. Novo Nordisk, the Danish maker of semaglutide, earns roughly 60% of its revenue in the United States. The same logic applies across other technology and advanced manufacturing sectors. Strip away the expectation of American consumption and much of the business case for large-scale innovation collapses.
This raises an uncomfortable question for Europe: what would European innovation look like—whether in tech, biotech, or clean energy—without the promise of U.S. customers? Would fewer products be developed? Would firms scale more slowly? Would capital flow elsewhere? The answers should give pause to anyone who treats decoupling as cost-free.
When politicians lament the absence of European tech giants, they mistake symptoms for causes. The problem is not a lack of subsidies or ambition. It is an economic environment that struggles to generate and scale high-growth firms organically. Trying to manufacture champions through protectionism does not fix that engine. It strains it further.
Worse, a transatlantic decoupling would mainly benefit a narrow class of rent seekers on both sides of the Atlantic: firms shielded from competition, lobbying for barriers that allow them to extract supracompetitive profits while innovation slows and consumers pay more. Europe would lose access to cutting-edge technologies and export markets. The United States would lose high-value European goods.
The alternative is neither submission nor isolation. It is growth.
Europe already has a blueprint. The Draghi Report rightly emphasizes cutting red tape, completing the Capital Markets Union, lowering energy costs, and unlocking private investment. But trade deserves equal prominence. The Mercosur agreement offers a clearer counterpoint to the politics of fear than any industrial subsidy program. It expands markets, deepens specialization, and reinforces the logic of comparative advantage that has underpinned European prosperity for decades.
Security does not come from cloning yesterday’s American successes behind protective walls. It comes from being indispensable to global growth. A richer, more dynamic Europe will command influence, fund its defense, and shape standards far more effectively than one that retreats into managed decline.
Prosperity, not protectionism, is Europe’s real strategic asset.

