Matt Bodie’s “Canons” project continues over at Prawfs, and antitrust is up to bat.Â I took a stab at a reading list which I believe meet’s Matt’s criteria: articles that are essential to doing antitrust scholarship.Â My long, but embarrassingly underinclusive list, is below the fold.Â In particular, I have left out a good deal of more technical economics scholarship (though some appears on the list): the literature on merger simulation, post-Chicago models on specific vertical practices, nothing on immunities or exemptions, federalism, etc.Â But it’s a start.Â By the way, Andrew Gavil’s Antitrust Anthology is an excellent collection of classic antitrust scholarship.Â Please feel free to add your own entries over at Prawfs!Â But here’s what I’ve got so far…
Jonathan Baker, Competitive Price Discrimination: The Exercise of Market Power Without Anticompetitive Effects (Comment on Klein and Wiley), 70 Antitrust LJ 643 (2003).
William Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 JL Econ 247 (May 1985).
Robert Bork, Legislative History and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. Econ. 7 (1966).
Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (1978).
Ward Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L. J. 19 (1957).
Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal-Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided, 68 Antitrust L.J. 659, 680 (2001).
Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief about Monopoly, in Industrial Concentration: The New Learning 164 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974).
Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
Frank Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,” 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1981).
Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 941 (2002).
Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253 (2003).
Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory – And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale LJ 681 (2003).
Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 18 Antitrust Bulletin 45 (1973).
Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Raising Rivals’ Costs: The Standard Oil Case, 39 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1996).
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213 (1985).
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise (2005).
Keith Hylton and Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision Theoretic Approach, 69 Antitrust Law Journal 469 (2001).
Louis Kaplow, Extensions of Monopoly Power Through Leverage 85 Colum. L. Rev. 515 (1985).
Roy Kenney and Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J. Law & Economics 497 (1983).
Benjamin Klein and John Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 Antitrust LJ 599 (2003).
Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Franchise Cases in the Wake of Kodak: Applying Post-Contract Hold-Up Analysis to Vertical Relationships, 67 Antitrust L. J. 283 (1999).
Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J. L. & Econ. 265 (1988).
Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J. Corp. Finance 9 (1995).
Thomas Krattenmaker & Steve Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale LJ (1986).
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings LJ 67 (1982).
William Landes & Richard Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1981).
Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 JL Econ. 1 (1982).
John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 JL Econ 137 (1958).
Alan Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 553 (2004).
Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 Geo. L. Rev. 487 (1983).
Richard Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6 (1981).
Richard Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1562 (1969).
Richard Posner, Antitrust Law (2d ed.).
Steven Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 Antitrust LJ 311 (2006).
Steven Salop and David T. Scheffman, “Raising Rivals’ Costs,” 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 267 (1983).
Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 53 Antitrust LJ 483 (1995).
George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. (1964).
George J. Stigler, The Economic Effect of the Antitrust Laws, 9 JL Econ 225 (1966).
Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade, 3 JL Econ 86 (1960).
Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655 (1962).
Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 837 (1990).
Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975).
Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 American Economic Review 18 (March 1968).